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Introduction:

--~ -

Orisis.

1940

Indochina

-

~

~

--

In 1867 France had conquered two countries of southeastern Asia, Cambodia and Viet-name
under the authority

That year, she placed them

of a Governor General, and named the whole

territory French Indochina.

To this possession,

the French

added, in 1893, a third country, Laos, after a long struggle
with Thailand.
Moreover,

1
after the occupation

had intentionally

ot Viet-nam, the French

divided this country in three administrative

units and gave to each one of them a name, referring to north
Viet·nam

as Tonkin, to ce11tral Viet-aam as Annam, and tosou.th

Viet-nam

as Oochlnchina.

Consequently,

~

in history and geography text-books,

was s~lid that French Indochina

consisted of five distinct

regions: Tonkin, A·nnam, Cochinchina,
though Viet-nam
Cochinchina

------1. Andre

Cambodia and Laos, as

d1d not exist, afid tha~ Tonkin, Annam and

were separated

According

it

cou~trie8.3

to this artificial make-up, French Indochina

Masson.Bistoire de ItIndochina Francalse,p.96
2. Tran-du.c-~hao,...
:;lI'Les
RelatIons Fr·aneo-Vletnamlennes" t
~
!gmps Modemes', XVIll, March. 19"7,p.1059,no1ie 1 •
• See,?orexample,Canada
Department of Mines and Technical Sur~eys,.Indochina.J'
Geographical Appreciatlon,p.4;
or Alb&rt,de P,OuvoQ~~111e, LtAnham1te~ p.35.

was an area or 2e8.600 square miles. south or China, east
of Burma and Thailand, north 01' the Gult of Thailand and
west or the China Sea.
The Indochinese peninsl1la is mostly mountainous.
physiography
than one half

Its

is dominated by the uplands which cover more
01'

the.total area.

the border of China.

The mountains stand on

~hey spread over Tonkin and Laos.

They go south by the Annam Cordillera which forms a natural
border between Annam and Laos and a backboae of Indochina.
In Cambodia there is a range of plateaux along the coast. 4
Almost all the uplands of Indochina are forests which
occupy about 120,000 square mil~s. or more tban 40 per cent
About 33 per cent ot these forests are

of the territory_

still inaccessible to the population.

In the accessible

parts. the mountain tribes practice a snitting cUltivation.
locally called Illczops ,

Forests are but~d

to make fields for

In a tew years. when the soil is exnaustied , people

set forth for another clearing.

About 16 per cent of the

forested area bas been atfected by this practice. 5
More important tor Indoe~lna than its topography are
its river systems.

Two great rivers actually torm two great

deltas which feed the popUlation
of Vietnam.
1

.r.

They are the Hong-ha

lndochina and especially

(Red River) in the North

~ t-~~.:" ~
:'clt'~ ,pp: "'11:"12". -.'
~,

°7~~\,~(~·~~t,,~~~.
,:'J".!·,jl,",)t~'~'~l·~~~'~t·,::.~:~:J.'~.~.
:. '-?·.~J·_-~r·h
(~~'l,'T

"':4,~",t,e~;n~Q;i~n :.G~~ernment, 'oj?
.. . 'l)~ lbid'~: pp .19-20

" '3'",

01'
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and the Cuulong (Mekong) in the South.
The Hong-ha is an abrupt current, with a total length
of about 720 miles.
in its upper course.

It flows in a deep structural trough
But when it leaves the mountains,

its

waters usually outrun its banks in the rainy season, i.e.,
trom June to Ootober each year.
ments are built.

To keep back tloods,embank-

These' embankments decrease i~ height down-

stream, where the diverging river mouths provide a more equal
distribution of tlood waters. With the contribution ot a smaller river called Thai-binh, the Hong-ba tormed the Tonkinese
delta which spreads on an area ot 10,000 square miles. 6
The Cuu-long is a great river ot Indochin~ and of Asia,
having nearly 2,500 miles 1n length_
territories,

Tumultous in Chinese

its course becomes more placid when it enters

Laos. It runs along the northern borders of Laos, goes through
Cambodia' and divides itselt in nine branches (whence its name
Cun-lons, Which means Nine Dragona) in Coehinchlna before coming to the China Sea.

In C~bodia,

the Cuu-loAg receives the

waters ot Lake Tonle-sap, Which acts as a regulator ot its
tloods.

In Cochinc~ina,

it torms the most fertile delta of

Indochina, the Cochincblnese

delta.

It is opportune to note

here that the two deltas ot Indochina are in Viet-nam, whioh

-

:i¥:iuz

;

6 •. Le-tpanh-Khoi, Le Viet-Bam, Histoire et Civilisation,
pp. 19-20; Masson, OP.clt., p.IO-II

4

has also a narrow strip of arable land along its coasts.

7

Over these mountains, rivers and deltas, blow the monsoons beoause Indochina is situated in that area of the world
called the ~onsoon

Asia".

A monsoon is caused by unequal

air pressure over the continent.

In winter the dense and

cold air in continental Asia sinks, forming a center ot high
pressure, while the surrounding ooeans have a warmer and les
dense atmosphere.

The result, therefore, is that a flowing

ot oold and dry air eomestr~

th.e

summer, conditions are reversed:
to the lands.

and

to the ooeans.

In

winds blow .from the oceans

According to their prevailing directions,

the winter monsoon is called Northeast Monsoon, and the summer's
Southwest Monsoon.

In Indochina, the Northeast Monsoon period

lasts trom ~i~-September

to March, While the Southwest Monsoon
prevails during the remainder at the year.S
Under the intluence o~ the monsoon and oecause ot the
terrain, Indochina has varied temperatures.

The uplands of

Tonkin, Laos and Annam have below 650 F. In January, the coldest month ot the year, While t~e lowlands and deltas have 750F.
During summer, Which oocurs in June and July, the temperatures
are respectively 750F and 850F. In general, Indochina has a
tropioal climate. Warm and wet.

7.

The wettest part of Indochina

Canadian Government, op.cit., pp.12, 15;

£!!. pp.2l-23

8. Ibid, pp.24-25; Nyugen-van-Huyen,
~aB!mite, pp. 5-6

Khoi, 2£.

~ivilis8tion

5

is in the southwest, where the moisture-bearing

Southwest

Monsoon meets the uplands of the Oambodian coast.
Cordillera and the mountainous
ceive a higher precipitation

The Annam

regions of Tonkin and Laos rethan other areas.

In the North,

the rainy season is summer; in tPe oentral part and the south,
it 1s the autumn.

The maximum rainfall in Tonkin 1s 14 inches,

in Annam 31 inches, in Coehinchina
inches, in Laos 12 inches.9

13 inches, in Cambodia 10

These climatic conditions favor the cultivation of rice.
Rice, therefore, is the main production of Indochina.

It is

the basic tood tor the Cambodians

and Laotians.

But it is a

resource ot wealth tor Viet-name

In 1937, tor example, the

Vietnamese obtained from their harvests more than 6,000,000
tons at riee.

this made Viet-nam the sixth largest producer

and the second largest exporter of rice 1n the world betore
the World War 11.

Bat daring the Japanese occupation and

the War of Independence
to 1954 the agricultural
creased.

Production

against the French, i.e., trom 1940
production

ot Viet-nam greatly de-

ot rice in the year 1952 to 1955 amount-

ed only to 2,633,000 tons. 10
4

~

9. Canadian Government, oE.oit., pp.l6-l7; Rhoi, op.eit.,
pp. 24-35
10. Canadian Government, op.cit., pp.40-4l,45-46; Khoi,
op.cit., pp.4l8-4l9;
tnstitute of Pacitic Relations Internal
Secretariat, A Biiet Politioal and Economic Handbook of Eastern and Southern .•sia, pp.22,24, hereafter CIted as A Brlet
~andbook.
~
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The second important crop of Indochina is rubber, and
it is found especially

in Viet-name

In 1938, rubber pro-

duction of Vietnam was 45,000 metric tons, of which 40% was
exported to the Vnited states.ll
Other orops of Indoohina are pepper, coffee, tea, cotton,
corn,_ potatoes,

soybean,etc •••Llvestook

tant part of the agricultural
grasslands

are rare.

do not fOrm an ~por-

econany in Indochina,

since

Cattle and buftaloes are used as animals

of draught in the fields, seldom for tood.

Pigs and fowl tur-

nish the usual meat in the Indochinese

diet.

the plaoe of meat as a real supplement

to rioe in the daily

meals.

The tisheries resources,

portance in Indochina.

But fish takes

are, therefore, of major im-

There are not many full-time fishermen

but nearly eTery peasant is fishi,ng at some time of the year.
Fish are fo~d

abundantlY

rivers, and particularly

along the coasts of Viet-nam, in the

in the l$~e Tonle-sap. 12

The sub-soil ot Indochina
There are, however, oonsiderable
nam.

is not very rich in minerals.
coal reserveS in North Viet-

The estimate given in the Internation

1 Geological Con-

gress held in Toronto, Canada, in 1913, attributed to the reserves ot Viet-nam an amount ot about 20,000,000,000
Here are some figures ot coal production:

tons.

in 1958 - 2,140,000

11. I.P.R.,A Brief BandbookLP.22. The French historians
used to say that 95% rUbber ot vtet-naJllwas exported to France,
but the addition of the figures ot exportations to France shows
only 30.5%. Jean Cbesneaux,Contribution
a ItHistoire de la
N!tion Vietnamlenne, p.~
*
,
l~. Canadian OOvernm.ent,op'."'}O:1t~·;,
P'.!;,~~ ••:::: /:.~ ",)
...... ,".. if

metric tons; in 1948 - 360,000 metric tons; in 1953 - 63,000
metric tons.

Beside coal, iron ores. tin, zinc, wolfram,

sten are .Qlinedalso in North Viet.-nam.

tung-

Central Viet-nam has a

gold mine. 13
Indochina bad a population

of about 25 millions in 1940.

Ot this population more than 21 mlllion wer~ Vietnamese,
millions

Cambodians,

and about one billion Laotians.

tigures are not in proportion
territories.

3

These

with the size ot the respective

Viet-nam has 121,300 square miles, while Cambodia

has 67,900 square miles, and Laos has 94,400 square miles.
population

pf Viet-nas is ~rticularly

The

dense in the North, where

about 1,500 people live in a square mile in the delta. 14
The principal
Vientiane

cities ot Indochina are:

(1936: 15,000 inhabitants).

Plplom-P!nh(pop.1948:

110,000),

Cholon (pop.1948: 1,669,600).
united'into

one admin~strative

capital of laOS;

capital .ofCambodia;

8aigo11-

capital ot Viet-nam, two cities
unit since 1931, industrial and

comme.rcial c~nter ot Vlet-nam and or Indochina, major harbor
and. air base; ~,

(~oP. 1951: 216,000), capital of Indochina

in the colonial period,tormer

capital ot Viet-n~.

land and river communications

ot ~onkin; Hai-phong

14,6,000), ohiet,harbor

(pop.1951:

or North Viet-nam ,and major industrial

center; Hue, (pop. 1956: 43,000),

,

center ot

c·

;

oapital of Annam. 15

,

13. .Canadian ,GovernDlent,IQp ..~;hlt'W,,;-p~~/:?2'~:
Y·;>::-·.\':

....
~..r)~,:, ,4/"

. ~,
>

:tJ';;,

'.

~

,-

:. f~:~~~~;~anA~::~~~:~~§~~~~t~
}~~~?~~,r~;r·!
.'

•

~~:.~

,
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When we come to the historical
behooves us to proceed caretully.
china through the writings
French his~orians

scenes ot Indochina,

it

The world knows about Indo-

ot the French historians;

who wrote on Indochina

and the

during the colonial

period, i.e., trom 1860 to 1954, could be rightly suspected.
in 1955, a student

o:t

l1istoryexp'resaed this idea as tollows:

Daring the oolon1al period and 8ti11 since 1945,
the French students who specialized pn the peoples ot
Indochina, on their language,th$ir history, their civilisation, were tinanciallly and politically bou~d to the
colonial power. How,then, to expect that they would have
attenti~ely stud1e4 the Vietnamese national reality,
the perman~at.negatlon
of'whloh,ln. theory as well as
in praotl.oe:,.was the very co~ltio,n tor the .maintenance
ot the l;IamecC)lon1al power? "
,
The author mentioned
given the ~portance
tate ot Viet-~
oountries,

or

in particular
Vlet-aam

tbe Vietnamese, because

in the indOChinese Union, the

would have decided the tate ot the other two

C(iJJlbodiaand Laos.

The same author did not hesitate

to desoribe the unde-

sirable influence, ot tJ,latcolonial 'bias on the French education
itself.

He said:

FroID.the el,ementary school, each one was intormed
colonial "Indochina''',and otits rive
constitutive eleme,nts:, ~Tonkin", "Anne", "Oochincb.fna",
Laos and C~mbodia.
'l'heyhardly in.dicated to the future
citizens that the tirst .threeot'these "countrtas" spolce
the same langtlsge,belonged to the same natiol1. They
scarcely insisted Oil the steady resistance whic'h, during
-eighty years, thlsp,ople
had opposed to the colonial
regime whicll, in other quarters, one presented
8 pure
and stainless.
They prUdently aVoided stressing that

ot the artiticial

'9'

16.. Cheaneaux,

op.c!t., p.S

these three "annamese" countries had formed, long betore the Frenoh oonquest, a solid national organism,
the history of whioh was not less ancient than that
ot France. And, of this oountry, ot this nation, the
traditional nameV~!~-Bam
itself was striotly banished
trom all our text-books otthe Dt~ary, secondary and
superIor education until 1945. 1?
So, to ,get the rea11 ty behind this "artifioial colonial
Indoehiha",

it is necessary to 80 back to the "reality of

Viet-Bam". 18
Tpe historical reality ot Viet-~.
The historical
still ebaeur-e ,

aad racial origin ot the Vietnamese i~

:Patient.researches have shown, however, that

theY' started with a mixture of many elelle.nts,in which the
brachycephalic type dominated. 19
What was known is that by the third century B.C. the ancestors ot the Vietname,e people had settled on the banks ot
the Red River (Hong-ha).

At that tLne, a Chinese general

named Trieu-da. handily carVed an independent kingdom. out ot
these delta lands and certai~provinces
But not long.after its organization,.the

of Southern Obina.

kingdom of Trieu-da

was swallowed up by the Chinese E,npire in 111 B.C.

The Viet-

namese people thus existed under the Chinese rule until the
year ~39 A.D. 20

---_

......_--."..,

------_

.....

1~. Chesneaux,op.eit., p.~
IS. Ibid., p. 12
19 •. Hoang-thue-Tram., Lieh-su Xa-hoi Viet-nam.pp-.39-48
Luong-due-Thiep, Xa-hoi Viet-nam Tien-~Qa-8U, pp.21-29
20. !iff.,ftljl-T'rc;mg~~dlm.;~, Viet-nam stl-luGe pp ,28-29

10.

Under the period ot nearly a thousand years ot foreign
domination,

the Vietnamese were sub~ittedto

the Chinese civil-

isation.

They learned the Chinese language, adopted the Chinese

morality.

But, paradoxe of history, they grew at the same time

more and more steady in.their national consciousness.

Many re-

volts broke out; some were successful for a time; in many cases
their leaders have become tolk heroes, surrounded by pop~lar
legends.

A national holiday is still dedicated to two ot the

earliest ot these heroes.
Trung.

They wer~ two women, the Sisters

III:r.aot,in 40 A.D .•, these two young ladies indignant

with .the atrooities, of the alien rUlers, raised an army and
drove the Chinese out of the country.

When,two years later,

the Chinese troops came back to tind the Vietnamese Volunteer
army dispersed, the Sisters Trung committed suicide rather
than see their territory once again under foreign domination.21
Anothe~ remarkable revolt 4appened in 544.
nationalist

leader n~ed

That year, a

Ly-Bon took over the control of the

country and gained a sixty-year respite tor the ., Vietnamese.
'

At

tbe beginning ot the ~eventh century, the Chinese succeeded
again in iJnposing their heavy yoke on. the 11 ttle natioll. TlUs
t~e,

with what seemed mOre hopefulaess

dhinese_oal~ed

than accuracy, the

the Vie~nam.ese territory Annam, which means

"paQit1e.d south".

This tact explains the disgust ot the Viet-

namese for this term, either it is used to designate the whole

-

,

2il. Fhl'li:rpPP'i;Itevj;)l]~~'8J, R1stoire du Viet-nam 19~O-1952

p. 13; Th1ep,op.eit.,

pp.52-3 !hoi, op.cit., pp.loO-102

11.

country or the central portion of it. 22
After the o.ther attempts, a Vietnamese named Ngo-Quyen
raised again the banner of revolt in 939.

This General de-

oiselvely deteated the Chinese at the strategic Battle ot
Bach-dang

(Sach-dang is the name or a river, tributary or

the ~ed River), and thUG opened a new era or national inde23
pendenee which lasted tor the next ten centuries.
Of <X>t1rse,the Chinese did not let their prey go without
,

resistance.

,

They came back many ttaes, but each time just to

find the Vietnsznese ready to deteat them.. At the end ot the
thirteenth
century, Viet-nam faced a terrible thre~t.
,

Atter

having overrun China with his _ongol hordes, KUb~lal Khan
tried three times to conquer Viet-na~.

Three times, however.

the Mongol troops had to retreat, l~aving dead on the battlefield more than a half ot their soldiers, inclQdin~ the son
of K~o11ai h~self.

24

Dark days c~me again in 1413, wh~n a Chinese army, with
superior forces, swept through the Vietnamese territory to
re-estsblish, their sway.
ed only tive years.

Fortunately,

the BeW occupation last-

Xn 1418, the Vietnamese rallied behind an

fisherman named I.e-Loi, who organized a guerilla army and fOUght
7#

..

12.
sucoesstully

to regain treedom.

ceased to consider

their tiny neighbor

in the south as an

25

easy prey.

Not only did the Vietnamese
to~er

From that time the Chinese

eheOk ~he invasion ot their

rulers, they led also victorious

ed them to eXpand to the south.
Vietnamese

campaigns which help-

This southward march ot the

people had beSUD right atter their settlement

the Red River ~elt$.

When Ngo-~uyen

~e1gned, in the tenth

century, 11is te:rritory already reache'l Boaun-son,

a trans-

versal chain ot mountains

whioh cut the Central Viet-nam

trom the Annam Cordillera

to the coast at the eigh.teenth

On the other side ot the a0a~.son

p~rallel.

kingdom of the Chams.

For oenturies,the

ins. wi-th the Vietnamese,
Vietnamese

thus advanced,

trontier.

By l~g8,

in

extended the

latter were tight-

but they werEttinallY

deteated.

The

cleared the jungle, pushed baek the

their terrltory had expanded as tar as to

the sit~ ot Saigon today. 26
By that time, too, a strpggle tor power took plaoe in the
Court ot' th.e_dynasty ot: Le (.deseent$ of Le-Lol).
tamilies,

the Trinh, wb.oatayed

Two strong

in Hanoi, and t~e Nguyen, who

escaped to the South ot Roann-eon

tor measureo!

security,

opened up an epooh ot c.ivil war. which endured tor a hundred
years. 2'1

..

,-

25Khoi, op.cit •• p. 21&-21a,K~, Op.cit •• pp. 19~2~3.
26Khol,
27Ibid,

oP.clt.,

Pp.239,2&6-7

pp.242 tt.; K!m, Op.cit., pp.295-304
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Up to the 16th century, the Vietnamese
or Confucianists

or even Taoists,

were Buddhists

or all three together. At

the end ot that century, the Jesuitmiss10naires

came.

They

were Portug\1ese and Spanish.

They JQ,8dem.any conversions

among the Vietn~ese

In 1662, t~eFreneh m.is~ionartes

followed

people.

the Jesuits.

but .at a lower rate.

They continue4

to convert the peo~le,

Soo~, the activities

priests aroused the snsplclon

ot these toreign

of the Vietnamese

faithful and the mis.sionaries,were

kings.

The

alike ,ersecuted.28

In 1'784, one of the missionaries. deci(led to procure aid
,

to the. Nguyen tam11y ,'With. tlehope

ot tuturEt peaoe to the

Church ot Vle.t-nam.. Bishop Pet.erPlgJ1eau de Behalne, t)le
Bame of the missioJlatoy, went. to .FraIloeand obtained substantial.mater1alsupport.tor

thePrinee

ing tha. new insul',gents,..
taeTay-son
had sQcceeded

then escaP-

•. 'rhe latter, 1n. fact,

in taking over south Viet-nam and were advanc-

ing to the north.
of Viet-n~.

Nguyen,Anh,

In 1'786, they became masters ot the whole

But their star taded $oon, because Nguyen-Anh,

wi tll the' help. trolL:the Freneh :Bishop, began the re-conquest
ot ,ower.

He recap~ared

the cities, one atter another, and

. ....
..

2S. Masson, op.c~t.t pp.43-52. The, Vietnamese people
remained always gratetulforFatber
Alexandre de Rhodes, a
Jesuit, who bau invented the rQmanization, of the Vietnamese
language.
He wrote m.any boo,kS in.that romanized Vietnamese
characters.
He was also. the ,promoter ot. the Societe des
Misp.ions Etr,aAger!s ,de .Paris •. ,See .also nOi, op.c1t., pp.
288-294° Emtr1anualJacques, !'Oppor,tunities iB Viet-mam.-. .
World MisSion,February
1951,pp.2-8;.paan-dinh-Kh1em,
Hanh~
a2nS Xi-lio1,PP.155-159
----

14
tinally celebrated his tr1umph over the unified Viet-nam in
1802.

At that date, Nguyen-Anh

became Emperor Gia-long,

founding the dynasty ot Nguyep, o.t whioh Bao-dai was a
succeS$or to the throne fro~ 1926 to 1945.29
Gia-long treated gratefully the French missionaries,
who enjoyed peace t o» a while.

But, the French missionaries

undertook a double Job, that ot Christianization
French propa~anda.
western colonization

Moreover,

and that ot

at that time, the danger ot

appeared more and more imminent.

The

suocessors of Gia-long became, therefore, severe with the
missionaries.

Ter~ible persecutions

voked the indignation ot the French.
the first act ot intervention

broke again and proIt was reported that

in tavor ot the French miss10n-

aries in Viet-nam was conducted by ~n Amerioan Oommodore in
50
1845.
Ot course, the attitude of the Viet-Damese kings agaihst
the French missionaries

was unwise.

European powers, ~bued

witb mercantilism,

Asia ..
with. covetolls eyes.

It was a time when the
looked at East

The British .had seized Penang in

1786, Malacca in.1824, Hongkong in 1842, and were fighting

-

29. Khoi,op.cit., pp.295-322; Masson,op.cit.,pp.53-60
The French missionarIes had made an appeal to the French
Government to send Frenc.h ships to Viet-nam to help them in
their missionary work.
30.JQ1I8ph
CuenQt, La Salle ...
d~s4Marttrs, pp.4-6;
Chesneaux,op.cit., p. 95

15

Tne Dutch.had obtained the East Indies in

to occupy Burma.

1824 and were longing for Borneo.
the colonial race.

The Frenoh lagged behind in

In their impatience,

any pretext would be

good tor them to earve an empire out ot this part ot the Pacitie.

And a pretext was given them in the persecutions

French missionaries
the missionaries

by the .Vie,tnamese kings.

of the

BeCSllse among

the.r.e.
were.s B.UQlber.ofSpanish Dominicans,

they got the Spanish to participate
peditions against Viet_nam.51
In 1658, Admiral

could not hold it.

w~th them in their ex-

Rigault de Genouilly took Da-nang but

He descended

to the south, captured

In 1862, the. king of Viet-nam was forced to

Saigon.,in 1859.

cede three provinces

around th:at city to France.

In 1867,

France annexed three more provinoes and established the colony
of Cochincbina.

32

At that time the Freneh were weakened by the FrancoPrassion war •. They col11d not use toree on a large seale. Incapable ot controlling

tae whole ot Viet-uam by a single act

ot conquest, they invaded it ,iecemeal over the course of
many decades.

In 1874, atter neW aggressive activities,

exacted :from the Vietnamese
sovereignty
"""

...

over Cochi~ohina.

king the recognition
Fo~

they

ot tlle French

years latef, they made new

. 4

31 •. Harley Farnsworth MacNair and Donald F. Leah,Modern
Eastern .International Relations, pp...34~35,Al1en t. Hammer
he.Stru68
tor IndochIna, pp.63-64
52. 01,op.olt., pp.3~~-374
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strides in north and central Viet-n$m.
authorities

In 1884. The Vietnamese

had to sign the Treaty ot Frotectorate

French over the remainder ot country.

with the

It was at this oonjunc-

ture that the French divided up north and oentral Viet-

into

two administrative

units, Tonkin aud Annam; Cochinohina having
33
been cut ott before.
But. While the King of Viet-nam and his offioials surrendered betore the western aggressive ambition. sustained by a
superior armed toroe. the Vietnamese people was organizing a
tumultous movement ot resistanoe.
in 185~. continued uninterrupted

This movement began early
until it ended in the tri-

umphant victory ot the Viet-namese ,over the Frenoh at Dienbien-phu on lIay 8. 19.54. 34

At tbe first cont~ct with the

French troops. the Vietnamese

had sketched a program ot a

long range detense.ot ~heir rights.
their indomitable nationalistic
but very humane declaration
ment ot resistance

feelings in a logical. strong,

1n 1862.

in Coohichin~

They had summarized

In that year the

ove-

told the French:

All the inhabitants ot the province ot Gocong unanimously make this declaration: When we
lose the government ot our king. we are in desolation Just like a child Who loses its parents.
'

.
•

$

33. Chesneaux.op.o1t ••Pp.107-137; Khol,op.cit ••pp.38qtt
-Masson.op.cit •• pp.76-64. Cambodia was oocupied in 1863. About
"the Franoo-,prussion. War,s~e :risher.R.A.L., A Ristorl ot Euro~e
(Boston.HoUghtonMitt~ln
C~ ••1939) pp.lQ22-16 5
34. Luoien Bornet,Dien-~1 n-¥hU pp.l.5-15?
The whole
book gives a d~oumentar1 aocoun~ 0 tSe triumph ot the Vietnamese over the Freno~ 1n spring ~954
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Your oountry belongs to the western seas. our
to the seas ot the Orient. As the horse and
buttalo ditter trom one another, so we ditfer
by language,writing and oustoms. Man was
oreated tormerly in distinot ~aoes. Everywhere
he has the same value. but his complexion is
not the same. Gratitude attaches us to our king.
We will revenge his insUlts or we die tor ~.
It you persist in bringing h~e to us the sword
and tire, the disorder will ~e tor long, but we
will act acoording to the will or heaven. Q.!£
cause will tinish in~trium~h. It you want peace.
gIveiback to our king his erritory. We are
fighting tor this purpose.,. You haTe oocupie
our provinoes to add to the riohes of your empire.
to the lustre of your reputation. Do you want
a ransom in exchahge tor our territory? We will
pay you that, provided that you cease tighting
and bring your troops baek to your concessions.
We will be even gratefUl to you and your glory
will be known in the universe. Do you want a
concession to do business in this oountry? We
consent to it.
ut it au refbse we never oease
tighti~ to obel
e w
0
eaven.
e respeo
your vaue. but we :Pear Heaven more than your
power. We swear to tight eternally and relentles81y. When everlthi~ ~ill be wantinf to us.
we will take the branc es of the trees 0 make
tlags and sticks to arm our soldiors. How, then,
can you live among us? We ask you attentively to
examine this request and to put an end to a state
ot things untavorable to our interests as well
as to yours.55
Needless to say, tne Frenoh did not pay any attention
to the representations

ot the Vietnamese.

It the latter

planned to resist, the tormer, on their part, planned to
set up punitive expeditions.

The nationalists were partly

killed, ~artly exiled to the Poulo Condores, or to the
tar-away Islands ot Reunion.

The rest ot them were in prison.

55. Go-cong is the name or a provinoe i& South Viet-name
This text is cited in Chesneaux, op.cit •• pp.108-9; cited and
commented in Paul. Mus, Viet-nam, 80010l06ie d'~e Guerre,pp.
224-225

p

•
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Acoording to a writer, who was in a position to know the
question better than anyone else, ·of the six Vietnamese
emperors, since 1884, there were three exiled for opposition to colonial polioy or tor open rebellion; one abdicated; one reigned only three years, insufficient time to show
his mettle.

The sixth, Bao-dai, eduoated in France, has

done nothing to displease colonial power or policy." 36
Among the many revolts, the most important were that

ot De-tham in 1897, ot Phan-boi-Chau
thai-Hoc in 1930, ot Nguyen-ai-QuQe

in 1912, of Nguyen(Ho-chi-Minh) from

1920 until the defeat of the French. 37
The national plight was not the only conoern of the
intellectual

people.

Everr unknown peasant, living in re-

motest villages, was hoping tor happier days when the toreigners would leave the oountry.

This b~rning aspiration

ot the mass of the Vietnamese people had aa illustration in
the following report of a French missionary
In 1902, a missionary,
vince ot ~opg-~uyen,
er to oonduct it.

in Oochinchina.

haVing to cross a river of the pro-

finally found a light. boat and a villag-

On the ~lver, the Vietna~ese peasant seemed

eager to a$k a question.

He grew bolder and addressed the

Father: "I know ~hat I may have confidenoe in you and that you

....
36. NgO-dinh-ThUO
~1et-n~
through Vietnamese Eyes",
World Mission,February i 951
37~ Paul Deveze, ~ ,France d'OutrejMer, pp.94-l04
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would not report to the administrator
ask you.

what I am going to

Please, frankly tell me how long the French will

stay in this country"?

As the Father was wondering,

he

added: "You donft want to tell me that, but you should know.
Is it in one or two years that the French woul~ quit?"
this peasant could venture
how much. more earnestly
fellow-oountrymen.

to ask a Frenebnan

If

such questions,

he must have discussed them with his

And this ~appened

in Coch1nchina,

the

part ot Viet-na,m which the French had considered as definitely tneirs. 5a
Instead ot recogniting

this vit~lity of the Vietnamese

nationalistic. spirit, the trench ordinarily put emphasis on
their accomplished

pacification.

Yolts raged everyw~ere
pouryourvi11e

In 1932, the year When re-

in the whole ot Vietnam, Albert de

wrote:

Here is the conquered Al1nam.:here is the
Protectorate, composed of tive countries of the
Union, which estab1isnes tor the Indochinese
peoples ahonLogeneity .in the peace as they have
never known. 39·
The contrary would be correct.
period was a t~e
0pen rebellions

of continuous
succeeding

The entire colonial

unrest tor the Vietnamese.

to secret plots, they were ~lways

4

38. Mus,op.cit., p.223. The peasants ot Viet-nam during
the colonial perIod not on~y nourished angry tee1ings against
the French but also supported the movement of resistanoe organized abroad with their scarce money.
39. Pourvourvil1e, op.cit., p. 35
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hunting a propitious occasion to throw out the yoke ot the
40
French, because it was really heavy.
The French had tried to make the world believe that its
colonial policy was muniticent.

To thsnselv8s, they went on

repea~ing that they bad a "civilizing
mission",

ission", a "religious

a "cultural mission" in Indochina.

amount ot harm they did to the Indochinese
ly the good that they brought.

In reality, the

outweighted great-

President Franklin D. Roose-

velt had a 'wondertul remark on this matter.

In 1945, he

said that the French had been in Indochina "over a hundred
I

.

•

lears.and have done nothin6 about educatin~ them. that tor
everl dollar thel have put in~ t~l
;

ot "putt1~

The Proportion

been mo~e than one to ten.

in"

haT! taken out ten". 41

and "takiu

out" should have

A dependable French author had

made the account and said that the expenses France had made

tor the improvement ot Indochina tram 1900 to 1239 were

-t·.,

million trancs.

522

On the point ot view ot "taking out", it

Laurent Arthur 1~ right, the Bank.ot Indochina alone obtain d
trom Indochina a benetit ot 400LOOQ,OOO,OOO
;

One ean _gine

how thorough wa

trancs a lear.

t)leFrench exploitation,

one adds to this tinancial drain, the explatation
material and labor, a.nd all kinds ot heavy taxes.

when

ot raw
And one

is inclined to agree with Claude Letort who said that the pop-

tt,

40. Bammer,op.cit.,pp.54
41. Ss.m~~.l.'1... ,Ro.s.e.nmaiiQ.
ot Z.D.R.,~944-5,p.362
,"

~

-',,~.'~,,"'..,~

••

", .• _ .. ~ ""I'

The. ~ubl,=O PaRers and Addresses
~

..
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ulation ot Indochina
tlileFrench rule.

"lived on the verge ot starvation"

under

4~:,;

The politieal picture was not brighter.
who was by no means anti-colonial,

A French author,

had proved it.

Ne wrote:

There were in 193t a hundred ~nd ten million men
submitted to t~e French sovereignty, but torty-two
m11lion O.f them crowded on the t.erritory ot 5~OtOOO
squ~re kilometers in the,West,ot Europe (France,.
It was ess~ent1alll to th!Jllthat were applied the con,tlt,utional laws, therIgnt to vote, lh!-r1Shts ot
man and citizen, the !ndividual libertre!=tmlne
Italics). 43
.
.
It the Frenchmen only enJoyed the "rights ot man" and
"individual

liperti~s",

other people in t~e French Empire

were practically .slaves in ser~lce
ot Viet-n~who

or

Fr~nce.

~ad "fought A thousan4years"

against the

could not be easily redueed to servitude.44

Ohinese 4Qmlnation

They had resistedaga1nst_the

Frenc.h to get back their "rights

ot man" and their "indi~idual liberties".
ed cruelly.

But the people

The French retaliat-

In 19"3, even in the ,midst ot the Japanese occupa-

tion, ..
the French 'Governor Gene.ral, V.ice-Admiral Jean Decoux,
had suoceeded to eXl1e o~ to put in jail nearly 10,000 Indochinese. 45
Moreo.ver, tbe French used to think that the move.tnent ot
resistance

in Viet.nam wss a stepchild ot the French education.

On January 15, 1930, Alexander Vare~.
.

8$1d: "It was a real

..

"Les Classes EXplo1 tees",
~II,
March, 1947, pp. 1080-1081
-43: Deveze, op.clt., p.1l
44. Hammer, op.elt., p.62
45. Deveze, op.cit., p.16l
42t.:

MOde~nes,

C1BJ.xa~: ,I'e:.f.or' "

drama tor France to see the ideas plentitully
her spring up and turn against her".

thrown out by

To know how plentitully

the French e~ucation in the colonies was, it is enough to reter to the tigures given in 1947 by R. Saller, Governor ot the
Colonies:

he showed that while France, with 41,000,000 popula-

tion has 17 universities,
000 population

her overseas territories wita 50,000,

have none •. Needless

to say that the Vietnamese

didn't know French yet when they wrote the declaration ot 1862.
And. when the French gave some e~ucation to the natives, they
did in a way that detied all common sense.
tory, tor example, the Vietnamese
.ere taught t~at "nos ancetressont

In classes ot his-

c~ildren ot ten years old
des Gaulois" (our ancestors

are Gelllcs )46
U~tl1

DOW, aany

po1iey in Indoohina.
niter.

French contin.ue to Justity their colonial
In Februa~y

Francois Mauriac,

in glowing terms.

still exalted French colonialism

He called it

a "kind ot orus de".

1947. the tamous French

"$

bountitu1 civilization",

Many wondered Why this Catl101ic, so

olever in other qu.arters, be,came so short-sighted

in this

question.

Lea Te.tp.ps
Modern!! wrote about him. that "it is

soandalous

that a Christian Proves himselt so inoapable to

Deveze,

..

'6.
op.cit., pp.13,19. About the French education in Indochina; I need no other authority than myselt,
because I was pne ot the boys who had repeated: nos ancetres
sont des Gaulois.
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desist trom h1mselt and his "ideas". and to retuse to look
at h1ms lt, even tor an instant. with thee.yes at others".
Francois Mauriac. however. was not more Christian than the
French missionaries.

and there were no mOre tervent advocates

ot colonialism than they were.
can be complex.

The reasons tor this attitud

One at them can be in the tact that Francois

Msuriac held 12 sha~esin

the Bank ot Indochina, and the pro-

curator ot French Foreign Missions. 102 shares. 47
But. recently.

such an expert in the colonial problems

as Albert Sarraut. a tormer Governor General ot Indoohina.
did not hesitate to say:
Colonialism is an interested act ot torce •••
The peoples ~ho look tor' and hold colonies in the
tar-away continents pr~arily think only ot themselves,
work only tor their power. conquer only tor their protits. ~
In other words, the French coloniali~
be described as a combination
tical slavery and intellectual

in Indochina can

ot economic exploitation. polioppression.

Franklin D. Roose-

velt. speaking ot the French policy in Indochina, said that
-France has milked it tor one hundred yea~s".

It would be .ore

acourate to say that Franoe bas st~rved.the Indochinese.

In

1944, tor example, to get ready to detend themselves against

47.
48.

Les1Temps Modernes, March 1947, XVIII,p.104l
Arthur, op.clt., p.50
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an eventual Japanese taking-over

of their sovereignty, the

French in north Viet-nam had made a requisition ot rice, which
resulted in the starvation of about 2,000,000 Vietnamese.49
So. when the !tatus quoin
H

1940, Was referred to the Viet-

namaae were not en.thusis$tio about it.

Status guo mean.t to

them that they had to live torever uhder the highly u.ndesirable
domination

oftha

Frenoh.

It was not to say, that when the United

S~ates deten~ed tne statuswsuq,

it.w~s defending oolonialism.

The foreign polioy of. the Unite~ States, espeoially the Atlantic
Charter and many st8teme~ts of President Roosevelt regarding
Indochina, proved la~gely that the Amerioans were against any
colonial exploitation.
evil.

But, th~ United States chose the lesser

In 1940, by defending the ,tat~~ guo, it preferred, tor

the t~e

being, a peacetul colonialism to the war.

And in 1950,

when it decided to help the Frenc4 agai~st the Viet-minh,
took the courseot

saving the ~enoh

it

aims rather than to give

Viet-nam to the commun1sts.50
Moreover, however

r

liberalthe United States might be, it

cannot solve alone such an 1nternat~onal
It needs the collaboration

question as eolonialisa.

of other powers in the world, spec-

ifically that of the colonial powers.

~beretore., it took time

to wait for comins eYeJi,ts,in whiC~~~~~ colonial powers would
;p

'*

25.
be roreed to eo-operate with American policy,
With regard to Indochina, history showed that different
steps taken by the United Stat~s during the last fifteen years
were vital to its independence.
1.

In 1940-1941, whe~ the Japanese were trying to take

over Indochina, the United states, on one hand did not give
the French any material

support to tight against Japan; on the

other hand, it energetically. opposed to the Japanese activities
by representations,

by eeono$ic sanctions.

The result was that

when the Japanese succeede4 1.11ocoupying 1n4och1na, this occupation did not a~ount to a ~eal exploitation,because
previously
thanks

ooncluded .i~h thf French.

'0 the aora1 and diploma~ie

could keep their sovereignty,
the Vietnamese

nat~onalists

of agreements

'!'heFrench, on their part,

support of theU~ited

but were greatly weakened.

States,
And,

under tAe cover ot Japan oould or-

ganize to a certain extent.
2.

From Pearl a8rbor to the Japanese surrender, the United

states always retused

to give

anY support to General de Gaulle

in his effort to reoeo~py Indochina.

T~s

way, Japan was able

to put the French in the jail of Indochina on March, 1945, and
to give independence

to the natives.

The latter had taken pro-

fit of this ocoasion to fortify themselves against an eventual
coming
3.

ot the French.
Atter the Japanese

surrender in 1945, the United States

did not support the French, but neither did it support the Vietnamese nation.alist.s.

As.s consequenee., the Vietnamese Oommunist
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leaders

could not take over the country, nor could the French.

After a long war, the French gradually consented to give a
certain degree of independenoe

to the Vietnamese,

so that the

latter would co-opera~e with them.
4.

But the Vietn.am.esepeQple~J1ew

that the French were

deceiving them, so they tO$k the side of the Communist leaders
to ti~ht tor tae1r independence.

In 1950, the danger that

V1et-nam. Would become a communist country became imminent.
~hen the United Stetas decided_to help the French to tigh,t
against tlle Communist leaders with the. condit-ion that France
would g~ve real independence
pite the Ame~icanaid

to t:ne states of Indochina.

the Frenehwere

Des-

discouraged before the

supreme jttorts of the.Vietn~ese.people.

The United States

then put pressure ~n the French, so that they put in pOwer
a non-e~un1st
5.

n~tionalist,

Ngo-dinh-Diem.

In 1954, the French were defeated by ~he Vietnamese

Communists,
masters

and areal

and were ready to recognize the CO$munists as

in Viet~nam,

but theU~lted

Finally, Viet-nam,w8s

temporarily

ference on July 1954.
helped Ngo-dinh~Diem

States opposed that move.
cJ1Yld~d by the Geneva Con-

From ~hat tl$e.the

United States

~o"build up a Fr~e Viet-nam, tree trom

colon1al1s~ and Communi$m.
In the following pages. we ahall stUdy one phase ot this
American polioy. in other wordf;1,we shall see hOW, in 1940, the
United States, While making strong representations
Japanese activities

in Indoohina,

help to the Fre,nchto

fight

against the

did not eive any material

against Japan.

,l. ,~. The .United
"-

Sta tea

and
Indochina
.."
' ,~

in

<

The First Indochinese

Crisis

The Episode ot
General Georges Catroux
Ju.ne-July 1940

For a long time, Japan had dreamed ot a world empire.
Exalted bl'~he~r nati~~al pride~ contid~nt in th~lr national toroes, the Japanese planned to carry out their program
ot "Greater Eastern Asia. Co-prosperi ty Sphere", which euphemistically

meant the Japanese oOlonial policy.

This pro-

gram had been applied to China in 1937 by the inv~sion ot
the northern. Chinese pro.vinees.l As a cQnsequence ot this
aggressive act, the rights ot the American nationals in
China were violated: right ot extraterritoriality,
ot residence and trade, rights
.

2

property, etc. ••

In

rights

special areas, rights to

Whereupon 'the'United States Government

made its representations
"open dOOr" policy. 3

and urged Japan to continue the
The Japanese Govermnent took this

occasion to deti~e their expansionist

ideals in the$e terms:

,1. T.g.Bi8S0n,J~an
in China,pp.1-39; TatsuQ Kawai,
The Goal ot JaR&nese
.RSnsloa,pp.6l-67
2. Wllliam
Johnstone, !aeUnited States and Jaiants
New Ord6r, pp.23-ll6
...
*
. 3.' ·Shepard Jones q-ndDeIlYs P. M'eyeJ;Os,
Documents on
Americ~n Forei~ Relations, January 1938-June !§!9,p.2!'
Hereafter, cit~ as Documents_on AmerieanFore1e,R~lattoe.

c.
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At present Japan, devoting its entire energy to
the establishment of a new order based on genuine
international justice throughout East Asia, is making
rapid strides toward the attainment of this objective.
The successful accomplishment of this purpose is not
only indispensable to the existence of Japan, but also
constitutes the very foundatioa ot the enduring peace
an~ stability of East Asia.
It is the firm conviction of the Japanese Government that now, at a time of continuing development ot
new conditions,in East Asia, an. attempt to apply to
present and future conditions without any change conoepts and pri~ciples whie~were
applioable to oonditions prevailing before the present incident d08S not
in any way ~ontribute to the solution of immediate
issues and further does not in the least promote the
firm establishme!).t ot theellduring peace of East Asia.4
The U~ited States soon sharply realized that "the validity ot the conception

of Japanese ~uthorities

ot a 'new con-

dition' and a ,'new ord~rt in-East Asia is highly paradoxical.
The United States Ambassado~

warned that a failure to ob-

serve the, policy ot '"open door" would breed "international
frictions
countries,

and ill-Will, with oonsequences
including in particula~

tail to observe it".

injurioQs to all

those countries whioh

At the same time, the United States

eenr eased another
equally tirm oonvietiOn that observanc~ of t~at
pr,inciple .promotes the opelling of trade ohaQaels
th~reby making available the market, the raw
materials and th~ manufactured products ot the
commwaity ot nations ip a mutually reciprocally
beneficial bas1s.5

ben c1 ted

to
the
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After this first clash ot views between the two countries
the United States was going to take measures against Jap,an. On
July 26; 1939, the.Secretary
the Japanese Ambassador

or State, Cordell HUll, notified

in WaShington, Kenzuke Horinouchi,

that the Government ot the United States wished to terminate
in six months, i.e., on January 26, 1940, its commercial
treaty at 1911 with Japan, in accordance with procedures preseribed by the treaty itselt. 6

But, when Japan undertook the

sou,thward advance over Indochina, in ,1940, the American-Japanese
relations underwentagra4ual
was cOnsummated

bQt serious deterioration,

in the tragedyot

The Japanese encroachments
yearsbet()re.

which

Pearl Harbor, December 7,1941.
on Indochina had begun two

On Jt;1ly7, 19Se, Japan had.made it known to

the French ..
Ambassador

at Tokyo,. Charles Arsene-Henry,

that

tram that date, th~ French ha4 to withdraw trom the Paracels
.'

Islands and giv& them to Japan.
trary to the Franco-Japanese
anese Navy tookoTer
North Indochina.

7

On February 10, 1939, con-

agi:.eementof 1907,8

the Jap-

the Bainan Island, ott the coasts ot

The Japanese Foreign Oftioe stated in this

oceas.ion that the operation of' the t8panese foroes was "for
. '

-.'

i

6. 'Document!-on ~arican FOr$il; R§latlons, 11,244
7. ~ontemporary lapan, 4fXI,-I9:B,p.38~; as cited in
Harol¢ S. Quigley, Far Eastern War, 193V-1941, p. 306
a.The
Agreement ot 1907 assured the respect of the
integrity or China, the equal treatment of'commerce,etc.,
and wag signed at Paris,June 10,.1907. Ibid., p.307,note 3
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preventing unrest and disturbance

in the contiguous regions

and vicinities" ot tbe territories

ot Japan, and that the

agreement ot 190? was not violated, beoa~se "sinoe then conditions in China have undergone ,a comVlete change". 9
the French Ambassador

When

inquired about the same matter, on

February 13, 1939, the Japanese Foreign Minister assured him
that the ooct1pationot
essity". 10
another move.

Bal~n does not "exceed military nec-

More than a month later, on March 31, Japan made
It announced its intention to take possession

ot the Spratley Islands and plaoe tham ~der

the Jurisdiction

ot the Japanese Goverllor-Genera1ot

Under instruction

othis

Government,Ambass~dor

Taiwan.

Arsene-Henry,

to the Japanese Vice-Minister

on April 6, handed

tor Foreign, Attalrs, a note pro-

testing again,t the Japanese .actiQn. Whereupon the Japanese
otticial. told the French Ambassador

that

there is no room tor conside~ation regarding the
issue, Which was decided on the basis ot established policy, and that the Japanese Government would
receive the note only a& a matter~ot reterence. 11
Also, in 1939 the Japanese had compelled the French Gover,or.'iGeneral ot Indochina to pr.ohibit transportation

ot arms

and ammunitions into Chiaa through the railroad Ha~phong-Yunnan;
and had bombed this railroad in the.Ch1Aes~ t~rritory. 12 This

--------_. -----------",

"9'. QUigley, op.cit.,

p.

307.

10. Statement oithe Japanese Foreign Ottice,Feb.I0 1939
Co.ntemporery Japan, VIII,1939,p •.
182,as, cited in Q.1ngle••~1d4:.i.,
pp. 307-3Q8
11. Statementot.the
Japanese Foreign Ottiee.Feb.15,l959
loe.oit.It
is not correct to say that the French Government
did RQt protest, Chesneaux,op.clt., p.224
12. "French Indochina", the New International Yearbook
1940, p. 291·
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began to involve the United States in the Indochinese
because the merchandises

transported

question

through the Haiphong-

Yunnan railroad were mostly ot American origin, and those who
did business there were mostly American citizens.
At the beginning ot 1940, the Amerioan Embassy ot Tokyo
notitied the Japanese Foreign Otfioe a ~ro-mem£!1! that readq: .
The United states GoVernment is intormed that
the portion of the railway between Eaiphong and Yunnantu
which lies in Chinese territory has recently been subjected to trequent bombings by Japanese military airplanes. This railway in recent months has oarried a
considerable part of the trade involved in the normal
commercial relations ot the United States and China.
American oammerce must, theretore, neoessarily be injured an~ the lives of American oitizens engaged in
.that commerce may be endangered as a result of the
Japanese bombings of that railway •••••
The United States will b8ve no other choiee, if
the bombing continues, than to add this to the extensive list of injuries commercial and otherwise
which has been suttered by it as a result of the actions of the 3apanese forces in China ••••••••
The American note added tha,t the Haiphong-YulUlan railroad was "an important means ot ingress and egress" to the
personnel
Therefore,

of American

ofticial establls.bments at ChQngking.

the Japanese bombing of it would have more ser-

ious consequences.13
In their re91y, the Japanese authorities
the lawfulness

established

ot their actions, invoking the Franco-Chinese

agreement ot 1903 which applied to the laying ot the HaiphongYunnan railroad,
any cla~

and said that the railroad W&s exoluded trom

to neutrality.

They oontinued:

-------,----13.

Foreign Relations

of the United States,Japan,
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At the present time, the Chiang regime is ·employing the railway as an important route for the
s~pply of arms, ammanition and other military commodities, and therefore, the Imperial forces may
properly take suob military measures against the
railway as t4ey teem necessary.
With regard to the injury to American trading rights
and to the danger to the lives of citizens, the note expressed the regret of the Japanese Government, but stated
also tMt

Japan could not cea~e bombing the Haiphong-Yunnan

railroad.

fhe text said:

As a part of the military operatio~s whioh are developing on a large scale in China, the Imperial forces
are takiag poper military measures against the transportatien of military supplies over Hanoi-Yunnan railway; oonsequently, although it is regretted that the
lives ot the Amerioan nationals and Amerioan oommeroe
are eXP9sed to danger, the circumstances are UDavoidable.
In view ot the legal positIon above stated, it is believed that the American Goveronent will appreciate the view
ot the Japanese Government; that the question ot assumption ot responsibility by the latter Government does
not arise. 14
Th~ United States rejected flatly the Japanese view. On
M~rch 11, 1940, in an answer to the Japanese note, the AmerJoseph C. Grew, made it clear that the United

ican Am~assador,

States Government did not admit "the relevancr to the question
unde~ consideration
.ignOtti~e,to

of: the reference

the Chinese-Fr~neh

made by the Japanese For-

Railway Construotion Agree-

ment ot 190a" nor did it appreCiate th$ view of the Japanese
Governmentresarding

the "lack of responsibility

on the part

of the Japanese GovernMent tor any ~oss ot Amer!can life, or

-

i¥

6"-~.

14. Forei~

..

.. . '
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damage to American property" sUbsequent to current bombings
of the railway by the Japanesemilitarcy

airplanes. 15

As for Indochina itself, in the middle of 1940, the
situation was _ope1ess.

On one hand it could not expect

any help trom Franoe, Which was succumbing to Nazi invasion. 16

On the other hand, it was already half-encircled

by the Japanese.

The latter we~e established in the Sprat-

ley Islands, in_ the Parcels !slanda,in

Hainan Island. More

dangerous still, the J~panege Army at Canton had reached the
Northern herders ot Indochina, in the other side ot Lang-SOB;
and three other Jap~nese bata1lions were operating in the
Chinese Provinee ot Kwan~si, beyond the fronti~rs of Laakay.17
And, when the french authorities surveyed their military forces
they found that, in ~11 In40china there were about 60,000 men
in the Army, and practically

no Navy.

They had no modern airplanes and their strategy was that Of the year 1901.18
The Japanese, on their part, did not make a secret of
their designs on Indochina.

.Repeated1y, theY ~enaced the

French authorities ~ith the threat of an armed invasion it
the carrying ot supplies ~y way ot the Indochinese railroad
.

.

15. Foreign Relat~ons_C)f the Unlted.sta1ieSdJapan,~.678
16. See, ,for example, wIlliam L. Linger an S.Everett
Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1931-1940, pp.454-458
17. Jea~ DeeoQx,A la Barre de l'Indoehine, Histoire de
mon Gouvernement General, 1940-1945 pp.16-77
Ie. Ibid., pp. 79-80, 85-86
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into China did not stop at once.
summarized

~he attitude

General Georges Oatroux

ot t~e Japanese military

authorities

toward Indochina as follows:
The Commander ot the Japanese Army in KWeichow,
Province of China (directly North et Indochina) was
constantly threatening and criticizing IndoChina tor
"assisting" China by permitting the transport of
materials across Indochina into Ohinese territory.
The Japanese Army radio constantly Broadcast these
protests and demands - the Japanese were particularly
angry regarding the transport ot gasoline to Kumming
under the Ohinese-American agreement.
Being aware of the weakness
stopped the transit ot gasoline
to appease t~e Japanese.

of IndoChina,

General Catroux

on June 16, 1940, in an etfort

19

But this preventive

measure

Governor General came too late.

on the part of the French
Cataclysmic. events had pre-

ceded him in Europe, Which gave the Japanese 8 golden opportunity to satisty their ambitions

in r~gard to Indochina.

In fact, on. June 16, While German troops were pouring
toward Paris, Italy ieclared war against France.
of France

The tall

appeared certain.·20

Four Four days later, i.e., whe.n in Indochina,
made 'his concession

General Catroux

to the. Japanese threat, the French Oabinet

which bad moved to Bordeaux voted 13 to 11 tor an armistice.
On tbatftdecisive date in FrenCh historyft, the President
France, Albert Lebrun, asked Marshall
...

.....

t

of

Henry Philippe Petain

~)

.. 19. Statement of General Catroux, on Aug.l, 1945; the
General was, then, Ambassador of .France to USSR, in Moscow.
New York Times, August 2, 1940
.20. HamIlton Fish Arms,trong, QhroB2lo&
of Failure,
Th~ Last Dals ot_theF:~ch Repub!!£, p.77 .
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to torm a government.

That same night, Marshall Petain sent

tor the Spanish Ambassador

and asked Madrid to communicate to

Chancelor Adolf Bitler the French Government's
armistice.

request tor an

21

The next day, the fighting still continued on the soil of
France.

But in the evening, the world had heard already the

mourning of Sir Winston Churchill, Pr~e

Minister of Great

Britain:
The news from France is very bad, and I grieve for
the gallant French People w~o have fallen into ~his terrible .isfortune.
Nothing will alter our feelings toward them, or our faith that the genius of France will
rise again. vVhat has happened in France ma~es no difference to British faith and purpose. We have become
the sale champions now in arms to defend the world cause.
We shall do our best to be worthy of that high honor.
We shall defend our island, ~nd with the British Empire
around us, we shall fight on unconquerable until the
curse of Hitler is lifted from the brow ot men. We
are sure tnat in the end all will be well. 22
On June 16. 1940, while all FrenCh cities and towns of
more than 20,000 population are for practical purposes surrendered to the German$ by an ofticial proclamation declaring
them to be "open cities", General Charles de Gaulle, with a
tailing voice, appealed fr~

London to the ~eople of France

not to cease resisting the invaders.

He said:

The Genera~s who tor many years have commanded the
French armies have formed.a Government. That Government,
alleging that our armies have beeh defeated. have opened
negotiations with the enemy to put an end to the fighting.
wi:

21.
22.

+ics

---

Arm.strong, op.cit" ·PP.95,102
Ibid., p. 106
.
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We certainly have been, and still are, submerged by the
mechanical strength of the enemy, both on land and in the
air. The tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans
far more than their numbers were responsible for our retirement. The tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the
Germans astnunded our generals to such an extent that
they have been brought to the pass which they are in
today. But has the last word been said? Has all hope
disappeared?
Is the defeat f1nal? No.· Believe me, t
speak with knowledge and I tell you that France is not
lost. The same methods which have brought about our defeat can quite well one day bring viotory. For Franoe
is not alone. She is Dot alone - she is ~ot alone. She
.ha'sa vast empire behind her. She, can unite with the
British Empire, which holds the seas and is continuing
the struggle. She can utilize to the tull, as England
is doing, the vast industrial resources of the United
States ••••• 23
These developments,

directly and indirectly, confessed

aloud not only the weakaeas but real helplessness

of Franee.

General De Gau~le boasted or the Frenc~ vast empire and counted on it to build up the resistance.lIlovement. But the Japanese
who had given refuge to the V~etn~ese

nationalists

for half

a century, 24 knew well that the French Empire was sustained
only by the French armed forces, and these forces were actually wanting.. The United States remained the hope or France,
and the obstacle te Ja~anese ambition, but was the UAited
States willing and ready to ti~t
All these facts concurred

tor the Fre~ch in Indochina?

to show to Japan's leaders that the

door was swinging wide open to them to ~pose
will on Southeast Asia.
p

*

23.
24.

Armstrong,
Devillers,

op.cit., p. 110
Qp.cit., p. 36

their political

3'1

In reality.

Japan did not miss its cbanoe.

1940 when the Frenoh

Government

was reoeiving

ply to Petain's request for an armistice,
ot France were waiting for the hwniliating
would come from the Nazi Chanoelor,25

the Ger~an re-

and while the people
oonditions which

the French Ambassador

in Tokyo was invited by the Japanese Vioe-Ministe~
Atfairs, Masay~ki

On June 19,

tor Foreign

Tani, to the Foreign Office for an interview.

What Japan had to otfer to France then, was a "strong representation" regarding

French Indochina.

later, by "strong representation"
ulttmatwn;

it was resolved,

the French refused,

But. as it was revealed
the Japanese meant a real

~~ the part ot Japan, that it

tOTce would be used.

those days, it was reported

26

In tact, during

that the Japanese Navy performed

unusual activ:lt1-es in· the South, Seas.2'1 Here are the main
points ot th~t representation:
1. The French Government is called u.pon to issue
an order prohibiting exports ot materials to the Chungking Government trom Indoehina;
2. The tollowingmeasures
should be adopted to
enable an idea to be tormed as to the measure of strictness with which the proposet order is carried out;
a~ Statistics of gasoli~ettrucks.and railway equipment held in Indochina should be compiled for presentation to Japanese ofticials;
b. It necessary, statt members ot the Japanese
consulate in Indoohina should be allowed to inspect
materials ,in the,presenee of French officials;
c. Japanese officials should be allowed to station
tbemselves at ~noi and points along the Chinese border
to see that speoified materials are not e~ported to
China trom Indoohina;
Armstrong,~.cit
•• p. 102
"Kido Diary, entry for Ju.ne 1'1, 1940; as eited in
He~bert Feis, !he RoaAto Fearl.Harb~rJ the pomin5 of War Between the United. States and Ja!!n. p. 66
2'1. Decoux, op.clt., p.66~
25.
26.

58

d. French authorities are to close the Chinese
border if these measures fail to ensure strict enforcement of the proposed embargo on exports of materials to
the Chungking Government.
28
Immediately. Arsene-Henry

transmitted these points to

his Government and to General Catroux.

The French Ambassador

4id not forget to advise the French Governor General that a
conciliatory
cumstances.

attitude would be desirable in view of the cir29

General Catronx realized this. and on that

same night, without consulting the French Government at
Vichy announced his acceptance
Arsene-Henry.

of the Japanese proposals to

3Q

On the following day. June 20. 1940. the Toklo Gaze~
made pUblic the result of the Japanese diplomacy on the Indochinese question in these terms:
The French Ambassador called on the Vice-Minister
at 3:50 o'clock this atternoon and stated that the
Frencb GoVernment have since the 17th of tbis month
forbidden the transportation of such oommodities as
gasoline and trucks to China. but that in view ot the
repeated representation of the Japanese Government they
have decideQ to prohibit the transportation of materials
and goods of an extremely Wide range of varieties and
that they have no objection to Japan's dispatching inspectors to the spot. This interview ended at 3:45
o'clock this afternoon. 51

or

course the conduot ot General Catroux was hazardous.

And he was blamed severely by his Government.
not do otherwise.

Bu.t he could

Refusal to the Japanese demands would have

entailed the loss ot Indochina. because as already noted.
28.
29.

Document on American Forei~ !elations.II,p.27l
Andre Ga~del, L'Indochine
rancaise en Face du

. - -JaI!.on,p. 70
30. Decoux. oR.oit •• p.66
31. Documents on Merican Foreign Relations,II,p.272
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Japanese forces 'were ready to invade it.

Fnrthermore,

in

the mind.Gt the, French Governor General, his concession had
the purpose of buying t~e,

while he was waiting tor help

from the United States.
In taet, atter having stopped the transit of gasoline
through I~dochina into China, General Catronx was axious to
know the attitude ot the United states it the Japanese at.
tacked Indochina.

On June 18, 1940, he asked the French Am-

bassador in Washington
Department.

,The next day, he asked again the French Ambass.

adar, in Washington
misslonto

to take up the matter with the State

to requ.est the, State Department

ship 120 airoraft and anti-aircraft

china for the purpose ot "maintaining
Pacific

tt •

Unfortunately,

tor per-

guns to Indo-

the status.guo in the

here are theresul.ts

Of his demarches.

Catroux said:
On June 20, the Freneh Ambassador in Waahington
transmitted to ~e the reply ot the under-secretary of
State: "The United States Govermnent did not believe
that it could enter into confliot with Japan and that,
furthermore, it would take no action it Japan attacked
Indochina".
The French .Ambassador in Washington observed that
in the Circumstances, the only oourse open was to close
the Chinese tronti.r.
To this the Under-secretary of
State remarked: "I will not answer otficially but that
1s what I would do in your place." 32
With reference
arms lathe

to the request tor the permit to purChase

United states, the Under-secretary

Welles, told the rrenoh Ambassador

ot State, Sumner

that the application

32. New York Times, August 2, 1945, p. 7

.would
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be welcomed like that ot any friendly government".

But.

"nothing came trom the request". concluded General Catroux.
The United States Pad declined also an invitation of
the French and British Governm~nts
their con!erencebeld

otficiously to attend

at Singapore from June 22 to June 27.

1940. for the purpose of a joint defense in the Far Eastern
area. 33
The discouragement

in rE;'gardto help from the United

States was voiced also in the telegraa which Admiral Jean
Darlan, Minister

of the Navy and Merchant Marine ~f the

French Government.

sent on June 24. Ig.O, to Vice-Admiral

Deco~x, then Commander ot the French Navy in the Far East.
In this telegram it was revealed that there was "little
local support to be expected from the United states". and
that there was "no effective help to be expected trom the
United States in the near tuture". 34

This was another

proot that 'General Catroux had taken the right course when
he made concessions to Japan.35
But was the United States inditfer~nt to the interests
of Prance and ot Great Britain in the Pacific area?

To

understand the solicitude ot the American Government regardI

;

¥

33. Deeoux.op.cit •• p.22
34. Ibid., p. 34
35. General Catroux said that his appeal to the British
tor assistance wa$ also unheeded. According to the message
Lord Halitax,British Secretary ot State for Foreign Affairs,
sent on June 10. to General Catroux. in answer to the latter's
request. Indochina had no hope tor effective military aid from
Great Britain. General Cat1'"Ouxwas told the same thing,on June
29, by Sir Percy Noble, British Commander in Chief or ~e
China Station. Ibid., pp.43,49
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ing the situation i,nEast Asia, it is enough to glance at
this passage of Cordell HUll's Mem0!rs:
As I surveyed the chaos in Europe and tried to
calculate the dangers that threatened us trom that
quarter, I could never for an instant relax the at.
tention I had concentrated on the Far East. In addresses an4 statements in previous years, I had pointed out again and. again the interrelation of the variousareas of the world emphsizing that war in one was
certain to have disruptive effects in all ot,hers; but
never had this fact become so evident as BOW. 36
To his own efforts, the Secretary of State added those
of his political

advisors, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Maxwell M.

Hamilton,

and Joseph W. Ballantille, thre~ ranking Far Eastern

experts.

He told them:

I can't think of anything we have overlooked in trying to arrive at working relations With Japan. But I
want you to take a fine-tooth CQmb and a microscope and
go back over our relations With Japan and see if it is
humanly possible to find something additiomal with which
to approach them and prevail upon them not to gallop
ott on a,wild horse. 3?
He tel t really relieved when in accord wi t,h the.tn,he
d14 find a sol~t1an to the problem ot the Far East. To quote
him:

We did make one special propoeal, relating to the
Pacitic Ocean possessions of the European belligerents.
I cabled Grew OR June 22 to propOSe a tormal exchange
ot notes with Japanguarantee1ng
the status guo of
such. possessions.
I further proposeQ. that our two
Governme~ts sho~d oonsult should any question arise
concerning the §tatus guo of theQ~, territories. 36
Secretary

of State Hull did not expect that Japan would

be willing to bind itselt in this exchange ot note he proposed.
36.

3?
38·.

42
But he tried what he could do.
Ambassador

On his part, the American

at Tokyo noted as follows the result of his

activities during June, 1940, in executing the directives
of the State Department:
My private conversations with Arita (Japanese
Minister for Foreign Affairs) on JUne 10,19,24, and
28 have led to no concrete results, but they have at
least served to keep the door open between our two
Governments, which was their primary purpose. 39
So, it is evident that the United States kept a watohful eye over the situation ot the Far East and was not indifferent to the plight ot the Europeans possessions

in

this area, as far as the peace ot the world waa concerned.
It seems opportune to cite here the logical explanatio~
given by Werner Levt, author of perican-Australian

Rela1iions

on the reason why the United States worried about the Japanese int.ention to move Soqthwarcl.

Lev! wrote:

This thre.t to Southeastern Asiaw8s a threat to
lite lineS.ot the British Empire and to Vital raw materials needed tor the survival ot Great Britain, Which
the United States considered vital tor its own satety.
Anything endangeringtbe
existence ot Great Britain
was theretore considered as indirectly endang$ring the
United States. Consequently, Japants southward move immediately provoked a stitter attitude on the part ot
the United States and the planning ot .easures to prevent the re~lizatlons ot Japan's intention. 40
Theretore, When Japan menaced Indochina, the United states
,.

--

-

...

39. Joseph C. Grew, !On Years in Jaesn,A Contemporary
Record Drawn trom Diaries.and PrIvate and Official Papers of
JOseph C. Grew, Onlt~d States Ambassador to Japan,l932-1942
p. 321

40.

Werner LeVi, !merican-Australian

Relations, p.l46
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was alerted.

Indoohina was in tact an,important

strategie

spot.

It was a rice bowl which could teed the Japanese troops for a
long time.

It possessed many strategic raw materials

such as,

coal, tin, wolfram, rubber, Which could help the Japanese to
prolong their fight.

More important still, Inq.oohina was the

gate-way to Thailand ant Malaya.

It cou~d serve as a spring-

board for the Japanese to jump to Singapore, to the Netherlands
East In~l1es, and eventUally

to the Philippine

Islands which

the United States was bound to defelJ,d. Besides that, the United
States also had direct commercial

inte~ests in Indochina.

In

June 1940, there were about 125,000 tons of goods, mostly com.
ing from the United States, accumUlated

on the docks at Haiphong,

ot which about 10,000 tons were being transported into China
through the Haiphong-Yunnan

railroad.41

But, at the height of the American concern, on June 17
or 18, the Japanese Director
the British Military

of Military Intelligence

told

Attache' lh Tokyo that the Japanese people

would be cowardly it they tailed to take advantage of the disasters suftered by France and Great Britain in Europe to seize
French IndOChina,. the Netherlands
At the same time, the American

East Indies and Hong-kong.

intelligence

service were re-

ceiving reports which suggested the possibility

of a Japanese

raid on Hawaii. 42
The United States, however, When it looked at the Pacific,
41.
42.

Langer, l!eChallenS!,
Ibid., p. 595-6 .

p. 597
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did not have the same ambitions as France and Great Britain.
Its plan, therefore, was different from theirs.
case of the Monroe Doctrine

in 1823, an~the

As in the

Open Door at the

turn of the oentury, the policy of the United States in the
second World War was imbued with more liberality and justice
than that of the European nations.

Regarding the situation

in the Pacific the United States was trying ~ot only to avoid
war, but also to avoid colonialism,

whereas France, for exam-

ple was trying to aVoid war only to save colonialism.
differenee

of aims resulted

This

in a difference in tactics.

Coming back to General Catrou.x, we see that he was help ...
less betore the Japanese ult~at~.
essary concessions
Gover~ent

But When he

to Japan, many protests arose.

at Chungking announced,

had made nec-

The Chinese

on June 23, its indignant

feelings, stating that therelationshlps

between China and

Indochina were not only intimate in nature but also sanctioned
by several conventions,

the most recent of which, signed on

May 16, 1940, agreed ftto the transportation
of all kinde of merchan4iae

inolu.ding arma and ammWlitlon".

So, France should live. up to her obligations

and keep the Indo-

It France yieldeQ, to the Japanese demands,

chinese route open.
the Chinese Government
cern.

through In400hina

could view it with but the gravest con-

And the. Chinese Foreign Minister

ended ~is statement

with a menaCe:
Therefore,

in the case of armed Japanese invasion

45
of Indochina, the Chinese Government, in order to preserve Chinats existence and independence, will be constrained to take. such measures in self defense as may
be deemed necessary to cope witb the situation in purSQance of its fixed policy of resistance against aggression. i3
The protests of the French Government

itself against

the oonduct of General Catroux was still more threatening
to him.
General Catrouxbad accepted tne Japanese demands without
consulting the French authorities.
the Fl:'enehGovernment

Given the actual chaos ot

t-raJ]l which he received

no communication

tor tour 4ays, 44 and beca~se ot the emergency of the Japanese
ultimatum,

the lrreneh Qavernor General thought that ae couJ,d

aet by his own 4isc1"etion.
Minister

But when he infar~ed the French

ot France Overseas at Bordeaux on June 20, 1940,

instead of approval, he received a grave. reprimand.

45

Feel-

ing that he was misun4,erstoG4, (Jeneral Catrolix presented his
able detense to the Government

of Marshall Petain as tollows:

I think that you Would appreciate more exactly
the r~a11ty of the tbr~at which Japan makes on 1~dochina, by Considering the tact that one part ot its
Navy is directed toward the C08$t ot Tonkin. This
event will help you '\;0 understand tbe better,the decay wkith which the capitulation of France has affected
her in Asia, and to see that there is no more time for
us to sta~d fir~ again$t Japan.
Whe.Ilone is bea,ten, when one has no airplanes and
anti-aircraft guns, no submarines, one tries to keep
one's property wit~out having to tight, or one negotiates.
Tha tis. what I have done •
..

43.
44.
45.

j.

Documents Qn.American Forelgp. Relations,
Gaudel, op.clt., p.'O
Decou, ~1L.,
p. 66
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You tell me that I should have consulted you •••
I answer that I am at a distance ot 4,000 miles from
you, that you can do nothing for me, and lastly, that
I would have been bound to a delay.
I have taken my responsibilities.
I will do it
again ••••• 46
This strong language ot Ge~eral Oatroux resulted in the
loss ot his position in Indochina.

On June 26, 1940, the

French Gover~ent

decided to recall h~ and named Vice-

Admiral Decouxto

his place.

T~e tormal announcement

of

this change was made tour days later. 4'1
But at thist1me

ot trouble, ot shame, and ot indeci-

sion in the situation ot the ~other-eountry",
proved to be a rough te~t tor General Catroux.

obedience
He was much

opposed to the Freneh request ot an armistice and was strongly i1'lcline4to continue the war from the Empire in accordance
w,"th tile appeal

ot General de GaUlle.

atter the armistice was a~ounced,

On June 26,

the day

Catroux said in a tel~gram

to Viee-Acimiral Decoux, th.at "I retuse to recognize an armi48

stice or armltic8.$,and.! will not execute the conditions thereof".

But being cautious, he did not plan to do anything which
could give the JapaAese a reason tor exploitation.

On June 29,

when the Japanese transit con~rol commission arrived at Hanoi,

-----_._- ----_..._....

46. M.Gsl'cen, La Fracas au Ma..rach~lPetaill.Compte Rendn
StenosraRhique, 11,760
47. Decoux, op.cit., p.55
48. Ibid., p.37
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he transnitted

to the French Resident

SuperiQr

of Annam

this message:
For your personal information, I previously
stated tbat w~en I shal receive my revocation, •••
I will not proclaim the dissidence of Indochina.
For such an act would be, as I know it, considered
and exploited by the Japanese as a modification ot
the status guo in the Pacitic. 49
And it w~~ in this spirit that he met the Japanese
authorities

the next day.

But, the Japanese, who tailed to take over Indochina
by the ulttmatum
tory attitude

of June 19, 1940, thanks to the concilia-

ot General Oatroux, telt themselves

and tried again on June 29.
commission,
machine

With the Japanese transit control

there also arrived Japanese warships,

and a torpedo-boat,

harbor ot Hai-phong,
stationed

"eowardly"50

Which took up stations in the

While another Imperial Navy unit was

at Rainan Island. 51 SimUltaneously,

troops were concentrated
chinese border.52

in ~wangslProvince,

Meantime,

ed to provoke reaction
ing themselves

a dredging-

Japanese
on the IndO-

the oontrol commission

from the French authorities,

as in a conquered

tween the representatives

country.

attemptby behav-

Any incident be-

of the two co~ntries would be a

good pretext tor an immediate

Japanese military

occupation

.,

49. Decoux,oPicit., p.3'1
50. See the s a emEtnt ot the Ja.panese Director ot the
military intelligence service,mentioned
in page 42,th!s paper.
51. Decoux, op.clt., ,.70
52. The New International Yearbook.1940,p.291

48.

ot Indochina.
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For a second t~e,however,
their machinations,

the Japanese had to bold back

because ot diplomatic pressure trom Wash-

ington and even from Berli~, and directly because ot Oatroux's
own machinations.
We have noted that Oatroux's request tor help trom the
United States was turned down by the Under-Secretary

of state,

because, at that time, quite apart trom the tact that the War
and Navy Departments
Indochina,

did not have units that could be sent to

the American Administration

any complioation

was determined to avoid

in tbe Pacitic area if "humanly possible."54

But trom June 21, 1940, the United States Government was
delQged with pleas to take a strong stand on Indochina.
day, in a telegram,58niang-Kai-Shek

That

oalled the President's

tention to the serious situatioa ot Indochina.

Consul Reed

at Hanoi had also a word to say about the same question.55
June 27, the British Ambassador,
the Australian Minister,

at-

Lord Lothian, accompanied

On
by

Richard G. Oasey, asked the Secretary

ot State to decide whether Japan should be opposed or appeased;
they reminded him that, in the latter case, ~rench Indochina
might be ocoQpied at any moment".

and the security not only or

the British Empire but that ot the United States as'well would
be ~periled.

On'the tollowing day, Secretary Hull made clear

Deeoux,op.olt., p.68
54. HUll,Q2.o1t ••1,a88; see also page 38 of this paper
55. Tel. from~eed
(Hanoi) June 21,1940,eited in Langer,
the Ohallenge, p.599
56. Tel. trom Chiang Kai-shek,June 21, 1940,loe.c1t.
53.
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his view, saying that:
neither should we make ooncessieDs so sweeping that
Japan would aecept them as a basis for agreement and
tllep.bide her tim.e to make further demands or take
further steps, nor should we embark upon military or
eoonomic action5~o drastic as to provoke immediate
war with Japan •.'1
Whereupon, Rulldecided

to leave the American Fleet at

Hawaii, hoping that this was sufficient tQ deter the JapaneS7
from a flagrant aggression against Indochina. 58
These talks and actions were still like the beating of
distant drums. so tar as the Japanese were ooncerned and, as
Ambassador
the records

Grew remarked they pretended not to hear. 59

But

show that: "The Japanese Navy. remained wary about

a long war with the United States with only l1mited reserve or 011.60

8

war tbat would be begun

At the same time, negotiat1p.t:lsconducted in Berlin by the
Japanese Ambassador,

Saburo Kuruau, with the purpose ot getting

Nazi favor, were not encouraging

to Japan.

Ambassador Kurusu

pointed out that Japan had a marked interest in French Indochina and asked Germany to let it have a tree hand in that
territo~7. 61

But, trom Tokyo, the German Ambassador, Engen

Ott, sent to the.Nazi Fo~eign Minister,Joaohim

von Ribbentrop,

the wise advice that Indochina be used as a bargaining item to

HQll, op.cit., 1,899
Lae.cit.
59. Grew,op.cit., p.321
60. Feis,~.cit.,P.69
.
61. Depar e.nt ot State BUlletin,June l6,1946,nV,103;:
57.
58.

~F~~
;~:-:)
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Japan in the Axis sphere. 62
But the main factor in frustrating the Japanese plan
ot a military invasion of Indochina at the beginning of
July, 1940, was Catroux's prudent policy, a policy designed
"to temporize and hold em, wai tins tor a more 1'avQrable turn
to the war". 63
In tact, on June 30, 1940, General Catroux staged a show
01'political skill in manipulating
he m~naged to drive Vice-Admiral

a double enemy.

On one hand,

Decoux out of the Government

General of Indochina, on the other, he tried to divert the
Japanese trom their territorial ambition.

Both aims succeeded

tor the moment.
That same day, when the nomination of Jean Decoux to the
Government General of Indochina was declared officiallY,Decoux
transmitted

to the French Government a telegram which begins:

~n comr!ete aecord with Gfneral Oatroux~ and basins
on man~ gual:!led advlcss rltal~cs mIner; I e$tImate it
dangerous In every aspect ~ediately
to replace the
Governor General in actual circumstances ••••• 64
Then, General Catroux availed himself or this delay to
secure his position vis-a-vis the Japanese.

-

consented to respect the French sovereignty

~d

the latter

on Indochina, he

would have thrown otf altogether the authority of Mannall

62.Loa.cit.
53.The New Y9rk Times,August 2,1945,recording the statement of General eatroux on the situation of Indochina on JuneJ~ly,1940

64.Deeoux,op.cit.,

p.56

51.

Petain.

Though the Japanese soon proved to be too ambitioQs

tor his ability of concession and he had to stop, his attitude at the start of the negotiation with the Japanese head
of the transit control commission, General Isaku Nishihara,
had saved Indochina trom an ~ediate

danger,C~troux

said:

I gave the JapaJl~se Arm.y no pretext for intervention,
insisted on mutua+ respect tor the transit agreement,
and refused encroachment on the sovereign rights of France.
In order to divert Japanese attention trom their
territorial aims, I pressed them toward economic under65
standing so that it oould be advantageous to both countries.
GeneralCatroux

was very positive in the last point. He

presented to the Ja~anese a memorandum

ot present and future

foreign trade of Indochina in which he described the downward
tren~ot

exports to France si~ce aut~

products as rice,~nions,coa1.

1939 of s~ch staple

In conclusion, he went ahead

of the Japanese demands and said:
Accordt.ngty, it is a matter CJt urgent necessity for
French Indochina to seek an outlet for her exports other
than France, espeoially in the countries of the Pacific.
Regarding stapleprodl,tcts,fortanate1y Sapan has replaced
Franoe as a large buyer of agricultural products, and it
might be well said that Japan has saved French Indochina
trom an economic c~isis. America,too,has inere~sed her
purchase of F~ench Indochina rUbber since the outbreak
at the Europaan war, but there is a limit to the export
of other goods to the United States; Japan isa good customer of coal,1ron,ore.salt,etc ••• ,and there is a great
prospect ot increasing eXPorts ot rabber,tin and rock
phosphate to Japan, while French Indochina can bUy Japanese cotton yarn, cotton text1les,rayon,porcelain wares,
a,nd chemical prod~ets.6'

65.

66.

The Ney! Y2rk Times, August 2, 1945
~oeumen~s on Amer!canFore!&e
Relations,III,274
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About this, Vice-Admiral
conversations
political

between

Decoux remarked

the two generals

than technical

of listing

interest,

Secondly,

of which into China would

67

General Catroux also declared he turned down

"an otfer by the Japanese
liance",

took soon a much more

so that "no one still thought

the goods, the transport

be hence prohibited".

that the quasi-daily

and refused

Petain Government".

General Nishihara

to "recommend
68 However,

such an alliance

themselves
Lang-son,

controllers

in six points in Indochinese
Cao-bans,Ha-giang,

to the

it he did not conclude any

alliance with Japan, he did make tar-reaohing
July 2, 1940, the Japanese

tor a ipanese Al-

Lao-kay,

concessions.

On

were allowed to station
territory,

namely,Mon-cay,

and the port of Hai-phong.

Since early in July, the Japanese had also insisted on the
following

demands:

a)The supply ot prOVisions and munition to the Japanese Army at Kwangsi through Tonkin;
b)The right faculty tor this Army to send the wounded
and the sick to the Tonkinese hospitals;
c)Partioularly,the
right ot transit for the Japanese
forces toward Yunnan thrOUgh TOnkin.69
General Catroux
of exploitation

~iscerned

in these demands the possibility

in favor ot the French interests;

on July 9,1940

he granted per.missioO tor the operation of Japanese supply services through Indochina,

and the right to evaouate the wounded

and the sick into his territorY.

The next day, Ae told the Jap-

Decoux, OR.cit., p.e8
68. The New York ~imes, August 2, 1945, p.7
69. Decoux, 2R.clt., pp.&8-69
67.
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anese authorities that h~ was disposed to let then supply
munitions

to their army at Kwangsi and evacuate this army

through the Tonkinese delta, provided that Japan would
guarantee to respect the French sovereignty on Indoohina and
on the Spratley Islands, and to withdraw their torces trom
Hainan.

In response to this proposal, General Nishihara hint-

ed the possibi~lty

of a military alliance.

'10

Up to July 10, 1940, General Catroux conducted the negotiations with the Japanese Gene~a+t Nishihara, at his own discretion, without inro~ing
Vichy.

the French Goverbment, now moved to

When General Nishihara suggested a military alliance,

Catroux asked the.advlce ot the Frenoh AJIlbassadorat Tokyo.
Atter tive days, Ambassador Arsene-Henri
here on a very dangerous ground".

warned that "we are

The secret ot General Catroux

was thus leaked out and on July 18, 1940 he was ordered by Vichy
to suspend all ~egotiations
Indochina to Viee-Admiral

and to transmit the government ot
71
Decoux.

In the atternoon of July 19. 1940, his last day in ottice,
General Catroux had a long talk with his successor.

In conclu-

sion, ~e said:
Since the beginning, I resolved to go beyong the
Japanese demands so to unbend the relations with the
J&panese missien and to create a favorable a~osPhere
to our conversations.
To this effect, I have closed
up the frontiers to the e~pl)rt into 6hins, and I just
have done the same thing to the reverse movement tor

'0. Deooux, op.oit., p. 69
71. Atter the occupation ot Paris by the Germans, the
Freneh Government moved to Bor~eanx, and, on June 50, 1940,
trom Bordeaux to Vichy, Ga~con oe.cit. II, 869
*
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a month, at the request of the mission, despite the many
damages suoh a measure would oause to us. It will be up
to you to re-open the frontiers on August 7, in the direotion of China-Indoohina.
•
I bave eVen admitted the establishment ot a mixe
airline over Oanton and Hanoi, and aooepted in prinoiple the
installation of a cable between canton and Hai-phong. All
this represents a great assistance to the Japanese. So,
in return, I demand the conclusion of an accord which wou14
guaraptee the maintenanoe of the Frenoh sovereignty on Indochina. I have added that, suoh an acoord, of oourse, would
be negotiated between Tokyo and Vichy, but that, it the
Japanese Government gives me right now the fundamental guarantee in question, I would be in measure to acoentuate my
polioy at sUPPorting Japan.
But, time rolled by while the politel guarantee, Which
I disoounted to be gr$nted and whioh was promised to me,
is not notified to me. On the oontrary, the mission was
developening its aotivities and aocentuating its enoroaohments. We bave, therefore, reached the point where, in
my opinion, it behooves us to stitfen our attitude, to
react against the unbearable abuses of the Japanese and
henceforth, to canton the mission in the strict execution
ot its mandate.
That will be your i~ediate task. 72
So, on July 20, 1940, ended a phase of the Indochinese history which Paul ,Baudouin, the Frenoh Foreign Minister at the
Government of Petain, called. the ~Phase Catroux". 73
General Catroux was blamed for his policy.
But, it he had stiftened his attitude toward the Japanese
right in ~he beginning ot the Japanese enoroaohment

on Indochina

, Japan would have invaded the French colony before any other power
co~d

have taken any measure against it, and then WOQld haTe pre-

sented its oceapatioA a'_a fait aecompli. ?4

~2. Decoux, op.oit •• PP.6e-~2
73. Ibid., p.95
'4. Garcon, op.cit., 1,276

The United States and Indochina

The First Indochinese
June-September,

in

Crisis

1940

The Japanese Ocoupation
of North

Indoohina

September 1940

It August, 1940, was a month of activity tar the Japanese auth~rities,

September was a month of realization.

Of course, to break the status gu~ and to get into Indoohina was regarded as a ditfioult undertaking if the United
States stood tirmly upon its established rights and policies.
Nevertheless,

Japan went

end ot September,

head with its program and, at the

1940, the Japanese military felt at home

in Hanoi, the capital of Indochina.
The political agreement

signed by Franoe and Japan on

Indochina on August 29, 1940, was to go into effect after
the conclusion

of a military

accord to be negotiated,

on

the spot, at Hanoi, between the military authorities of the
two countries.

Here, difficulties

sistent opposition of Vice-Admiral
Japanese troops.l

arose, because of the perDecoux to any arrival of
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On July 20. 1940. Vice-Admiral
Government

Jean Decoux began his

General ot French Indochina.

After the long talk

he had had the day betore with his predeoessor.

General Georges

Catroux, he was more contirmed than ever in his view ot "defense and no defiance"2 against Japan.

The next day, when tor

the tirst time he received the Chiefs of'Services of his administration,

he proclaimed

ity of the sitaationwhich

that "whatsoever would be the gravI should have to oonfront with, I

would not be a liquidator'of' Indoohina".2
To General Nishihara.
showed the same firmness.

who~ he met some days later, he
In his own aooount, he said:

I declared without equivocation that he had not
to rely on me in treating the questions whioh were
beyond my competence. or exceed my personal responsibilities. I added that I would aot only in full contormity with the French Government, Which, of course.
should remain in the serious circwnstanoes of the mo~ent the only master of' important deoisions to be taken.3
On July 23. Vice-Admiral

Decoux telegraphed

telling the Government what his predecessor

to Vichy

had done. saying:

My conclusion, atter a thorough examination of the
situ.atien, is tbat cOIlCessions, very big, going even beyond what they (the Japanese) dem,anded, have been
.ell
the Japanese wit.hout any counterpart, to the effec' ot
creating a favorable atmosphere,in view ot obtaining
from them guarantees.
Facts, however, have proved that our concessions
had the unique result of developing Japanese appetites.
The expected counterpart, whioh, trom another principle
exceeds the power ot the Governor General, has not been
~corded, and I doubt that it will ever be •

...
2. Jean Deooux, oE.oit., p.78
3. Ibid. pp. 91-92
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I am eager to put a good order to these errors, to
stop the Japanese encroachments, to reopen the frontier
to a certain extent, atter a previous accord of the Japanese mission on the goods to be transported or transited. I will also try not to make any concession without
inmediate and substantial counterpart, but I am placed in
a serious state ot tact, t~nding in reality to a peaceful
conquest ot Indochina by Japan. I will try to reduce the
Japanese mortgage, of whicb I have to take into account.
To this effect, it would be of interest to come back
to normal methods. I propose,therefore, to deal on looal
questlonswith. General Nishihara, and to submit to yOll
the conclusions, Which I have arrived at, so as ~o enable you to get in touch with the Government ot Tokyo by
normal diplomatic avenues.
On July 27, the French Government,

atter deliberation,

gave tull agreement

to the plan sketched by the Governor Gen-

eral ot Indoohina.

~boldened

Deeoux, on J~y

29, oouldreply

by

this blessing, Vice-Admiral

to General Nishihara,

who

would leAve the next day tor Tokyo to report the result of
his mission to the new Japanese Ga.binet, that the:Governor
General eould not agree with Japan on the following points:
a) Interd1ctien ot all transit ot Japanese troops
'across Indochina.
b) Interdiction ot transport ot ammunition and war material, save provisions, tor the Army ot Kwangsi.
c) Interdiction
ot the establishment ot a Japanese
station ot wireless telegraph in the Indoohinese territory.5
While Vice-Admiral

Deeoux was proud ot his attitUde, the
.
6
Japanese had just set a program to ourb him. In fact, On July
27, the Japanese Government

4.

had made a great decision.

The

Decoux, Op.cit.,P.93
Ibid.p.92
'fheprogram was not intendeEl to curb Deooux in person.
It was ot a general scope~ but applied to IndOChina, it kept
in check the aims of the r~ench Governor General,
5.
6.
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Liaison Conterence,

r w nt

the tir t ot its kind, whose po

beyond that ot the Cabinet and the Court, had approv d
policy present d by the new Cabin t ot Prince Fum1maro Konoye,
called "Gist ot the Main Point

in Regard to Dealing with the

Situation to Meet the Change in

orld Conditions".

The story

how this policy was arrived at is worth telling.
In July 1940, the Japanese militarist

were becoming in-

creasingly dis atistied with the Cabinet ot Admiral Yonai. It
as the Yonai Government which tailed to take over the French
Indochina when the tall ot Franoe ott r d an excellent opportunity tor such an undertaking.
torces were tWio

Late in Jun , the Japanes

re dy to inTade Indoohina, but tWio

they

had to withdraw beoause ot the relatively oiroumspeot prooe ure
of the Gov rnment, because ot the diplomatio opposition ot
other nations, and beoause ot the adroit maneuverings
eral Catroux.

The oonversations

ot Gen-

between the Japanese Ambass-

ador, Saburo Kurusu, with Joachim R1bbentrop tell also tar
7

short ot the hopes ot Admiral Yonsi, who, on July 7 sent Naotake
Sato, a tormer Foreign Minister,
Berlin.

for a good-will mission to

Sato did gather the tact that Germany had no ambitions

in respect to the Frenoh

nd Dutoh oolonies in the Far East,

at least tor the time being, but did not get any pledges fro
Ribb ntrop.a

The reason was that R1bbentrop tollowed the re-

7. Naotake sato came to Berlin on July 8,lg40.See International Mi~itary Tribunal,Far East Tokyo,1946- • r:COrd p.6l70
by F.C.Jon.s, in his Japan's New Order fP East As aelts Rise
nd Its Fall 1937-45 p.222
8. ~'PP6187-40;
Jones,Ibid p.223
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commendations

of the German Ambassador

Germany would probably

in Japan who held that

give Japan a tree hand in Indochina

"if Japan obliges herself

to tie down America

area, perhaps by a pr~ise

only

in the Pacifio

to attack the Philippines

and Hawaii

in the event ot America' 8 entry into the war against Germany. "9
But these conditions
it appeared

did not influence the Yonai Cabinet as;

in th~ broa~cast

ot the Japane~e Foreign Minister,

Hachiro Arita, who, on Jane 22, 1940 had mentioned
policy ot non-involvment

in European

~o.cop.with the cold attitude.ot
Ministry

attairs.lO
Ribbentrop,

the Foreign

ot the Yonai aabine~ drafted a German-1apanese

ment and discusse~
on July 12 and 16.

it w1.t~ representatives.ot
The proposals

should.coopera\e

with Germany,

al)out tlle surrender

agree-

the Army and Navyll

ot this agreement were that

Japan .should recognize.German.leadershlp

b~inging

Japan's

in Eureope and Africa,

by measures

short or war, in

at Great Britain, and in ravoring

the position

ot Germany

in Itstrade

with Greater East Asia,

that Germany

and Japan should conter on the measures

taken, it eithe~ of both powers ~ere threatened
tnat both powers should prevent Amer~can

to be

by the USSR,

interterence

with

10. Tel. trom Ott to Berlin,June 2.,1940 (Toklo War
Crimes Do.cwnents, N,o. 40250) Cit,ed in The Challenge to Isolation.19:i?-194G,by Wil.llam L. ;Langer and S.Everett Gleason,
195t.~~
•• 3ones. 0R.'~. p.22~,~ote 4
11. Th.e m~mpers:were. An(lo and Ishizawa,Seetion
chiets
at the F~reign.Minlstry'; Lt.ColQnel Takafama.ot the War
lI4inistry; Major Tanemur.a,ot Army General Statt; Comm.Shiba,
Qt Navy Minis,try -t and Captain On~,. ot Naval G$neral Statt.
1Jrl'-j'E.Exhtb1! Nos.52? 8.o.d,.528.S,ti Jones,OR.e!1 p.224,note 1
FeiB,OR.e-l~,.7~,

60

their respective

activities

in Europe and in Asia.

In re-

turn Germany should support Japan in its ambitions over the
South Seas region, including French Indochina and Netherlands
East Indies. 12
But time had run out ror the Yonai Cabinet.

The militar-

ists were already out of Patience; they talked ot assassination;
they plotted to kill all. the leading advocates of triendship
of the United states and Great Britain,13 at the end, they
bluntly asked tor a oabinet change. 14

On July 16, the Mini-

ster of War, G$neral Shuroku Hata, powerless to control the
Army, resigned, and so did the Prime Minister.15
The next day
tormer Prime Ministers

and senior members

ot the Privy Council

oonven~d to ohoose a successor to Admiral Mltsumasa Yonai, a
man

WhO

should be able to manage as "having the oonsent ot the

Army and being close to them".16

That same night the Emperor

issued an imperial mandate, to Prince Fuminaro ROnoye to torm
17
a new government,
which was practically set up on July 18.
On the evening ot JUly 19, 1940, though they would be
tormally invested with power only three days later, the
Foreign Miaister. Yosuke Mat.u.0ka, the Minister

of War,

11&12 The members were Ando and Ishizawa,Seotion chiets
ot Foreign Ministry; Lt.Co1.Takayame.ot the War Ministry;Major
Tanemura,ot Army General Statt.; Comm..Shib, of Navy Ministry, .
and Capt. oao , ot Nval General Statt .•IMTFE,Exhibit, No.52?
and 528.8ee Jones,0~.Clt •.
p.224,note 1; Feis,~tclt.p.7g
13. "Kido Diarytf.•entry for July 5,1~40;-See l'eis.Op.cit
p.'l8

14.
15.
16.
17.
L.Langer

IMTFE Diary Exhibi~,No.5205;Feis.Loc.cit.
"Kido Diary",entry tor July 16 & I'.Feli.OS.Cit.P.?9
IMTFE !!!!. No.3340;Feis.lbid p.80;Langer.2P.c1t.p.606
lMTFE.Loe.cit. Bee also ~e Undeclared W$r~oy William
and S.Everett Gleason,p. 4. FeIs.!!!! p.80

61

Lieutenant-General

Hideki Tojo, the Minister

of Navy. Vice-

Admiral Zenga Yoshida, m.et with the Prime Minister

tor an

exchange ot vJews. What was going on in that important meeting can be seen in these few words of Prince Konoye, who
said that "••••• because Matuoka

spoke out as though he ad-

vocated war with the United States, the Navy Minister was
aghast at first.

However, he was. placated when Matsuoka

followed with moderate explications".
Atter a week of intra-ministerial

de~1beratioas,

and ot

discussions w1th the court aDd military men, the new cabinet
approved the result on July 26, 1940.,. Wl.der th,e title: "Gist
ot the Main Points in_R~gard to.Dealing with the Situation
to Meet the C~anse in Wor~d Condition~".l1

In this very im-

portant politioal doeument two $sin purpo~es were set forth:
a) to hasten tbe end ot the confliot.in Ohins;
the problem of the south ,!ithinsuchsco~e

b) to solve

.!.S would not le!,d

to wa:r:~
with .o!ler 20wers (1t8110s of Feis)' 19

When the Liaison

Oonference adopted this policy on the following day, it made
H.

#

18. IMTFE. Exhibit No. 1310; Feis. 02.etl. p. 84. About
this program Herbert Feis r~marked: w.tike aI;ost all Japanese
official documents (and not only Japanese) ot the sort, this
was so oomposed to allow d1fterent detinition~ by difterent
persons _.atdifferent times. The ambiguity was useful. Gaps
in meaning served to conceal secret purposes; obsourity ot
phrase permitted future twists of aim. Autbority within Japan
could become unified only in a haze. ~berefore the student
can never be sure of exact shades ot intent, or eveh that he
has culled out trom the many parts and sections those that
were most .tneant".
19. The summarization.is or Herbert Feis, Q2.cit.,P.85
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its decision.s:
(1) To maintain a firm attitude toward Amerioa on
the one hand; to effect on the other hand a sweeping
readjustment of Japanese relations with the USSR, as
well as a political combination with Germany and Italy.
(2)
To take stronger measures against French Indochina,
Hong Kong and foreign concessions in China looking to
the prevention ot aid to the Chiang regime ••• (3) To
practice more vigorous displomacy toward the Netherlands
East Indieast in order to acquire vital materials. 20
The Konoye cabinet carried out faithfully
during its year in office.
dissensions reappeared.

these deoisions

But even before it began to work,

Thus K~rqu1s K1do, the Lord Keeper of

the Privy Seal, reoorded an observ8tion of the Emperor:
I was reoeived in audienoe and told by His Majesty
his impression in regard to the execution ot the plaBs
decided at the Imperial Liaison Oonference (of JUly 27).
The Government body, Army and Navy cliques, all hold
ditferent ideas in regard to the xeeution ot the plan.
Premier Konoye believing that t~e China incident cannot
be easily settled, wants to try to reduce the area of
occupation in Ohina and start the southward operation.
Thus he seems to be trying to divert the discontent of
the people over the failure ln Chlna towards the South.
The Army wants to leave the situation ln China as it
ls, and to advance south if there ls an opportunity.
~~~iih~h:a:~rs~:m~~f~
~~e:e~~ie~:silto
dvance south
20. Feis, Loc.cit. The Japanese based their decisions on
the principle of self-defense. But ~erbert Feis observed rightly
that: "The concept of national self defense hasss many hues
as a rainbow. Each country has its filter, and eaoh bends the
rays to its own wants and fears. To the men w~o wrote Japanese
policy in JulYt1940tnational selt-defense meant any action deemed neoessary to place Japan in a position to win a war ln case
it could not achieve its aims without war •••lt seeks to oonceal
asS£esslve (sic) and threatenl~ Ja2anese aim-S;-bl stressfns
the strate~c jQstrtIcatIon ol~apaneseJneasures.p.
86 !b!~.The
LIaIson Co erence was attended by the leadIng cabinet officers and the Chiefs ot Statt ot Army and Navy.
21. "K1do Diary·, entry tor July 30,1940; Feis.OP.elt.p.87
4
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Amidst these differences

of opinions, one thing emerged

clearly, namely to use the expression
22
goes hell-bent toward the Axis".

ot Ambassador Grew, "Japan

During these days when Japan planned policy touching America, the United States, on its part, though particularly

of

Japan, and not in a nice manner.
Early in July 1940, r~or

was afloat that Japan attempted to

bUy great quantities of aviation gasoline and lubricants. The
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, for example, on July 18,
reported to the st~te Department
buy any and all quantities.

that Ja~an was Offering to

At the same time, according to

word sent to Washington by the American eonsuls at Kobe and
Osaka, Japan was planning to acoUD1!l1ulate
stooks on Hai~an Islands.

These indioations were oonclusive ot an imminent southward movement ot the Japanese.23
On July 19, 1940,.the Seoretary of State left for a eonferenoe of the Am,ariean Rep~blics at Havana, without definite
ideas on how to oope with the new developments

in the Pacific.

But other officials ot the Government were thinking of a solution.

The e~en1ng before at a dinner where Henry L. Stimson,

the Secretary of War, Frank Knox, the Seoretary ot the Navy,
Henry Morgenthau,Jr.,

the Seoretary at the Treasury, were

present with the Br1tish Ambassador,
j

Lord Lothian, and the

-

22. Joseph C. Grew. Ten Years in Jaren. p.324. fhis book
is a oont~porery
reoord drawn trom the d aries and private
and official papers ot the U.S.Ambassador in Japan,from 1932-1942
23. Fels. Op.~it. p.89

64

Australian Minister, Richard G. Casey, an idea was brought
out "that we now had an opportunity under the new l~gislation of stopping the supplies of oil to Japan.24 The next
morning, Morgenthau

su.ggested to th,ePresident:

"There is a

possibility that a plan can be quickly developed with the
eo-operation of the British GoverIl$ent to stop oil and gasoline tor Jap~n.

Lord Lothian, whose proposal it partly is,

is enthusiastic about its possibilities

and will ascertain
25

his Government's reaction, should you deem the plan teasib1e".
This was the plan: The United States was, on tbe
ground of national defense, to stop all exports ot oil;
Britaiu was to ~et all its oil trom the Carribean area;
Britain and the United States were to buy up any surplus production in that area; Britain was to arrange with
the Dutch government to destroy the oil wells in the
Indies; and, tinal1y, it was to concentrate bo~bing attacks on the synthetic oil plants in Germany. Where 26
then, and how, would Japan. and Germany get oil for war?
The plan sounded good, and the President convoked Stimson, Knox and Sumner Welles, t.b.eActing Secretary ot State,
to the White House for discussion.
The President pointed to the map across the room
and said that be had sat there day atter day watching
the map and that he finally came to the conclusion that
the only way out of the diffieulties of the world was
by starving of the people ot Europe, particularly in
regard to their supply of fuel to carryon the war ••••
The President ~~s ideas by Which America could, acting
Qader the recent legislation, prevent all of the petroleum. supplies - particularly aviation oil - trom going
to the Nazi Axis powers. American oil could be stored
in the ground and the cost of the Government buying it
in that condition would be comparatively small. This

--

A

24. Unpublished diary ot Henry L. Stimson,entry tor
July 18, 1'40. cited by Feis, Loc.cit.
25. St~son diarY,entry tor :uIy 19,1940; Feis,loc.cit
26. The plan is summarized by Feis,op.elt. p.90
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would prevent oil from going to Spain and through Spain
to the Germans. Great Britain would take care ot the
Ven£uelan supplies, and so on. When they got to the
Far Eastern side, S~er
Welles put in an ob~ection that
an embargo against Japan would cause Japan to make war
on Great Britain. I ventured to doubt this 'and the
question came up of whether or not the New Netherlands
wells could not be put out of commission and thus Japan
deprived of her Objective tor going to war with Great
Britain. Altogether 1t was a long-and interesting discussion but whether or not it wa& intended to be a tactual one was left in the air. 27
New develop$ents

proved that it was intended to be a

tactual one. The next day, July 20, 1940, the President sign.ed a bill for a two-oeean Navy, desigaed to enable the United
28

States to deal not enly with Ger~a~y, but with Japan as well.
Two days later, the Treasury statt presented to tbe President
t~e Text ot a procl~ation,

placing under control export of

all kinds of oil_and all scrap ~etals.
President

Sim~ltaneously,

the

received. a telegt'iilm
trom General De Witt,Commander

at San Francisco ot the 9th Corps Area, reporting that tremendous Japanese purchases of aviation gasoline were being madeand concluding:

"Should the Arm, and Navy need it in quantity,

during tbe next six to nine months there would be a shortage
of a~iation gasoline it thase Japanese purchases are oonsummated". 29
The President. on July 26, 1940, signed the proclamation
and informed the press ot its contents.

Aecordingly,

papers spread a lang~8ge that meant an "embargo".

-

York T~es
,

..21.
28.

29.

news-

-

The New

announced: "Embargo put on Oil,Scrap Metal, in

-

St~son diary,entry tor July 1~,1940 cited by Fais,cit.loc
The New York Times, July 21, 1940,p.l
Feis, op.clt. p.92
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30

License Order by Roosevelt".
But in the atternoon

ot the same day, when the proclama-

tion was sent to the state Department

tor countersignature,

Sumner Welles hurried to persuade the President
in tavoro(

a lesser one.

The Presiden~

text, signed on July 26, the President

agreed.

to discard it
In the new

said;

Now, theretore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President
ot the United States ot ~rtca,
acting under and by virtue ot the authority vested in me by the said act ot
Congress (Aot to Expedite the strengthening ot the National
Detence, approved July 2, 1940) do hereby proclaim that ••••
I have determlped that it is necessary in the interest ot
the national defense that on and atter August 1, 1940,
the additional materials hereinafter listed, shall not be
exported trom the United states except when authorized in
each case by alioense as provided tor in the aforesaid
proclamation:
1. Petroleum products
2. Tetraethyl lead
31
3. Iron and steel scrap
It is obvious that the regulatiGJ1s dealt nG more with all
kinds of 011 and all scrap materials,
the first document.

as they were drawn up in

But these beitations

and correotions

would,

in tlwe, loose their raison dte~t~, When the Japanese encroachments became real i~ Frenoh Indochina.

Atter the week of discussions

and planning came the t~e

tor action.
On July 26, 1940, the day when the United States proclaimed
restrictive

-

measures

against Japan, as it is just said, the Jap-

..

30.The New Y~k T1mes,July 26,1940 p.l That same day, the
New York Herald Tribune gave the story under this heading: "U.S.
!iibargo Is Clamped on ietals and 01ls •
. 31. DeEartmen~.qtState
Bulletin,July 27,1940(vol.III.No.57)
p.49.The text Is reprInted In Fore~~lat1ons
ot the Un1t~d
StatesLJap!Bj 1931-1941, II 216,217
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anese Minister for Foreign Affairs of the new cabinet met the
American Ambassador

in Tokyo.

In this interview, Yosuke Matsuoka,

according to Joseph C. Grew, "referred to an article which he
had written some time ago stating that if the United States and
Japan ever have to fight each other they should know precisely
the causes and reasons for which they were fighting and that
if war comes, it should not develop, as in so many other cases
in history, through misunderstanding".
bable misunderstanding

As if to clear up a pro-

between the two countries, the Foreign

Minister expressed the concept of history of the Japanese people.
Mr. Matsuoka then said that history is based largely
on the operation of blind forces Wh~gh in a rapidly moving
world cannot always be controlled.
Matsuoka was not content to make this notion known only to
Grew, but still wanted him to convey it to the President of the
United States.. To quote Grew:
Mr. Matsuoka asked me now to express privately to the
President that he shared his. lifelong hope and interest in
the preservation of world peace. He added, however, that
he had come to ~derstand that since the world is constant~y
evolving, changing and growing, peace cannot be safeguarded
by adhering to the status quo. The League ot Nations failed
he said, because its member states had not had the courage
to implement Ar~icle 19 ot the Covenant, which provides for
adjustments to meet such evolution and changed circumstances.
A new order must come into being in the world, and the peace
of the world must have as its foundation our adaptation to
the developm~~t and change. 33
4

The tenor of this message rehearsed the doctrine of the
"Gist ot the Main Points in.Regard to Dealing with the Situation
32. Grew,or.Cit.entry tor July 26,1940, under the title
"First conversat on with Foreign Minister Matsuoka". p.322
35.

~,p.323
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to Meet tbe Change in World Conditions",

that the Japanese

Cabinet stenciled down in indelible ink on that very same
day.

It was also an orthodox continuation

of the Japanese

militarist line of thoughts tracing back to the Tanaka Memorial 34 in 1927, and to the diplomatic reply of Japan to the
request of Open-door of the United States in 1938.35 On this
message, the President

oommented that ~a genuine and durable

world peace, in our opinion, ca~ot

be aChieved by other than

orderly prooesses and by dealing fairly and justly, both of
Which entail respect for the rights of all ooncerned, and
36

whioh allow all nations to attain their legitimate aspirations."
But, before this answer reaohed the Japanese Minister, Japan
.had begun to carry out its expansionist policy.
On August 1, 1940, the Japanese Government announoed the
summary of its fundamental national polioies, the basic ata
of which "lies in the firm establis~ent

ot world peaoe in ao-

cordanoe with the lofty spirit of Bakko.lohia,

in which the

34. !hft Tanaka Memorial, is a·report that Baron Gilchi
Tanaka was suppose~ to have given his Emperor, on July 25,1927.
It expresses the views ot the militarists, espeoially in the
passage, that,tollows: "In the future,it we want to control China
we must tirst orush the United States, just as in the past we
had to tight in the Russo-Japanese War. 'But, in order to oonquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In
order to con uerworld, we.:must tlrst:conquer,~Qhi·na.:~·Ifwe :',
Sucoeedto .;oonqner China, ',there.iitot the Asiatio countries
and the South Seas oountries will tear us and surrender. Then
the world will realize the Eastern Asia is ours and will not
dare to violate our rights."OttoD.Tolisohus,
Through Japanese
Exes. p. sa
35. ForeiS; Retations ot the United States,Japan 1.800
36. Grew.~,rt.
entry tor August 3,1940,unde~ the title
"President RooseT~t~eplies
to Foreign Minister Matsu0ks,"p.323

69

country was founded, and in the construction,

as the first

step, of a new order in Greater East Asia, having for its
toundation

the solidarity ot Japan. ManchoukuG

More explicit, Foreign Minister Matsuoka,
day, stated that "aocordingly

on the same

the immediate aim ot our for-

eign poliey at present is to establish,
the lotty spirit ot the ~

and Ohina".37

in aocordance with

(Imperial way) a great East

Asian ohain of common prosperity with the Japan-ManchoukuoChina group as one ot tbe links". 38

It was understood

the next link would be French Indochina;
delay, he handed a memorandum
Arsene-Henri,requesting
it facilities

that

because, without

to the Frenoh Ambassador,Charles

that France provide bases and trans-

in Indochina to Japanese troops, and threatening
39

torce; 1tFrance

did not yield.

The following day, in Indochina,
Japanese military

missioB,

the acting head ot the

Colonel Kemryo sato, who represent-

ed also the Japanese South China Army, delivered to ViceAdmiral Decoux a document,
cluded the tollowing

in torm ot an ultimatum which in-

passage.

The project ot Franoo-Japanese detensive alliance
wn!oh General Catroux had initiated implies a ~ilitary
collaboration.
It is an abso~ute and immediate necessity
to solve the China Incident, and the transit ot Japanese
~oops in Indoch~na is the very son! or that allianoe.
Consequently, Colonel Sato demands the transit ot troops

37. Foreige Relationa ot the United Statesala~an,I.109
Hakko Iohlu means "t'heworld a. one family".
38. IDid p.lll
39. lM±fE,Rtoord, p.6922; Jones,op.cit.p.227
40. Decoux,qp.cit. (see next page)
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sent against Chiang Kai-shek, the atilization of Indochinese air bases of Which the Japanese troops assume
charge; finally, all facilities for the transportation
of arms, munitions and provisloAs.
It was added that the resistance

of the Governor General

to suoh demands was "difficult to understand

and without

grounds, and that in case of C~inese incursion into Indochina,
Japan would have to enter also for its legitimate defense, and
summarily that the projected

alliance would be realized immed-

iately, otherWise Franco-Japanese
falling into worse conditions".
This document mirrored
ste~ Matsoukaj

relations would end up by
40

exactly the mind of Foreign Mini-

so Vice-Admiral

Decoux was told when alarmed,

he inquired of' the French Amb~ssador

in Tokyo.

Also, on August 2, 1940, while in Japan, Matsuoka informed Ambassador

Ott of' the Japanese

iDltiatives on Indochina and

asked Germany not to object to them but to help them in putting
pressure on Vichy.4l

The French Government got the news of the

Japanese aims trom Arsene-Henri.

Sig reactions ensued, from

which it resulted that "the propositions

of'Mr. Matsuoka ap-

peared to be a. simple step toward complete military occupation
of Tonkin, which would be itself the prelude of transformation
of Indochine into an ocono~ic annex of Japan and
Japanese settlement.
furthermore,
T

8

colony for

The Fran.en teared that concessions would,

amount to an active association with "Japanese

40. Decoux,01!.cit.p.'4; Charles-Roux,op.oit.p.250:Langer,
h~ ~ndeclared War,p.g
il. IM11i,~cord,PP.6295-6jJones,02.cit.p.227
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aggression against China", and would strain their relations
with the United states, which just gave a blow to Japan by
restrictions

on export of aviation

The French Government,
highly conditional
recognize

East".

therefore, replied to Japan with a

tone, requiring

"the French sovereignty

of the Indochinese

gasoline and scrap iron.

that first Japan sbould
on Indochina, the integrity

Union and the Fren¢h interests in the Far

After that the French would consider what facilities

they shOUld accord to japan.42
At the same time, the French-Minister

of Oolonies sent

to the Governor General of Indochina this telegram:
The Japanese Government has delivered to our Am.
bassador a memorandum in Which it demands urgently the
free transit of Japanese troops thrGugh Tonkin, the
installation of air bases. and an agreement in principle
to an almost total attao~ent
of the Indochinese economy
to that of Japan. These demands are aooompanied by oral
threatenings.
We have just answered in the negative. But
we have proposed to open immediately a negotiation Which
wou.ld cover a wide range ot sUbjects. :Bel ready, then.
to repel by foree any attack from J~pan. But avoid carefully any troubleAwitb the members of the Japanese Control Commission. ..3
Fro.rnnow on the Vichy Government

became occu.pied with the

Japa~ese. It had to renew the- policies ot General Catroux which
it had repudiated.

Hardly bad it replie(l to Tokyo before it

turned to the United States tor help.
Saint-Quentin,

the French Ambessador

the American Government

It 1nstructed Count
in Washington.

to inform

ot the Japanese demands and to make it

42. Charles-Roux,op.c1t.
pp.250-25l
43. Decoux,o;e. c1 t •• pp. 95-6 .Telegram from Vichy to
the Governor General-at Hanoi, August 3, 1946
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known that "the resistance

of the French Government

Japanese demands would necessarily

to the

depend to a large extent

on the nature and effectiveness

of the support which the'
American Government would be disposed tG give it.44 Unfortunately, the French Ambassador
report to his Government

could only, on August 6, 1940

the following

indication of James

o.

Dunn, the Politic.l Advisor of the State Department:
We have been doing and we are doing everything
possible to keep the situation of the Far East staQilize4.
F~rthermore, we have been taking various steps to manit st the economic pressure of the. United States, and we
have been keeping our Fleet based on Hawaii. Our position toward the development of events in the Far East
is well known. It is an indication of our actual attitude and our future aotivities. We hope that the negotiations, which have been projected, oan be delayed as
long as possible, given the internal ituation whioh is
susceptible of evolution".45
When Count-Saint-Quentin

was given ~hese explanations,

he

asked Mr. Dunn if they "meant that the United States would not

44. Memorandum from the French .Ambassy in Washington,
August 6, 1940., oIted by Langer, 0i.cit., p.lO
45. Charles-Raux. QR.cit. p. 51. In the memo to the Under
Secretary of State, Mr. Dunn w~ote "I told the French Ambassador that we have been doing and are doing everything possible
within the framework of our establiShed policies to keep the
situation in the Far East stabilized; that we have been progressively taking various steps, the effect of which has been to
exert economic pressure on Japan; that our Fleet is no based in
H~waii, and that the course which we have been following,as indicated above, gives a clear indication of our intentions and
activities for the future. I also raised with the French Ambassador the question Whether it would be practicable for the Frenoh
to delay discussion with the Japanese with respect to Indochina
for the periQd. Memo fQr~ Mr. Dunn to Under Secretary of State
Welles, Aug. 6, 1940, cited in Langer,op.clt.p.lO. See also
P rivate Diaries of Paul Baudouin, 188-193 --
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use military or naval force in support of any position which
might be taken to resist the Japanese attempted aggression on
Indoohina"46

Because Mr. Dunn did not make any effort to

correot this interpretation,

Co~nt Saint-Quentin

ooncluded

in his report to the French Gevernment:
The United States will not take any decisive measure
against Japan, as long as the threat ot a tinal victory
of Ge.rmany over Great Britain will not be discarded. 47
The French Government,

however, wa$ disappointed by this

ltuninterested attitude Of the United State~r". On .August 8,1940
when, in Indoohina,. Vice-Admiral

Decou

that Sato's threat was disavowed.by
ViChy intormed Washington
to take.

rejoiced on the news

the :8psn.ese Government48

ot the line at conduct it was going

The French Foreign Minister telegraphed to Count

Sa int-Q,uentin:
The f~ct that the American Government is not in a
position, at a t~e when the Japanese pressure becomes
precise, to give concrete etfects to its poliey, compels us to seek a line of conduct susceptible to avert
~ediate
risks which are threatening us. In doing so,
we will try all our possible conduQts to gain t~e.49
But the Un.ited States, on its part, was also doing its
best though witbin the trameworkot

its "established policies",

to give a helping hand to the French.

The State Department,

atter getting reports ot new dema~ds by Japan on French Indochina, had already called "these to the attention or the
46.
4'7.
48.

49.

Oharles-Roux,op.cit. p.252
Loe.cit.
tieeoux,~cit.
p.96
Charles- uX.Op.e1t.p.252
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Japanese Foreign Office~.50

In fact, on August 0, 1940, the

Acting Secretary 01" State, Sumner Welles, had instructed Grew
as follows:
New agencies have ca~rled reports that Japan has
~ade secret demands on France regarding French Indochina.
As reported, these demands include right on part of Japan
to move armed forces of Japan through that French possession, the rig~t $1" .rmed forces of lapan to use air
bases at certain points there, etc •••••
The statements given by the Secretary of State to
the press on April 17 and May 11, 1940, set forth this
Government's belief that (1) intervention in the domestic
affairs ot the Netherland East Indies, or (2) any alteration, by other than peaceful processes, in their status
would be prejUdicial to the cause of securitY,stabi1 ty, and peace in the entire Pacific area, not just in
the region in question. AlSO, there was set forth the
observation of the Government of the United States that
the belief restated in the preceding sentence was based
on a doctrine unequivoeallysupported
by this Government
The same belief and the s~e observation naturally applys
to French Indochlna ,likewise. This Government is seriously perturbed, therefore, over the demarche which it is
reported that the Go~ernment of Japan has made to the
French authorities.
If no objection is perceived, it is my desire that
at your early convenience yOu call upon the Minister for
Foreign Affairs and that you express to him, as under instruction from your Government and along the lines above
indicated, the concern felt by the Government of tgi
United States regarding the reported d~velopments.

gUi

In the,afternoon

ot the next day. August 7, 1940,Ambassa-

ador Grew called on the Fo~eign Minister
representation
to do.

of the American Government

Ambassador

and conveyed him the
as he was instructed

Grew said:

In replying to my opening remarks, the Minister said
that (1) he wished to withhold his comment; (2) that admitting certain demands had been made op Indochina,still
he eould not reveal their precise character; and (3)that

50.

HUll,~R~'::.c±!.
,I,903
51. Forei~-Relations
o.fthe United, States, Japan, II 289-290
telegrwn from_t~ Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador
in Japan,August 6, 1940

'15

in regard to the recent article in the New York Times,
a cabled report of whioh he had with him, he considered
its various points as either grossly exaggerated or com.
pletely unfounded. The Minister declined to comment on
the two demands listed in the Department telegram.
But the Japanese Foreign Minister
in strict confidence

told Ambassador Grew

that "Japanese demands had been already

accepted in principle.by

the French Government". Later, in

the same afternoon, however, Minister Matsuoka sent him a
message asking him not to disclose the object of his call.
To this, the ~bassador

de~1ined to assent, and, in Grew's

words, "the Foreign Office informed us, atter turther telephone conversation

that the press release would say that

I had oal1e~ to inquire about press reports pUblished abroad regarding late developments

in relations between

French Indochina and Japan, and that the reports were declared to be inaccurate by the Foreign Minister".
The mOPe oircum$peetly

52

the Japanese Foreign Minister

tried pUblicly to deny his deman~s on French Indoohina,
the more earnestly he worked in secret. On August 9, 1940
the Vice Minister tor Forei~Atra1rs,
ed anew to the ~enoh

Ambas~ador

Ch1chi OhaShi, present-

a dr_tt pretending to ob-

tain trom France the transit ot Japanese armed torces through
Indochina and the disposition
ot means or commun!oations

ot air bases, at wireless stations,

tor the Japanese troops which were

going to tigntChiang-Ea1-$hek.53

M

U~on a tirm retasal ot

52. Foreisn R~lations~t
United,States,Japan.II290-291
emorandum by A1rl.bassadorin Japan,Aug.7,1940
53. Charles.Roux.O~.cit. p.253;Baudouin,~cit.pp193,19a-199
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Arsene-Henri,P4"he

came again the next day with a revised

text, specifying the area which would be conceded to Japanese use.

Arsene-Henri

still stood firm, requiring more pre-

eision, especially on the points needed for air bases.

This

time Chiuchi Ohashi stOQ~ firm, pleading the need for military
secrecy, and the French A~bassador,

with sigh and protest,

accepted tha Japanese proposal$. in principle.55
But these proposals were t~e subject of a vigorous reaction
at Vichy.

General Maxima Weygand, the Minister

of Defense,

who relied on the figares given by General Maurice-Pierre
Martin, the Chief of Staft of the Colonial Forces, favored a
eate~orical refusal,whatever

the risks.

Henri Lemer1, the

Minister for Colonies, and other Mi~isters were of the same
stand.

Only Paul Baudouin, th~ French Minister for Foreign

Affairs had his own opini&n ontaia

matter.

PaUl Baudouin

was a former head of the Bank of Indoohina, should have
known bet tar than anybody else the interests of France in
this possession.

And he was of the view that "the conoessions

consented to the Japanese did not injure the independence of
OUr beautiful colony".56
This submissiVe attitude of Baudouin, coupled with the
new pressure of the Japanese Amba.ssadorin
Iso

.

,

2JJii@P

France, R.Sawada.

.....

64. IMTFE.Rocord,PP.688e-$e90,Jones,o~.cit.p.227
55. Ibid. PP.6892-~; Jones,loc.cit.
56. IiUrent,02.~lt., p.54

'1'1

who, on August 12, 1940, notitied that "the lapanese Government expeoted a oomplete and rapid acceptance
discouraged

the helpless french Government.

57

of its demands"
On August 13,

therefore the latter decided not to reply to the Japanese by
an abrupt denial, but to allow Arsene-Henri

to enter in the

road of concessions. 58 'I'h~ next day, the Japanese authorities
put neW pressare on the Frenoh ~bassador
on August 15, the French Government
to Which Minister Matsuoka

in Tokyo59.

In Vichy

dispatched new proposals

answered by threatening

"military

action". 60 Tbat same day, .the Japanese Foreign Ministry

re-

newed its requests tor Gerll18ll
support, Gut was told by Germany
that "our influence on French polley was limited". 61 Despite
this lukewarm Nazi friendship,

the Japanese decided to go

ahead with their own plan.
Impressed and depres$td, ,the French Government reverted
to the methods ta.ken by General Catrol1X just two months earlier
and on the evening of August 16, 1940, they dropped for the
time being the idea of armed resistance

.....

-

against the Japanese.l!

,57. Baudouin.OE.o~.p.199
58. Decoux, OR.ert. p.96
59. Charle$-RQui,o~.eit p.253
60. Charles-Roux,t:ld.p.254
6l.IMTFE
Record,pp.6295-6; Jones'!i.Cit.P.227
62. l3audQtlIn.Op.cit.pp.203-4,2ll.!i
this connection,
it is interesting to aote that the Frenoh historians used to
torget the real weakness of France, and to complain that the
United States was powerless; Jacques le Bourgeois,tor example,
in his Saigonsans.la.Ftancesaid:"Being
consulted for 11
second tLie,the Americans expressed their powerlessness." p.6
see also Cbarles-Roux,op.cit.p.252
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On the fallowing day, the French Foreign Minister
American Charge d'Affaires

told the

at Vichy, Robert D. Murphy, that

!tinthe absence, of any material

support from Great Britain

and the United States as distinguished

trom the enunciation

of principl~stt, France telt oblige4 to 7ield.63

The same day,

Minister Baudouln informed

tbe Chinese in regard to the gener~l terms ot the Franco-Japanese negotiations.64
On August 19, Foreign Minister Matsuoka made it clear to
the French Ambassador

in Tokyo that military neoessities were

so urgent that he could not wait tor the French agreement. At
the same t~e, Vioe-Admiral

Decoux advised Arsene-Henri

make any important concessions,

not to

saying:

I est~ate
that in regard to military,naval or aerial
matters, we can cede nothing important, without bringing
damage to our sovereignty on Indochina and dangerously
compromising all French possessi.o.hsin the Far East. 65

Vichy w~s really embarassed
same day, the French authorities
their cabinet meeting

by these developments.

That

invited Robert D. Murphy to

and, afte],',intorm.inghim. of the Japanese

aims, asked him to transmit to Washington

the following sugges-

tions:
In the event that we are forced to accord the transit
to the Japanese toroes, it would be opportune to have Tokyo informed that the Governmentot
the United States considers this
exped1tion as essentially temporary and wants to see these forces
definitely evacuate the ~ndochinese territory as soon as the
milltary_ operations in the Chinese territory would be ended.
QC&

63.

_

i

-

Telegram from Murphy, August 17,1940, oited in Langger
0R.cit. p.12
.
64. Decoux, 22.eit. p.247
65. Ibid ..Pp.9'1-9a
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Loyally the American

Charge d'Affaires did as he was ask-

ed to, but he did not torget to confirm that "it would be vain
to expect the American
oondemnation

Government

anything other than a verbal

of Japanese moves." 66

Robert D. Murphy was not wrong in his prediction.
August 21, 1940, Count Saint-Quentin
conversation

On

transmitted to Vichy the

he just had with Sumner Welles, in Which the latter

said:
We understand the situation of the French Government,
and sinee we are not in a position to come to its assistance,
we do not teel that we have the right to reproach.it for
according military facilities to Japan. But, it we were
to recommend to TokyO that its ocoupation be temporary, we
would be accepting the principle ot it. But this would be
a violation of the status gu£, the maintenance of which
we shall oontinue to-insIst upon. 67
So, there was no hope trom the United States, tor the time
being. However, Vice-Admiral

Dec0ux still preferred to risk an

armed conflict with Japan rather than yield to Japanese demands.
He reoeived news of the Franoo-Japanese

conversations

French Embassy in TOkyo on August 20,21, and 22.
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trom the

Atter giVing

serious consideration. to them, he warned Viohy in a telegram,
dated on August

2~: The

French Governor General said:

1. I estimate that all concessions in military matters
especially the ente~ing of Japanese troops in our territory and the utilization ot air bases, would amount to a
real peacetul transfer of Indochina to the dapanese Government ••••The transit of troops once accepted,it would be
impossible to tight against new encroachments, which would
soon came to a total ejection of our authority and an definite occupation or Tonkin as the first step;
66.
67.
58.

Charles-Ro~x,Op.cit.
Loe.cit.

Decoux~Op.oit. p.97

p.255j see also Langer,op.cit.p.12

eo
2. This capital conc sion would app ar to the eyes
of the Chines as a hostile act, coupled ith it tr cherous eharact r, and would inevitably ent il ev r r taliation on their part, a8Binst Tonkin, hich would at
onoe beoome the battlefield Of two b llig rents, swell
as against all our stablishments in China;
3. The Frenoh prestige,
lr dy aff oted by the pr sence ot the Japanese mis ion, oould not with t nd the
consequences ot this new abandonment, whioh would withdraw
tro us the Indochinese popUlations and provoke again t
ranee violent reaotion on the part ot all the big pow rs
interested in the maintenance of the status guo in the
Far East.
What Vice-Admiral

Decoux proposed a

tusal, polite but tirm,"to all demand
na al

nd a rial matt6rs".

concerning military,

69

diate oonfirmation ot hi

Vice- dmirel Decoux had an
s cond prOVision.

a solution was a r -

In tact, on August 26, 1940, the Minister

tor Foreign Affairs ot Chungkung GoT rnment declared th t "
hene er the Japanese use the facilities

acoorded th~

by

France to attack China through Indoohina, Chinese torces
will enter at once into Tonkin".70
On the tollowing day, th
a

Governor Qen ral ot Indochina

really angry when he learned the exact tenor or the ex-

change ot notes between Vichy and Tokyo. He could not help
sending to the

rench Government

that "haVing full oonsciousness

ot the colony, and with

hi

ot

representation,

stating

y responsibility

as head

p rsonal conviction

ot serving the

superior interests ot IndOChina and or France, I protest
energetically
69.

70.

against the solution trom weakness which Mr.

Decoux. O~.Cit. p.98
!ill. p. 47
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Henry seems to judge inevitable".7l
The strong wording

of this telegram as well as of other

similar against the policy of Vichy, would highly embarrass
those who defend Decoux as a skillful diplomat who had saved
Indochina by his timely concessions.72
But Paul Baudouin was more realistic.
military

the

figures given by General Martin du Gard, pointed out

that any resistance

would lead to the total loss of Indochina;

and he was in a position
lOBS, especially

to understand

Henry signed

8

how ~reat would be this

in the economic point of view.

AugUSt 29, 1940, Foreign Minister

sanctioned

He challenged

Ambassador

on

Arsene

,ccord, under the terms of which France

political

the Jap~nese
-

Matsuoka_snd

Therefore,

73
"~ew order" in French Indochina.
..".""

Here are the main prQposition~

of this fundamental

aecord:

1. The ~apanese Government recogQ!zed the Frencn
sovereignty in Indochina, and promised to respect its
territorial !nt~grity in all its parts;
2. France, on her part, admitted the preponderance
of Japan in the Far East, and agreed to accord certain
military facilities in Tonkin t,o Japanese forces, to
allow them to liquidate the China Incident;
3. A military oonvention should be concluded without
delay at Hanoi between the French and Japanese cOJDmands
to ar.range at the. best the manner Gt applying of the
political aceo~d.74

By the· accord ot August 29, 1940, the Japanese realized
a part ot their program

at the same time the.defeat

19-26, but it marked
f;!aa

..

set forth during the week of Jull

t

of DecouX·s

,f ...'

71, Decoux"Q;e.cit. p.99
72. Eour€.~1s.0P.cit.
pp.8-12
73.,Charl~-Roux.6p.cit.
p.258.Parcon,O;e.cit.,II,762
74. Decoux.o2.cit• p.l00
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stand.

As for the United States, the result 01' its pro-

clamation or July 26, relating
01'

iron and oil remained

to restrictions

undecided.

01' export

This he$itating at-

titude was due to the divided opinion 01' the Roosevelt administration,

as previously

reported.

But the cause must

be tound in the public who did not see clearly the reason
Why the United states should enter into conflict with Japan
to saVe European

colonialism.

Ih!LNew York Dail~ N!!!!, tor example, on August 5,1940,
editorially wrote:
•••••French Indochina is on the list ot properties which
Prinee Konoye hopes to pick up tor Japan. So are the·
Dutch East Indies. So,apparently, is British-owned Hong
KOng; and it would surprise tew people it the American
owned Philippine IslandS Should, turn out to be on that
same list.
There are sueh pickings in the Orient tor a strong,
aggressive nation, like Japan when the western world
has a major war going on. Prince Kanoye doesntt intend
that the grass shall grow under Japants teet while the
White talks bleed themselves still whiter. The whole
structure which he pl~ns is to go by the resounding
name ot "the New Order tor Greater East Asia."
What puzzles us is Why so many Americans are so
worried by the prospect 01' these changes.
We cantt see any reason tor moral indignation over
Japants e~pected seizure at the lands above mentioned.
The Dutch never exercised demooracy in the Dutch East
Indi~s. They exploited those rioh islands and their
easy-going natlves methodically and thoroughly.
Certainly the Frenohdidn't
bring the blessings at
democracy to Indoohina.
They tarmed and mined it just
as the Dutch did the East Indies. Britishers in Hong-kong
have never been tamed tor a chummY,democratic attitude
toward the Chinese. When you come down to it, our ettorts
to bring demooracy to the Philippines have been pretty
much blocked by the Filipino's own dislike 01' us and
all our ways.
It these territories should be taken over by the
Japanese, it would only mean a change 01' bosses tor their
inhabitants,most 01' whom probably wouldn't care, and probably would be neither better nor worse ott atter the
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seizure.75
The next daY,August 6, 1940, the Washington Time-Herald
had imperative lines like these:
•••••••••••••••••••

Would it not be well to consider not only what might
happen to Japan, but what might happen to the United States.
Do we desire, like poor France, to precipitate a war
tor which we are not prepared?
How silly it seems now for France to be indicting Daladier and his government for having gotten into war.
What satiSfaction can there be in such action?
How much better it would have been for France to have
kept out of war in Which it had so much to lose and so
little to gain.
How much better it would be for us to learn from the
experience ot others and keep out of a war for which we
are in no way prepared - not to one-tenth the extent that
France was prepared.
.
We have nothing to gain in a war with Japan.
We have everything to lose.
There is nothing that Japan has that we.want to take.
There is nothing that we have that we want war with
Japan to destroy - not our youth - not our cities - not
our slowly reviving property - not our social system not our peace and happiness.
Let us realise and appreciate oUr benefits.
Let us conserve and protect our advantages.
Let us maintain the independence our fathers won for
us and the isolation God in his gOQdness gave us. 76
When many people
administration

ere thinking along these lines, the

could not overlook their opinion, although

many others tollowed the opposite direction.
ot the Government

The etfQrts

to combine both streams ot thought led to

the result that "during the month of August,1940,

licenses

were issued tor the export of Japan ot $21,000,000 worth
75. Q2n~essional
Record; 76th Congr.3rd Sess.vol.So,
PP.4708-o9
76. ~.
76th.Congr.3rd Sess.vol.80,pp.4792-93
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ot American petroleum product, somewhat more than the total
for the entire first six months ot the year. In short, Amer77
ican oil was still tlowing f'reely to Japanese storage tanks."
This was the practice. In theorey, however, the United
States maintained

a strong attitude toward Japan.

August 3, the Japanese Embassy registered

When, on

a protest against

the United States tor having singled out Japan tor discriminatOr~ treatment in the export destinations

of'aviation gas-

j

oline,'S the American

Government,

the Japanese Ambassador,

six days later, handed to

Kensuki Horinouchi,

a reply that

read
Heference is made to the Japanese Ambassador's note
ot August 3, 1940, in regard to action taken by the Government ot the United States, in pursuance ot section 6
Of the Act of Oongressapproved
.duly 2, 1940 entitled "An
Act to expedite the strengthening at the national defense"
to restrict the export of' aviation gasoline trom the
United States. The Japanese Ambassador indicates that
the impression created by that action, in view ot Jpan's
large imports of'Amerioan ~v,iation gasoline, is that Japan
has singled out tor and subjected to discriminatory treatment. Accordingl~, the Japanese Ambassador records the
Japanese Government's reservation of' rights and its protests against the policy of' the Government ot the United
states involved in the action under reference.
The Government of the United States desires to state
that the action under reterenoe, as was mentioned in the
proclamation issued by the President ot.the United states
on July 26, 1940, referred to in the Japanese FGbassy's
note under ~cknowledgement, is necessary in the interest
ot the national defense and that.8ccordingly,th1s Government considers.s protest by any foreign government against that action to be unwarranted.79
77.
78.
79.

Langer,Oi.c~.
p.18; see also Feis,o~.cit.pp.96-99
Foreign ~la~ions
of the.Uni1!~StatesLJapan.II,218-t
!bld.pp.2l9-220
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And the United states continued this dual attitude until,
on August 27, 1940, the White House found a solution to help
Great Britain, and confidence

emerged that Britain would be

able to win Britain's war and to hold its position in the
Far East.

From September on, the policy of the United States
against JapQn became more and more precise.80
The tragedy ot Indochina also underwent a change: from

August 30, 1940, Vichy withdrew to the background,
Hanoi came to the tore, with Vice-Admiral
Nishihara as the main actors.

80.

HUll, op.cit., I,838

while

Decoux and General

The United States and Indochina in
The First Indochinese
June-September

Crisis.

1940

The Japanese Activities
July and August -1940

The week of July 19, ~940 to July 26, 1940 was a time of
gr~at plaaning in foreign policy for Japan, tor Indochina, and
even for the United states.

Eaoh country acted independently,

but the deoision of the one toached the very security of the
other.

When the Frenoh agreed between themselves to check the

advance ot Japan, the Japanese authorities were discussing
plans for stronger m.aSQres
while, 'by these measures,
empire economically

against French Indochina.

And

the Japanese thought ef making their

independent

of the United states, the

latter brought home the fact that it was not.

But beoause th

United States moved slowly" though steadily to oppose Japan,
the Japanese Government.oould
Indoohina.

Atterthe'

realize its program of ocoupying

n1nspectorate~1

obtained late in June, as

we have seen, the Japanese succeeded in bUllying the French
into complete acceptaace

of their demands at the end of August,

1940.
?

~

1. ~
magazine, revie'W1,ag the situation of Indochin.a
duribgthemonth
ot June,1940, has oalled the oondition Japan
had imposed on Indochina an "inspectorate". J~ly 8,1940,XXIV,3Q.
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On August 31, in a telegram to the French Government,
the Governor General still firmly maintained
pretending

that "a laading,

to be peacefa~ by these troops would destroy the

only chance which is left to us to save the oolony", and that
"if we have to run the risk of losing Indochina,
to lose by defending

it rather tbanby

it is better

betraying".2

Unfor-

tunately, that same day he received trom Vichy th~ notification or a political

agreement concluded in Tokyo; this was

an agreement concerning which Nishihara lJ,adspoken to him
the day before.
In fact, on August 30, 1940, the head of the Japanese
military mission had presented
agreement, demanding

that it be acc~pted by SePtember 2

(midnight) at the latest.
With the signature

Tbe text was already prOVided

of the Japanese General.

sueh an action, Vice-Admiral
ed instructions

him the text of a military

:f)eeo~

In reply to

said only that he need ...

trom his Government at Vichy.3

with a threatening mood, General Nishihara

Whereupon,

told the French

Governor G6neral "to stop _leaping, to $~t busy or take
the consequences.,,4
By no means1ntimldated,

Vice-Admiral

~eeting ot the Counell of Government

Deeoux called a

tor September 2. The

De~pux,op.ci~., p.102
Ibid., p.103
4. §eport of Nicholson to S'eoretary Morgenthau,Sept.21,
lj40.(Morsenthau_Diar1e$~.S.
Vol.308,Pp.239tt)as qaoted in
langer, The Undeclared War, p.13 - On September 12, 1940 it
is reported tha£;when at iidnight General Issaku ~lshihara
called on Deooux with the ~apanese demands, the latter,who was
in bed,replied: I ~ a0t getting up. It the Japanese want to
declare war, they can do it tomorrow morning.The New.York Times
Sept.12,1940,P.10
2.

3.
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The meeting actually took place on that day, and the Council
backed ap his position. In the words ot the Governor General I found, in the Council, a unanimous appro~al ot
my stand, the general opinion ot the members being that
Indo~hina should not 71eld to threats. nor renounce indespensable guarantees.
The Council estimated. however.
that it must avoid by all means an abrupt break With
Japan. f)
Furthermore,

General Ma~rice Martin, the Supreme Command-

er of the Frenoh Colonial Forces, assur~d Decoux that with the
troops under his oommand he should be able"to keep at bay. on
the Tonkinese

trontier, aggressive forces amo~ting

even to

three divisions and tor several weeks.6
With these supports, Vice-Admiral
ot September

Deeoux, on the evening

2, 19~O, rejected the Japanese ultimatum. while

admitting the principle
tiations as proYided

ot an immediate beginning of nego-

in the aecord at August 29. 7

Later that night, a telegram trom Vichy came to h~.
was complex in character but with a mere conciliatory
The French Government

tone.

iatar-med him' ot an accord given to the

Chinese diplomat, we~lington
cross the Indochinese

It

Koo. that Chinese troops could

borders in case ot a Japanese invasion

ot Indochina. Then the 'following directives were indicated:

1. With res~ect to the Chinese. Two eases to be
considered:
.
t---a) If Chinese troops penetrate into Indochina
before any Franco-Japanese military accord: to op])ose
this penetration;
5.
6•
7•

Deeoux.op.cit:.

p.104

Lac. 01 t • _"'')C: ~.,

Garoon; op. ci e ,

: _~

" :. '"

n;~
.,62'-
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b) If Chinese troops penetrate into Indochina
as sequel to a Franco-Japanese military accord permitting regular Japanese forces to enter the territory: to retreat while keeping contact with them but
to stand aside fram any fighting which might oceur
between the Chinese and the J~panese. The extreme
l~it of the retreat must permit the French troops to
bar the Chine$e from reaching the delta.

Z. With resE-eetto th!...JaEane!!. Two cases
also to be consIdered:
8) It the J8paneseseek
to disembark or to penetrate into Indoch~n8 before any accord had been concluded on the subject between the F~encb and Japanese
authorities; to oppose this action by tOrce;
b) If the Japanese troops penetrate into Indochina
in pursuance of a Franco-Japanese aecord: to comply
with the clauses of the accord, permitting the Japanese
to ase roads, etc., without abantoning the def~nse of
anyone ot the places or establishments Which possess
Tital importance in the militaryview.8
~hese details greatly annoy~d the Governor General ot
Indochina.

He informed Vichy, .t once, that he would use
torce against any aggression.9
On his part, General Nishihara was disconcerted
attitude ot Decoux.

by the

A little atter midnight on September

2,

1940, he withdrew his ultimatum and intormed the Vice-Admiral
that he was willing to open. negotiations.
that is satisfactory

He added,how~ver.

terms could not be arrived at, the

Japanese troops would advance into Indoohina on September 5,
1940.10
On September

4, General Nishihara ordered General T.Suzuki

8. Deeoux.op.cit., p.lOe
9. General Max~e Weygand

details "pap tor catsft•
10. Decoux,op.cit.,

p.107

disdainfully

called these
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to evacuate the Japanese nationals trom Hanoi as though war
was imminent.

But. agreements were reached. These were known

as "basic accord ot September 4, 1940".
tore signing this preliminary
portant observations.
tinal convention

dQc~ent,

He requeste~

General Martin, behad added to it im-

tbat to the degree that the

should not have been attended. and the date

of the entry into force ot that convention

should not have

been fixed, the Japanese land, naval and a.rial forces could
not advance into Indochinese

territory and waters.

ruled out any act susceptible

He also

ot being construed as pressure

and said that he would consider as an act Of pressure any
attempt on the part of the Japane~e to oross the frontier,
any concentration

of Japanese troops near the Indochinese

frontier, any actiVity of th$ JapaneeeNavy

off the IndO-

chinese coests and any flight over Indochinese territory. In
conclusion,

the accord reads:

In ease 'the above-.entione<l conditions should
not be respected by the Japanes8'forces, the French
military co~and would be authorized to break the engaged negotiations and to resume its freedom of aetion.ll
The intention of the Frenoh authorities, when they inserted these. conditions

in t.be rel1minary

accori, was not only

to check the Japanese threat ~f invasion, bat also ta delay as
long as possible the final agreement.

at the American Government
assistance to Indochina.
ll.Deeoux,

tor,

despite the etforts

to avoid holding, out hope of armed
the Frenoh still did not give up the

op.cit. p.107
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- the idea that eventually

some help might oome from the United

States to fight against Japan.12
In spite of the french precaution,
tember 5-6, 1940, a Japanese batta~ion
border near Langsom
mediately,
violated

on the night of Sepcrossed the Indochinese

Deoonx declared that the Accord of September
and brake otf nesotiations.13

On September
of the Governor

7, General Nishihara

General to present excuses.

dered the Japanese battalion
remained

4 was

hurried to the Palace
He explained

the inoident was the result of an error otmanoeuvre

otiations

Im-

and ocoupied the hills ot Dong-dang.

that

and or-

to withdraw at once. But the neg-

at a standstill

until September 13, when

Decoux made it known t.at he had received
14
sume them.

instructions

to re-

The Unit~d States was not informed ot the Franco-Japanese
political

agreement

ot August 29, until September

the time of the Japanese pressure
that time the American
way.

On September

5, 1940 at
exerted in Langson.15 During

foreign policy continued its regular

1, .Ambassador Grew wrote:

American-Japanese
relations are marking ttme. In
a recent tnstruction I saw indications that our G0vernment may be getting ready to show its teeth, an instruction WhiCh I hiShly applauded.
O~tright invasion ot

-

'12. ~n Septembe~ 12, 1940, it was ~eported that Deeoux
hed sent three telegrams to President Roosevelt to ask tor
help. The New York Ttftes, September 12. 1940
13; IMtft, Record; p.6930, as cited in Jones,op.cit.p.229
14. Loc.cit.
15. HU11.=02.cit., 1,903
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French Indochina has been held in check in spite of
military pressure, but if it should become evident
that Germany is going to win the "battle of Britain"
I woald look for an early move not only on Indochina
but likewise in Hong-kong and probably, eventually,
the Netherlands East Indies. 16
Two days later, he received instruotion from the Secretary of State to Call Matsuoka's

attention to the fact that

within the past few days reports from several souroes had
oome to the Department

of State,

to the etfect that the Gover~ent
of Japan has presented an ultimatum to the French authorities in
Indochina on Japan's demands tor permission to Japanese armed torces, for parposes of military operations against China, to pasa through French territory and to use military bases and other facilities.
The Secretary

of State added that the American Govern-

ment "wishes to point ou~ the unfortunate
public opinion from

~ne point

effect on American

of view of Japanese-Amerioan

relations if these repGrts prove to be correct".
wanted Matsuoka

to be ~eminded

He also

that, according to the press,

the Japanese Foreign Office had said on June 19, 1940 "that
Japan attaohed importance

to maintaining

the status guo in

Fr~neh Indochina."l?
The next day. September 4, 1940, in response to inqUiries by press correspondents,
he had instructed Ambassador

Hull repeated publicly what

Grew point by point. emphasizing

the fact that "should events prove these reports to have been

11. Grew, ~~n Years in Ja~~n. p. 326
1'1. JJ.:orel~R~la!tlons of' the ID;!itedStates.Japa!!, II,
29l~2. HUll. op.cit., I,903
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well founded, the effect upon public opinion 1n the United
States would be unfortunate.ft16
In tact, the development
stirred up anti-imperialistic
the long-range
consideration

of events in Indochina had
feelings and the concern over

home security of the American people; more
was centered on the possibility

of an imminent

Japanese invasion of Indochina and its consequenoes.

On SeP-

tember 5, 1940, under the title "Threat to Indochina",
New York ~im!a editorially

showed the seriousness

the

of the

situation:
Japanese invasion would, for one thing, have a
serious effect upon the war in China, Which now keeps
Japan so deeply involved that it actS' as a measure of
insuranCe for the British at Singapore, the Dutch in
the East Indies, ourselves in the Philippines. China's
capacity for resistance has been impaired already by
Japanese blockading activity on the coast of Indochina.
It,will be reduoed still further, if the present triokle
of arms through Indochina 1s stopped altogether, and if
the Southern Chinese armies should be threatened with a
Japanese encirolement from French soil on the South.
An invasion of Indochina would be serious too in
giving the Japanese a stranglehold on neighboring Siam
where their influence has been increasing during recent years. And this, in turn, would affect the safety
of Signapore, Which may yet be menaced from its hinterland as Gibraltar has been menaced by German-Italian
penetration of Spain. The Whole status~uo in Eastern
Asia ~ould be upset by a Japanese+move 1nto Indochina,
tor such a move would ~e a precedent and an entering
wedge for further Japanese depredations elsewhere. If
the Facific s~atus guo means anything to the United
States, our GOvernment and people will do well to keep

---

-_.

18. Department ot State BUlletin, (Sept.7.l940),III,196
The same day, Prince KOnoye,Matsuoka,the Ministers of War
and Navy decided that Japan's Sphere of Living would comprise
the Whole ot Southeast Asia .•Langer, The Undeclared War,p.25
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their eyes upon the developments
in distant Indochina.19

of the next few days

As tor public opinion, there was a growing opposition
to the conduct of Japan.

According

August 3, 1940, the proportion

to the Gallup poll, on

ot people willing to risk war

"to keep Japan from beooming more powerful" was 51 per oent,
with 31 per. oent opposing and

+8 per

oent undecided.

On

September 7, however, to the same question, the Rros had risen
to 70 per cent and the qons fallen to 18 per cent, others
being undecided.
On September

11, Seoretary Hull disoussed the agreement

Franoe had signed with Japan on August 29, with the new Frenoh
Ambassador,

Gaston Henry-Haye.

the French Government
disappoin~ent
ever to us".

The Seoretary remarked that

"oannot imagine our surprise and our

When it took this step without any notice WhatHe was told, however, that Japan had given as-

suranoe that the stationing

of Japanese troops in Indochina

would be merely temporary. The Frenoh als~ solicited the
.
20
United States to seek trom Japan'the same assurance.
In answering

this request, the Seoretary expressed again

19. The Hew York Times, September 5, 1940,p.22. About
the ~atus tUO, in November 1937, Prinoe Konoye had deolared
before the talian good-will mission: "I oannot but feel that
at this present time, when the negative prinoiple of maintenance
ot the status guo, built up atter the last World War, has torteited Its funotion as a result ot •••confliots and contradictions
the responsibility tor the creation ot peace devolves on three
powers,Italy,Germany
and Japan."
20. HUll, 02.cit., 1,904

95

to Vichy his surprise to learn of the extent of the French
concessions

to Japan and pointed out that there was little

warrant for entering into agreements which assented to a derogation of principles.

WWe deprecated",

Hull said.

France's recognition ot Japan's claLm to a preponderance of interests and a preferred eoonomic position
in Indochina and ot Japan's violation of French and
other rights and interests. As for asking Japan tor
assuranoes similar to those given to France, I said
we perceived no reason to associate ourselves with
an assent to an unlawtul procedure by asking tor suoh
assurances.
Moreover, What value could anyone give
SQoh assuranoes? 21
To these discreet representations

of the American Gov-

ernment, the French Foreign Oftice replied the next day
saying that the political agreement of ~ugust 29, 1940, was
negotiated

under constant threat of an ultimatwn, and that

in the present negotiations

at Hanoi, etforts were being

made to limit the conceSSions
then begged the Secretary

demanded by Japan.

to understand

asked the Government at Washington

The Frenoh

their situation and

to maintain its position

in regard to the status guo in East Asia.22
Also on September
Washington

12, 1940, Ambassador

Grew sent to

a most important telegram, ot which he said that

"a magnum opus tinally went ott to the Department
a message ot more than twelve pages".
ysis of the Japanese

today in

It was a general anal-

situation and the truit o~ Grew's thoughts

during the tifty days since the new Government took office in
21.
22.

Hull, ep.clt., 1,904
Charl~s::Roux, op.clt., p.259

Japan.23
This telegram was considered as a "green light" allowing the Department
fective measures

of State to take stronger and more et-

against Japan.

stand of the American Ambassador

In tact, it marked a new
in Tokyo.

Grew himself

confessed th.at:
In previous communicatiGns, I have expressed the
opinion that sanctions by the United States would set
Japanese-American relations on a downward curve. It
is true that our own neWly instituted program ot
national preparedness now justifies measures Which
need not fall within the realm of outright sanctions.
On the other hand we must enVisage the probability that
drastic embargoes on the ~port ot suoh important products as petroleum, of Which the United states is known
to possess a superabundance would be interpreted by the
J panesa Government and people as aotually sanctions
~:i~:t~~~~4and
prObably would lead to some torm of reBut the situation in Japan changed fast, and Grew had
reached the conclusion that such steps beoame vitally necessary to preserve the !tatus

gU0

in the Pacific.

He under-

took, then, to describe the hazards whioh could be involved
"in a 1aissez-taira

pGlicy".

His reason now waB that the

United States and Great Britain were the leaders of the English speaking nations around the world, which were threatened
today by Germany, Italy, Soviet Bussia and Japan •••a group ot
dictatorial powers.

The United States and Great Britain oould

not deal with these powers by the use ot diplomaoy, beoause
diplomaoy might oocasionally

retard but oould not effectively

23. Grew, Tyrbulent EraLA Di210matic Record of Forty_Years
1904-1945,11,1225
24. Grew, Turbttlent Era, p.1224
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stem the tide.

To deal with them, force or display of

force alone could attain some result.
was particularly
datory power.

This firm policy

needed toward Japan which became a pre-

And Grew analysed: Japan had submerged all

moral and ethical sense, she had become frankly and unashamedly opportunist,

she had sought at every turn to

profit by the wea~ness of others, and her policy of southward expansion was a definite threat to American interests
in the Paoific and a thrust at the British Empire in the
East.

In conclusion,

the important telegram read:

American security has admittedly depended in a
measure upon the existence of the British fleet which
in turn has be6n, a~d could only have been, supported
by the British lmpire.
It We conoeive it to be in our interest to support the British Empire in this hou~ of her travail;
and I most emphatically do so conceive it, we must
strive by every means to preserve the status guo in
the Pacific at least until the European war fias-been
won or lost. In my opinion this cannot be done nor
can our interests ~e further adequately and properly
protected by merely registering disapproval and keeping a Oareful reoord thereot. It is clear that Japan
has been d$terred from taking greater liberties with
American interests only out ot respect for our potential power; it is equally Olear that she has trampled
upon o~r rights to a degree in precise ratio to the
strength at her conviction that the American people
would not per~it that power to b$ used. OnCe that
conviction is shaken it is possible that the uaes
Qf diplomacy may again become accepted. 25
Later, Ambassador

Grew proudly and also gratefally

noted that his message of September
"What the DepartmentW!:ter
25.

"

12 aimed to present

good enough to characterize

Grew, Turbulent Era

a

pp.1224-9

as
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a 'cogent argument and penetrating
The Secretary

analysis'".

26

of State then reviewed once his policy

in the light of Grew's message and found that the policy
followed by the President

and himself had long since travel-

ed well beyond the use of words to express disapproval
Sapan's actions.

In fact, the American Government had ab-

rogated the commercial
moral embargoes,

of

treaty of 1911 with Japan, imposed

legal embargoes, undertaken a vast pro-

gram of rearmament,

maintained

the fleet at Pearl Harbor,

and assisted in various ways the Government of Chiang Kaishek.

Hull cited also some effects ot his ffp01icy of firm-

ness" on the situatio~ at Indochina and said:
The Japanese Army's original intentions toward
Frenoh In~oohina had involved a wnolesale invasion ot,
the colonY. Grew indieat$d in his cable that the Japanese Government had been able, at least temporarily,
to restrain the military trom these plans, and attributed this "degree ot caution" ~t least partly to the position ;of the United States.27

26. Grew,Turbulent Era, p.1230. Testifying in 1945 before the CongreiiIOnallnvestigation
ot the Pearl Harbor Attack, Grew summarized as tollows the reason of his reversal
of position: "The Japanese Army was steadily encroaching
further into t~e Far East art4 in~o East Asia. They were potentially threatening our vital interests. And from that
point or view the situation had very much changed iadeed.
That, I think, was the main rea~on why I sent that telegram,
but one must remember that ~1 so-called greenlight telegram
was not something Which had developed in a question of a
tew hours or a few days. It meant a progressive line at
thinking over a periodto the crux of the sitnationn• 79th
Cong. Pearl Harbor Attack. 1st Secs.,Part 2,p.638
27. HUll, o~.cit., 1,905
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This position of the United States was streftgthened. on
the same September
exports.

12. 1940. by more restrictions

Objections

on American

had long delayed these measures.

but

events in Indochina were judged serious enough to allow them.
On September 10. in preparation
cerning regulations.

tor the proclamation

con-

ot State had instructed Am-

the Secretary

bassador Grew to state to the Japanese Foreign Office that it
Japan continued to violate 4meriean rights. the United states
might be compelled to take measures

of defense.

Hull's tele-

gram argued that if the United States must take positive measures tor self-defense

in its relations with Japan. such retal-

iatory measures would be amply warranted and would have been
brought about by Japanese disregard.
of the rights of the United States.

"Persistent and continued",

28

The way thus haVing been cleared. on September 12. 1940.
the United States determined

that it was necessary to the

national defense "that on and after this date the followingdescribed articles and materials

shall not be exported from

the United States except when authorized

in each case by a

license".

These articles and materials

production

ot aviation motor tuel from petroleum, petroleum

products,

hYdrocarbons

or hydrocarbon

were eqUipment for

mixtures by process

involving ohemical change, equipment tor production

ot tetra-

ethyl lead; they included also any plans, specifications
•

28 •. Telegram to Grew. September
Langer, The Undeclared War, p.19

10. 1940. cited by

or
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or other documents containing desoriptive

or technical inform-

ation of any kind useful in any design, construction

or opera-

tion of any such equipment of aircraft or aircraft engines.29
These new measures were soon justified by new proof of
Japanese disregard toward the United states.

In the words of

Cordell HUll, we read:
A good indication of the attitude of the KanoY'e
Government toward us came two days later when the
Foreign Office handed Grew a reply to the representations
we had made concerning French Indochina on August 7. The
r~ply was written in pencil. It admitted that negotiations had been carried on with the French Indochinese
authorities, but gave no details. It asserted that Japan
had been making efforts not to bring about undesirable
changes in the status guo in the Pacific, in so far as
the status quo did not Interfere with "the firm preservation of the minimwn right,to existence". 30
Secretary Hull remarked at onoe that the restriction - "in
so far as the status SY2 did not interfere with 'the firm preserv~tian of a minimum right to existence'" - was a serious
challenge to the.~atus

gq£. This challenge appeared in a clear-

er light in the text ot the Japanese answer, in which it was
pretended that the ~perial

Government,

because of the need to

construct a hew order iU East Asia, had, therefore, carried out
negotiations

with regard to French Indochina, and on that basis

29. ~oreisn Relation$~f
the Un1tedStat~~,Japan,II
220-1
30 •. ull, 02.c1t., :r,90~On September 3, Secretary Hull had
instructed Grew to make representations on the same subject (See
above,p.93) But "the Vice-Minister denied that he knew anything
about an~lt1matum",
he denied not, however, "that armed forces
of Japan did intend to seek passage through French Indochina.
Ohashi said that the Japane e intention was a matter of military
necessity; that there would be no permanent occupation of French
territory; and that Japan would withdraw the foroes in question
as soon as the military necessity oeased to exist". Foreisa
Relations of_~he Ya!~ed §ta~es,Japan, II 292-3

had continued progressively
tions.

101.
with satisfactory

looal negotia-

Then the answer said:

Under the ever-changing conditions of today, past
rules and norms rapidly become inapplicable to actual
conditions.
It is clear that, merely to adhere blindly
to such rules and norms is not the way to stabilize
world peace. Despite the fact that in the western hemisphere epoch-making changes are actually being made in
the status_g~,
Japan has as yet expressed no opinion
tor or against t~ose changes. It has to be pointed out
'that intrusion by the United States in an area which is
so remote trom that country as in this case brings about
the same e~fect upon Japan's public opinion as tbe meddlesome attitude of a third country toward the policy of
the United States concerning third-power territories in
western hemisphere would bring upon public opinion in
the United States.3l
The philosophy
that the status

underlying

t~e Japanese foreign policy was

guo could not be any more applicable

sent conditions.

Moreover.

the penCiled

in pre-

"oral state~ent" hint-

ed that the United States itself had violated the !tatus guo in
thewestern

hemisphere,

pointing

to the American deal with British

32

Newfoundland.
Secretary
oommunication

Hull acu.tely perceived
and was t~iDking of

al

the tone of insult in that

strong reply. Meantlm.~ he

took a cautious cou~se.
On September

16, 1940, Lord Lothian suggested that the

United States should take ~s0me steps that would deter Japan
from oocuRying

Indochinaft•

The Secretary

of State showed him

the difficulty

of giving support to such remote oountries. He

sai~ that tbe United States had gone almost "to the limit in

...
31. Foreign RIlat10ns ot the United States,Japan,II.293-4
32. Hull, £!.eit., 1,836-8
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resisting Japanese aggression

step by step without running

t~e very serious danger of a military elash".

His idea was

to encourage Indochina "to delay and parley and hold out to
the last minute against Japanese demands

.e

tt

He expressed also

t~e hope that Japan would not dare make a military attack at
this time. 33 .
The French. on their part, had another occasion to prove
that they were following the adviees ot the Secretary of State.
Under pretext that Japan was baking Thailand in the aggressive
attitude Which the latter was manifesting

on the Indochinese

borders since the beginning

the French Ambassa-

of September.

dor in Tokyo threatened to 4elay the conclusion of Franco-

But this menace was immediately neu-

Japahese negotlatio~s.34

tralized by a Japanese counter-threat

of using torce.35

On September 17. 1940. however. Viee'·Admiral Decoux noted
a new t-endeney in the Japanese p6sition which he thought favorable to Freneh interest$.

Up to that date. the Japanese author-

ities invoked. as major argument tor the transit of Japanese
troops throngh Indochina.
in military

the need they felt to engage at onee

operations against Yunnan.

Now they recognized the

cogency of the technical o~ject1onsbrought
against sucb an undertaking.
to give up the idea.
torces into Tonkin.
reach a conclusion

-

33.

S4.
35.

forth by the French

end declared that they were ready

But they reclaimed the entry of Japanese
Decoux did not like to see the negotiations

on this'point,

always expecting that "an

-

Hull. 02.eit~. 1.906
Decoux.~.cit ••pp.133-4
IMTFE. Re£ors. pp.6931-2.as

cited in Jones.o~.clt.p.299
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American intervention
veto of the Washington
Japanese pretentions~.

would come in time, and that a powerful
Government would finally oppose the
He added that, to this effeot, he kept

the American consul at Hanoi exactly informed of the situatio~~
The policy of buying time practiced by the French authoritiesexasperated

the Japanese.

On September 19, 1940, they

made it known to .Arsene-Henry and .De eoux thet the Imperial Army
would enter Indochina on S$pt~ber

22, whether the military

cOBvention would have been concluded or not.57
Cornered to the final phase, the French authorities,

on

the followiag day, agreed to a compromise, which c.omprised
these, essential elements:
1. Utilization ot tour (or five) air bases in Tonkin;
2. L~itation
to 6,000 Japanese troops to be stationed in Indochin(i;
3. Retreat through Tonkin of a part of the Japanese
troops now in ditficulty in Kwangsi;
4. Landing, on the night ot September 22-25 of tirst
Japanese elements in the port of Hai-phong;
5. Because the Japanese Chief of Staff does not contemplate any more ground operations against China until
new orders, temporary renouncement to the entry of the
25,000 troops provided tor that eventuality. 3e
In this junoture, the Japanese presented to the French
tresh demands. They pretended
at Hai-phong

that the landing of 6,000 troops

and the crossing of 25,000 troops from Canton

through Tonkin would operate simultaneously.
that a Japanese Headquarters

They asked also

would ~e set UP at Hanoi and a

hospital tor the 1apanese troops would be provided. The French
-

-=

36. Decoux, op.cit., p.al
37. Ibid., P. 100
38. ~,P.
111
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considered the demands unacceptable.
There were critical moments.

39
The Japanese militarists

were thinking that Japan could not ever hope to afford the
monumental

expenditures

for navy, army and air foree that

America had been appropriating

and that, therefore, Japan

must strike quickly to attain all its ends before the American prepare4ness

program

waS.

well advanced.

"This radical

clique believes that America can now be defied with impunity
and 8rsues that Amerioa will not accept Japan's challenge as
40

long as Britain so urgently needs American-made

war materials."

So, in a threatening mOOd, the Japanese authorities left Hanoi
and boarded a warship in the Gulf of Tonkin, as war was 1mmtent.

Only Gene.ral Nishihara

On September
stration.

stayed in a hotel at Hai-phong.

~l, 1940, the Japanese Navy sta~ed a big demon-

iut, finally, the Japanese as well as the French,

did not want a fatal break, the tormer tor fear of the UAited
States, and the latter because they were unable to fight alone
against J"apsIl.4l
Consequently,
Franco-Japanese

on September

negotiations

22,1940, in the afternoon,the

resumed.

At 3 P.M., General Nish-

39. ~he French Delegation to tbeFraneo-German
Armistice
commission told General von Stuelpnagel, head at the German
Delegation, that the Japanese demanded the permanent stationing
ot 32,000 troops in Indoohina. IM'rFE,Record,p.6790, as oited
in Jones, Q~.ci~., p.230
40. t§eeoux,O;e.oit., p.112
41. Devillers,02.e1!.,p.77
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lhara at Bai-phong
which was

8

signed th

t xt ot a

nt him·trom Hanoi

ith th

illtary oonv n ion
signature ot General

Martin.

The prinoipal clauses ot the MartiQ-Ni hih r

vention

ere:

eon-

1. Right ot the Japanese rmy to use three air
bases in Tonkin.
2. Right of the Japanese command to st tion 6,000
troop in the North of the Red River;
3. Possibility ot an
ntual oros ing through Tonkin ot Japanese toroes going to operat in the direction
ot Yunnan. Tbe total amount ot troops stationed in Indochina hould not be in any case over 25,000 at the same
time.
4. Passage through the Tonkines d lta, tor the r embarcation, ot the battalion ot Canton now ooncentrated
at th trontier. This movement, howey r, can b und rtaken, by the terms ot the coord, only tter a peoia1
rrang ment which will regUlate th p1 n ot tr nsportatio
ot the torce in qu stion. 42
The text showed c1 arly the surrender ot the Fr nchuth.
oriti s to the Japanese menace.
in

nnouncing

But the Indochine • Government,

the agreem nt by proclamation,

the Japanese only "certain tacilities
.ithout turther delay", in exchang
to respect the territorial
ot Indochina.

ot a military natur

tor Japanes

guarantees

integrity and French sovereignty

Decoux said that the agreament represented

ot the greatest marks of oonfidenoe
another".

said it granted

one country can give

And General Maurice Martin who signed the conventio

termed it "the first manitestation

ot a durable triendship be-

tween Franee and Japan". 43

42.
43.

"one

Decoux, op.cit., p.112
San Francisco Examln!£, September 23, 1940, p.l
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The friendship between the two countries,however,
to be quite precarious.

proved

The battalion or CantoD, mentioned

in

the convention, knew of the ultimatum of September 19, 1940, and
was eager to invade Langson.
convention,

Right after the conolusion of the

in orde~ to prevent any accident, General Nishihara

had sent an emissary to Langson to inform the Japanese battalion
of the news and also of the restriction
through Tonkin.

concerning its passage

The emissary got there on time. But the officers

commanding the Japanese troop di4 not want to receive him. They
carried out, at 10 P.M. that night, an attaok on the French outpost at Dong-dang near Langson.

Suddenly,~ance

and Japan were

at war. 44
Vice-Admiral

Deooux had confidence in the French torce. Ao-

cording to the report given him by the Supreme Commander,Frenoh
troops at Langson could tight Victoriously
but three Japanese battalions.

not only against one

Soon, however, oame the truth.

The French, atter heavy dereats, sought and obtained an armistice at 8 P.M. on September

25, 1940.45

But the victo~s 01' the battl~ of Dong-dang were not happy,
either.

American pUDlic opinion turned strongly against them.

Already on September
in an editorial.

24, the New_York T!ie§ had denounced Japan

It said that Dong-dang was a signpost along

a new road of conq~est whioh Japan may regret advertising
+

44. Gaudel, op.cit., pp.85-8
45. Deooux, 2R..crt., pp 114-0; Devillers,oR.oit.,p.78
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the world in this violent tashion.

Then it declared:

Once more it appears that an unbridled young military oligarchy - the Japanese Nazis - defied the Government this time to follow the example of Russia and
Italy in striking a onoe powerful neighbor when he is
down. But in violating the territory of Indoohina by
toroe, while the Frenoh put up unexpected resistanoe,
Japan not only takes a deoisive step beyond the oonfines
of China. She runs into the opposition 01' the United
States; expressed by Seoretary Hull yesterday, and applies
what may turn out to be the tinal pressure to expedite the
conolusion 01' an agreement between this oountry and Great
Britain tor the Joint use of naval bases in the Paoitio.46
In taot,

On SePtember 23, 1940, Secretary HUll, atter

reoeiving the text 01' the Martin-Nishihara

oonvention, had

stated:
Events are transpiring so rapidly in the Indoohina
situation that it is ~possible to get a olear pioture
01' the minute-to-minute
development.
It seems obvious,
however, that the status ~uo is being upset under duress.
The position 01' the ~nrte
States in disapproval and in
deprecation 01' such prooedures had repeatedly been stated.47
The San Ftanois~_Chronicle

was n0t content with this

attitude ot the Amerioan Government.
it indignantly

On September 25, 1940,

announced:

The State Department at Washington is preserving
an angry silence beoause America is too weak to declare
war and protests are regarded in Tokyo as merely an added indication of weakness it they are not supported y
torce. 48
But the stand 01' the United States against Japan in the
second halt 01' September,1940,

was not that 01' weakness. Al-

ready on the 19th, at the news or the Japanese ult~atum

46.
47.
48.

to
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the French. Secretary Hull had instructed Ambassador

Grew

to inform the Japanese Minister tor Foreign A:f'tairsof the
report and to express to him the great surprise of the American Government

that "the Japanese authorities

in French Indo-

china should have taken action giving rise to this report." 49
On September 20. 1940. Ambassador
structions of the State Department.

Grew acted upon the in-

Tpe Japanese Minister

for

Foreign Affairs agreed that the report was correct. except tor
some minor pGints.

He explained

that the Governor General of

Indochina. ready to si&n an agreement on September 6, 1940. r~·
fused afterward to do it for reasons not evident to the Japanese
Government.

Whereupon.

the Japanese Gover~ent.

i~quiring of

the French Government the Qause ot that uncooperativeness.found
that the Governor General was .l}otacting in good faith.
latter. moreover.

The

had boasted to the foreign Consuls stationed

in Hanoi that he was using obstructive tactics.

For that reason.

the Japanese Government had presented the ultimatum.
~he Foreign Minister

repeated also what h~ said many times

before, namely that the measures

ta~en were designed to enable

Japan to attack Chiang ....
Kai-shek. and that the Japanese. as soon
as the hostilities
china.

have ceased .ould withdraw at once from IndO-

Japan also would respect the integrity and sovereignty

of Indochina,

anq there would be no interference

in the sta~u!

9,uo 01' East Asia.
49.

Forei§n Relations

ot the United States.Japan 11.294
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Finally, Matsuoka

did not object to the idea that there

were economio olauses in the agreement, but gave assuranoes
that exploitation would Dot ensue.
told Ambassador

He still confidentially

Grew that a request was first made by France

tor a renewal of guarantees pertaining

to the integrity of

Indochina, and therefore, "permission had been asked by Japan
tor the move~ent

of forces aoross Indochina and for the use

ot airports as 'compensation'

temporarily

the Frencb request."

tor complying with

. 50

In this oocasion, Ambassador

Grew presented to the Min-

ister the text ot the reply of the Secretary of State to the
"oral statement" of September 14, 1940, of the Japanese Government.

The most telling passage of the reply was:

It is the opinion of my Government that the status
a third country is serlonslY8tfected
when one
two countries which is engaged in hostilities
with another insists, in order to attack the other,upon
the right of the use of airdromes and tne right ot passage for troops through the third country. In the light
ot the Japanese Government's announced desire that the
st!tus guo be maintained in the Pacific area there appears to De an inoonsistency in oonnection with the stipulations of this nature which. are being made upon the
authorities in Indoc~ina by the Japanese Government. 51

Sf2
of
o the

That same day, September

2@, 1940, Under-Secretary

referring to the Japanese activities
minded the Japanese Ambassador

Welles,

in In~oohina, sharply re-

in waShington that "the United

States woul~ ••_.te&l it neoessary to furnish such means ot assistance in the way of supplies,munitions,etc_,

for these vic-

"'-,$
...

',~;

50.

Gr~'4'fen .~&ra .• ;<il8E!!h pp. 330-2
5l.i" Fore.ign Re a:t'ions.
o't the United States,Ja~an,II,296-7
.

-
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52
ggression in the Pacific area as might be required."

ttms of

The American Government

received the text of the Martin-

Nishihara convention on September

22, 1940.

Secretary Hull made the long resounding
lier.

In this connection,

statement mentioned ear-

And because the French Government announced that the

United States had approved the political Franco-Japanese
ment of August 29, the State Department,

in aprees

agree-

release on

September 23, after citing HUll's statement, added:
This Government has not at any time or in any
way approved the French concessions to Japan. The
attitude of this Government toward developments in
French Indochina is as expressed by the Secretary
53
of State this morning and in preVious publio statements.
The highhanded
ed the temperature

oourse of Japan in Indochina really "raisin Wasnington".54

On the same September 23

the so-called Liaison Oommittee, of Which Under-Secretary

Welles

was a member, considered

the problem of providing arms to Indo55
.
china, if Only a few rifles.
About this move to aid Indochins, the ~aa F~ancisc02at2al~1!,

on September 26, announced

on its front page:
In a decision ot diplomatic drama, loaded with tarreaching consequences, the Roosevelt Administr$tion mGved
today to extend its policy to "all aid short of war" to
stiffen Indochina's resistance to J~panese aggression.
At the present moment, Indochina's representative in Washington, Golonel H. Jacomy, is flying the 10,000 miles air
route tro~ the White House to his ~noi headquarters,with
the hot news he has received trom the New Deal spokesmen.56

tt,
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

atterward,

Washington

decided asainat selling arms and

•

Foreisa Relations ~ thetunited staies.Jap!B,
Ibid., II,2 7; aU!l op.c i., I.g07
%iIi T·~~.,l~, Langer,The Undeclared Wa!:,p.20
p.15
San Fr!a2!!co Caroniole,Sept.26,lg40.
p.i

rsra.:

1,881
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munitions,

it was partly because the American

preparedness

was

still at its beginning,

partly because the United states was
afraid that the American aid might go over to the Japanese. 57
On September

25, 1940, other concrete measures were under-

taken against Japan.

The Administration

made it public that,

"to assist China to meet her present foreign exchange needs,the
Import-Export

Bank has agreed to lend China $25,000,000 that

will be liquidated

through the sale of the tungsten."

58

That day, news was abroad that "8 further tightening
the Americane.m.ba~go

on war materials

table' as a result ot Nipponese
fact, on SePtember
strictions

to Japan 'appears inevi-

torays into Indochina".

26, the White House proclaimed

were brought on tbe exportation

scrap effective

October 16, 1940.

of

In

that more re-

of iron and steel,

From that date, "the export-

ation of all grades of iron and steel sCrap will be placed under
the licensing

system". 59

Of course, the Japanese

were ready to oriticize the firm

policy of the United States. Domei, Japanese-News
close connections

with the Foreign Office, declared that the

Japanese Army aad Navy were prepared
intervention
spokesman,

by a thir4 power.

was the result of an agreement

5'7.

58.
59.
Eelations

to counter any uncalled-for

And Yakichira

Suma,Foreign

aaid that, since the Japanese movement

r..

Agency, with

in "peaceful

Office

into Indochina

talks" no foreign

""Pl'!9*'

Langer, Tlte Undec!ar$LWar,
p.15
Foreisn ~eI~tron@ Of the~nit!d
StatesLJ8,!a,II,222
San Franc!ieo ExamIner,September B5.p.7; oreisa
of. the United States,Japan,II,223
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country oould object.

Apparently,

the spokesman was re-

ferring to the American note presented to the Japanese Foreign Offioe on September 20, 1940, in which it was stated
that the American Government

"urges upon all governments

the

employment of peaoeful means o.tU.yin their relationS with all
other regions". 60
Oritioisms of Hull's attitude were heard in the United
states itself. On September 25, 1940, an editorial of the ~

York ~~ilI N!!!, quoted in Congress, ran as tollows:
A sharp statement ~egistering Secretary of state
'Hull's disapproval of Japaa makes United-States-Japanese
relations a little worse than before. This time, Mr.
Hull, WhO, of course, is the Roosevelt A~inistrationts
ofticial mouthpiece in affairs like this, objects to
Japan's grab at French Indo-china.
. .
What moral objection there can be to the grab escapes us. France grabbed 1ndochi~a in 1883, atter 30
years of oft-and-on warfare betWeen the natives and
Freneh missionaires backed by French soldiers. ~rance
is n,ow three-fifths oocupied 'by the Germans, and."the
government of the other two-fitths 01' France has consented to the Japan~se Indoehina grab.
Yet Mr. Hull complains that the Far East "status
guo" is being upset'•••"under duress". What business,uie
that 01' ours? What duty have we to pres.rve the 8~tuS
guo in the Far East? 61
But this isolatienistic

view was not shared by the general

pUblic, who wanted the Amer1ean policy to be stronger. Generally, it was be11eY~d that "our threats without aotion have played dir~ctly into ~he ha~ds of the Japanese militarists,

as cer-

tainly as aetion without threats would have strengthened the

--------,_._--_._ ....
60. The New York Times, Sept.24, lt40,p.11; loreign R!Aations of th~ United [~ates.JaP!Q, I1,299
.
61. COD81eS!tonal ReCor~,76th.Congr.5rd.Sess.,vol.86
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hands of the ant~ilitarists".62
Furthermore,

the new show of strength of the United States

had obtained a quick result. On September 26, 1940, in the evening, just a day atter an armistice was signed on the incident
of Langson, Governor General Decoux received a message trom the
French Ambassador

in Tokyo assuring him that the Emperor had

given an order to the Japanese troops to cease all hostilities,
ot the Army ot Canton would be

and that General Ando,Commander

relieved trom. his co.n:unand.It was also reported that General
of War, who bad backed the solution at

Tominaga, Vice-Minister
Langaon was relieved

of his post beoause ot this. 63

Another action showed the setback of the Japanese militarists in Indochina. On October 5, 1940, the Japanese Commander
at Langson gathered the Frenoh and Indochinese

soldiers. He

knelt in receiving an Imperial rescript which he brought with
respect to his lips.
al kneelings,

He oPened the message, and atter addition-

he read it aloud.

The text, signed by the Emper-

or himself, said that the incident at Langson was an unexpected
event, an error of manoeuvre,

and consequently,

with respeot to the situation as a w~ole.

had no importance

It declared that the

Japanese troops co~ing trom China must evacuate ~apidly and that
the French sovereignty

on Indoohina was incontestable.64

62.

p. 6033
63.
64.

Con&:eseional
Decoux,op.cit.,
Gaudel,o~.cit.,

Record, 76th Cong.,3rd sess.,vol.8e
p.ll?
p. 62
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On the other hand, the Japanese tried to prove that their
coming to Indochina was rea11y the consequenoe of an understandimg between the French and Japanese authorities.
on September

To this ettect,

27, 1940, Japan and France announced a joint-commun-

ique, whioh read:
The Japanese Government has given the French Government an assurance they will respect the rights and
interests of France in East Asia, especially the territorial integrity of 1rench Indochina and the French
Sovereignty over all parts Of the Union,of Indochina,
while the French bave agreed to aecord to the Japanese
Army and Navy speoial facilities in ,Indochina whioh are
necessary tor the execution of the latter's military
operations.
In order to decide upon the ooncrete matters pertaining to the above-mentioned extap.sion of m;Llitary
facilities, conversations were hSld at Hanoi between
the Japanese and Frep.ch military autho~ities.
As a
result of these conversations a satisfactory agreement
was oonoluded ~DSeptember
22. 55
Japan sought elso to consolidate

--

its position vis-a-vis

the United States. ~hat same day, it ooncluded a Pact with
Germany and Italy, a pact which was a r~alization
gram 81'rivedat
26 and 27.

or

the pro-

by the Ja-panese Liaison Conference on July

This was a 'momentous 8chiev~ment

Gex-many as well as of Japan.

on the part of

!litler and Ribbentrop had made

all their efforts to draw tapan to their side, even before
the European war, but in vain.

Each time, when Japan needed

the German help tor its Southward expansion,
a German-Japanes~

military alliance cue

the question ot

up, but Japan always

115
hesitated.

RecentlY,on August 10. 1940, reports from Shanghai

still said that "diplomats arriving from Germany declare that
Hitler is intensely annoyed that Japan bas not formally adhered
to the Axis".

66

The reason tor this indecision. Which lasted so long on the part
of Japan, was that the Japanese Court and Navy circles remained
opposed to any pact which might involve the co~ntry in war with
great sea powers~ especially with the United States. But the
militarists

gained more and more influence in the Konoye cab-

inet, and the Japanese attitude changed with rapidity during
the month of September.

According to Ambassador Grew, the

Tripartite Pact
became a potential consequence of the trend of Japanese policy from the moment of the establishment of
the Konoye Government, but the pact itself came to a
head with unexpected swiftness. A veil of secrecy had
been draw over the proceedings, whioh were carried
on prinoipal1y by Herr von Stahmer, a special German
emissary, in Tokyo, and although speCUlation was of
course rife, very few people in Tokyo had any idea
that the negotiations would evolve so rapidly. 67
The caUSe of the Japanese swiftness in the conolusion
of the pact was complex.

But what played the main role in

Japan's decision could be attributed to its recent ocoupation
of North Indochina.

The above-mentioned

reports from Shanghai

said also that Hitler "Ls even more intensely annoyed that
Japan is trying to enrich heraelfby

attempting to obtain as.

cendency over the colonial possessions
66.

6?

of France and the

The Ne'w York Times, August 11,1940
Grow, Ten Years In Japan, p.332
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Netherlands".

And what Japan mostly needed at the present

moment was Hitler's

suppor

To gain it, the only course

t,

open to the Japanese was to adhere to the Axis.
the Japanese did.

In the end,

Seoretary Hull remarked correctly that

Japan "had held off her signature until German pressure
ceeded in forcing the Vichy Government
demands".

suc-

to accede to Tokyo

68

That the pa~t was aimed at the United states seemed obvious from the text of the pact itself, the third article of
which read:
Germany, Italy and Japan ••••further undertake to
assist one another with all political, economic and
military means if one of ~he three Contracting Powers
is attack.ed by a Powe~ at present not involved in the
European War or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.59
Japan was more preoccupied,

however, with its expansion-

ist program and the German support thereof. Their efforts
were crowned with success, baoaase the Tripartite Pact almost
repeated textually
1, 1940

88

what Prince Kanoye had announced on August

his government's

policy: the idea of a living space

tor the Japanese people, the ~hilosophy

of

8

things, and the plan tor a Greater East Asia.

new order of
The Pact said:

The Goernments ot Germany, Italy and Japan consider
it the pre-requisite ot a lasting peaOe that every nation
in the world sull receive the space to which it is entitled. They have, therefore, decided to stand by and cooperate with one another in their ettorts in Greater East
Asia, and re8iou$ of Europe respectively.
In doing this
it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain
8 new

--------------,----68. Hull. op.cit •• 1,908
69. Document!_on American Foreign Relations,III,305
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order of things, calculated to promote the mutual
prosperity and welfare of people concerned.
70
Of course, the Pact provoked a serious reaction in the
United states.

On the same day, after discussing with the

President, Secretary Hull issued the following statement:
The reported agreement of alliance does not, in
the view of the Government of the United Stat,8s, substantially alter a situation Which has existed for
several years. Announcement ot the alliance merely
makes clear to all a relationship which ha$ long existed in effect and to which this Government has repeatedly called attention. That such an agreement has
been in process of conclusion has been well known for
some t~e, and that tact has been tully taken into
account by the Government of the United States in the
deterri11ningof this eOllntry's policies. 71
The next day, September
announcing

28, 1940, while nswapapez-s were

that nwar in the Pacific between America and Japan

has come measurably

uearer with startling SUddenness", Under-

Secretary of state delivered an important address entitled:
"Our Foreign Policy and National Defense";

Welles affirmed

that the American pOlicy in the Far East differed in no way
from the American policy in relation to other countries of
the world. He referred to the doctrine of "the open door",
then denounced the Japanese endeavor to create a new order in
Asia by the "instrumentality

or

armed foree" and by a highhand-

ed course which clearly showed that Japan alonl "shall decide
to What extent the historic interests of the United States and
the treaty rights ot American
+

70.
71.

citizens in the Far East are to

-

Documents

on American Foreign RelationsLIII,304

HUll, gp.ctt., I,969
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be observed".

In conolusion,

he asserted that from the stand-

point of reason and of common sense, all problems presented
on the Far East could be solved peacefully through negotiations,
provided there existed "a sincere desire on the part of 8llooncerned to find an equitable and a fair solution which would
give just reoognition
all oonoerned".

to the rights and to the real needs of

72

And, it Japan openly sided with Germany and Italy, the
United States would stand by Great Britain.
State Hull indicated this direction

Seoretary of

in his ensuing comment made

on September 30, 1940:
As an ordinary precaution, Japan has had to assume
that whether or not the United States and Great Britain
have express agreements in regard to naval and air base
across the Pacifio and inoluding Singapore, the special
relations between our two countries are suoh that overnight we could easily establish cooperative relations
for the mutual use of all these bases. 73
That same day, Lord Lothian wanted to know the views of
the American

Government about a British announcement

on the

reopening of the Burma road, to be effected on October 17, 1940.
Secretary Hull replie~ that the United States "had pursued a
definite and somewhat progressive
in resisting

line of acts and utterances

Japanese aggression and treaty violations

recent years."

during

Then he emphasized:

72. The New York Times, September 29, 1940,
ed the ad~ress of the Under Seer tary of State as
address: Threat to Indochina Scored in Address by
also Forei&B Rela~ions of United States,Japan, II
73. HUll, op.clt., I,§O~

p.2: It announcfollows: -Welles
Welles". Se.
112-3
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The special desire of this Government is to see
Great Britain suoceed the war. Our aots and utteranoes with respect to the Pacifio area will be more
or less atfected as to time and extent by the question
of what course will most effectively and legitimately
aid Great Britain in winning the war. 74
On its part, Japan was trying to justify its action, affirming that the three-power al11anoe was not aimed at any
partioular country, and appealed to the United states for a
fair understanding.

75

As the Japanese efforts in this sense proved to be of
etfect, at the end the Japanese authorities resolved to
answer threats by threats.

,

On October 5, 1940, Prinoe Konoye

departed . from his usual calmness and uttered the tatal word

ot war.

He deolared flatly that should the United States

refuse to understand the rea~ intentions of Japan, Germany
and Italy and persist in ohallenging

them in the belief that

the recent paot among them represented
gainst the American Government,
open to them than to go to war".

74.
75.

a hostile aotion a-

"there will be no other course
76

HUll, o~cit., 1,911
Foreign R~Iat10ns of the United states~Ja!an,II,172
76. Documents on American FOreIsa ReratIon~,' II, 280

Conclusion

The Road to Pearl Harbor.

From October 1940 to December 1941, the tension between
the United States and Japan grew with the developments
Japanese activities

in Indochina,

of the

until the final break, whioh

resulted in the historic attack by Japan on the American fleet
at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941.
To begin with, the Japanese possessed in North Indochina
a solid foothold for their further advance in other Indoohinese
regions, and consequently

into other oountries of Southeast Asia.

The first step was difficUlt,
accord of September

but they had made it.

By the

22, 1940, with the French authorities,

they

had brOUght into Indochina not only their presence, but also
their military

forces, which were unquestionably

those of France in that area.

Moreover,

superior to

Japan had secured

the support of the Axis Powers by signing the pact of September
27, with Germany and Italy.

What remained to the Konoye Govern-

ment was to go ahead with its program of southward expansion,
despite the opposition

of the United States.

On the other part, the United States, after the "green
lightW message ot Ambassador

Grew, was more convinoed that

Japan wound be deterred only by a tirm policy which would be
express d by completion
restrictions

of American preparedness

ot exports to Japan.

and by greater

But the more the American
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Government took restriotive measures against Japan, the more
the latter beoame irritated and tried to oonsolidateits

grab

on Indoohina and Southeast Asia so to esoape the need of American supply.

Neither country made conoessions to the other.

On October 8, 1940, the State Department warned American
oitizens to leave the Far East.
"precautionary
"suggesting"

It stated that it was taking

steps" tor the safety of the Americans by
that those who were not detained by essential and

urgent businesses

should consider coming out ot "various disturbed areas", among whioh Indoohin was named.l
This step had an immediate reperoussion

in Japan.

The next

day, the Japanese Foreign Oftice at onoe asked Ambassador Grew
about the action of the United States in "ordering" the Amerioans
in the Far East to evacuate.

Ambassador Grew told Vice-Minister

Ohashi that the United States issued no "order" but only a
suggestion as a preoautionary

measure. 2

But the United States did not make any secret of its ohallenging attitude. On October 12, in an address, President Roosevelt declared:
The Americans will not be scared or threatened into the ways the,diotators want us to tollow. No combination of dictator countries of Europe and Asia will halt
us in the path we see ahead for ourselves and tor democracy. No oombination ot dictator countries of Eurepe
and Asia will stop the help we are giving to almost the
last free p~ople now fighting to hold them at bay. 3
~.Forelgn
Relations ot the United States,Japan,II,ll4
2. Grew, Ten Years Tn"7aR,an, p.31S
3. T~ PuDIie PaRers an~ Andresses ot F.D.R., IX,466
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The "almost last free people", the President

talked about

were obviously the British, whose survival depended heavily on
their Empire.

The United States, therefore, firmly opposed

the Japanese actions in Indoohina, mostly in order to save the
British ~pire

in the Pacific.

Along this line, Secretary

Ickes, on October 17, 1940, reminded President Roosevelt that
a real embargo against Japan appeared imperative.
letter to the President,

In his

he said that "we didn't keep Japan

out of Indochina by oontinuing to ship scrap iron, nor will
we keep Japan out ot the Dutch East Indies by selling it our
oil." 4
While the United States was considering the extension
its licensing system, Japan

W8$

inVolved in the border dis-

pute between Indochina and Thailand.
~pose

their mediation,

whiohwas

The Japanese sought to

finally aooepted by the

contesting countries on January 21, 1941.

In consequence,

Franoo-Thai

The outcome of

negotiations

these negotiations

ot

opened in Tokyo.

was that both Thailand and Indoohina were

isolated from the influence ot third Powers and integrated
into the Sphere of Greater East Asia.5
The United States was watching olosely the Japanese activit~es.

It knew that the Japanese soutqward advance was

being pU$hed with all energy by the militarists,

that their

4. Roosevelt Pa2ersLSeoretary's File, Box 58,as cited
in LangerTs,~he
Undeclared War,p.35
5. Deooux,22.cit., p.143; Gaudel,~.oit.,
pp.llO-115
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stranglehold
tensity.

in Indochina eOBtinued with ever-increasing

According to Ambassador

in-

Grew, Japan's acquisition

of naval bases in Cam-ranh Bay, Indochina, was "patent evidence of her intention to acquire jumping-oft tacilities tor
an eventual attack on Singapore".

6

Seoretary HUll, on his part,saw a real possibility

of

danger that could not be overlooked by any peaoeful countries.
This was that the military group in oontrol in Japan,
by a sudden, unannounced movement, could any day send
an expedition to the Metherlands East Indies and Singapore. Or they could, inch by inch, and step by step,
get down to advanoed positions in and around Thailand
and the harbor ot Saigon, Indochina. 7
To oounter this Japanese tide, the United States had
taken a series ot new restriotions:
The proolamation

of Deoember 10, 1940, put under the

licensing system the exportation
The proc1a~ation

of iron and stee1.8

of Deoember 20, 1940, extended the

licensing control to such other artioles and materials as
bromine, strontium, metals and ores, abrasives, equipment
and plans tor th~ produotion

ot aviation lUbricating oil,

eto. ,••••• 9
The proclamation
exportation

of January 10, 1941, regul~ted the

of copper, brass and bronze,zino,niokel

and

potash. 10
6. Grew, Ten Years in Japan,p.369
7. HUll, op.cit., 11,988
8. Foreigq Relations Q!-1he United states~Jai~,II,232
9. Ibid, II 236
10. JO:reiSB Relations of the ~B!~d statesJJa~an,II,238
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In the months of February and March, other proclamations
followed one another in short intervals: on February 4, pro-

ot well and refining machinerY,radium,

clamation on exportation
uranium, and calf and kip
ation ot belladonna,

kins; 11

on February 25. on export-

atropine, sole leather and belting leather

beryllium. graphlte,eleotrod

s. nd aircratt pilot trainers;12

on March 4, on exportation

ot cadmium, oarbon black, ooooanut

and other oils. glyoerine.

shellac and titanium;

phosphates; model.design.photographlc

jute. borax,

negatives, documents or

other articles containing a plan or technical information

of

any kind which oould be used in oonnection with any proc ss
or op ration ot any artioles or materials above-mentioned;
on Maroh 27, on exportation

of 51 additional

13

items. 14

On March 11, 1941, the President had signed the L ndlease Bill, a momentous

aid whioh would help Great Britain

to win the war. 15
On April 14, 1941, another proolamation was announoed,
by Which the exportation
and manutaotures,

of all maohinery,

of theobromine,

of vegetable fibers

oattein, sodium cyanide,

alaium oyanide and casein. 16
On May 28, 1941, the United States established
trol in the Philippine
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Islands.

export eon-

17

Foreiss RelationS of the United States~J eaa~II 241
IbId., II 248,250IbId., 11,252-4
I~,
II 258
TEe New York Times,Maroh 12,1941,p.1
Forei~Relations
of the United StatesL~an,II
260-1
Ibid., II,262
+
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To these Amerioan manitestations
anese reacted in their own way.

ot firmness, the Jap-

Instead ot halting their

conquest, as was expected by the Americans,
to extend it.

they were going

A Japanese weekly journal, the DiEloma2l, had

indicated this direction, as early as on February 11, 1941:
Japan will have to get iron trom French Indochina
and oil trom the Netherlands East Indies, as Japan
has been prohibited from getting ~hem trom America.
What has made the Japanese concentrate their attention
to the South Seas region is the execution ot an unrestricted, blustery policy by the United States. 18
In May, 1941, Japan had ended suocessfully

its mediation

in the border dispute between Indoohina and Thailand.
after repeated meetings and deliberations,
ment reoognized

that a military

was essential and urgent.
course," and,

on

In June,

the Konoye Govern-

occupation ot all Indochina

They proceeded with this "wisest

July 14, 1941, presented new demands to the

Vichy Government with the warning taat it a favorable reply
could not be obtained by July 20, force would be amployed.
These new demands were substantially

that the Japanese should

be al~owed ~o operate necessary land, sea, and air forces in
South Indochina,

to occupy eight air and two naval bases in
the same region. 19
Negotiations

between Franoe and Japan ware opened at

Vichy on July 17, 1941.

The French Government could not do
p.106
t!,chX,Two

18. Otto D. Tolischus, Througq Jaeanese El
19. Decoux,op.cit.,pp.100-3;
Leon Marcnal,
Years or DeceEt1on,pp.128-l30,168
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anything but accept the Japanese proposals.

On July 21.

a rel1minary agreement was signed which was followed two
days later by local arrangements

at Hanoi.

The theme of
20
"common defense of Indochina" was thus established.
Washington was alarmed by these developments.

The

Japanese Ambassador besought the American Government not
to rush to any "hasty conclusion", but the United states
thought it time to retaliate.

On JUly 26. 1941. an exe-

cutive order :froze all Japanese tunds and assets in the
United States.
by the press.

And the new measure was jUbilantly hailed
21

This was a "vioious circle of reprisals

and counter-reprisals".

Farsighted statesmen pessimistically
predicted that "the obvious conclusion is eventual war". 22
But. betore war actually occurred, another vicious
circle took place.
counter-proposals
one another.

It was a succession of proposals and
the United States and Japan presented to

While the American President wanted Japan to

evacuate Indochina "in toto", Japan stated that its troops
would stay in Indochina but would not proceed further.

The

American proposals were unacceptable to Japan. just as the
Japanese ones .ere to the United States.
doo.mod to tailure.
20.

Negotiations were

23

Loc.cit.
Langer, The~ndeclared
War, pp.65l-2
22. Ibid., p765
23. ~.L
His Personal Let~ers, 11,1190; F~reisn Re!!tlons ot the_Unfted ~~!~es~JaPan, ft, 546-550
21.

p. 127

The Konoye Government
It fell, therefore,
by the Government

chose the way ot negotiations.

on October 16, 1~41, end was replaced

of Hideki Tojo,

Cam~ to the Premiership

8

militarist

leader. Tojo

to get Japan ready tor war.

If he

continued to negotiate with the United States, it was only
a device intended to hold ott Amerioan action until the pro24

per tLme tor lapan to begin war.
The United States had

.0.0

warlike premeditation.

pared itself tor war in order to strengthen
Betore the means of negotiations

It pre-

its diplomacy.

wer~ exhausted,

the United

States was caught otf guard by the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, on Dec mber 7, 1941.

But, at that t~e,

the United

States and Great Britain were already in a position to win
the war against Japan. 25
Secretary Hull summarized

the American poliey in 1940

and its result:
It our poliey had shown any signs of weakness or
wavering, Japan would not hesitate to take over all
Indochina and the Netherlands Indies, and p~rhaps
Malaya as well.
Our Far East policy in the months following the
fall ot France gave us another year and a halt in
which to get ready, while denying to Japan many of
the ma~erials needed tor a greater military machine.
It enabled us to extend invaluable help to Britain
so that, when Pearl Harbor o~e, Britain was stronger
than in the summer ot 1940. 20

24. See, tor example, the !ew !2r~ T~es, Ootober 27
and 31, 1941.
25. See, tor example, Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt
and Hopkins, II, 487-528; Winston ChurChill, The Grand

1111890e,
26.

pp.605-606.

Hull. 22.oit.,

1,916
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found in the Appendix .•

U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, in the years 1940, 1941,
1945, 1946.0:rcourse,
it is the source of
oftioial documents to be consulted.
Fl1nk, Wilfred

(edi~), Roosevelt's Foreise Poliol. 1933-1941,
Franklin D. Rooseve1t@' unedIted Speeches
and 'Messages, {New York,WIItred.Funk,I942

Jones, S. Shepard, and MeYers, Denys P., Documents on Am!rican
Foreign Relations, vo1s. iI, III, IV, (Boston,
Wor14 Peace FoUndatio~, 1940,1941,1942).
The documents relating to Indochina are to be
found in the section "The Far East".
Rosenmann, Samuel I., The PU~llc P!~ers ang Addresses at F.D.
Roosevelt. 1944-fgt5, lNew York,MacMllIan,
1946).
Tiedemann, Arthur, Modern Jailan. A Brief.Historz, (New York,
Van Nostram Company, 19,55.' The half of this
book contains documents concerning Japan.
Tolischus, Otto D., Through Japanese !l!!, (New York, Rerna1.
194~). ThIs Is a collection of Japanese opinions as pUblished in different Japanese
periodicals.

B. Memoirs.
Grew, Joseph C.,

!en Years in JaEanL !_OpntemP9rarl Recot~
Drawn from the Diaries and Pr1vate and
Official Papers of :tose2h e:-Grew,United
States Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942,{New
York,S1mon iiid'SOhuster, 1944) A precious
doewnent wit~ a tune contemptuous toward
Japan.
T~bulent Era, A Diplomatic Recordar !21tl
Years 1904=1944,2
vols, TBoston,Houston
Mlffltn Co.,1B2).
Complementary information
~to be found here about the ~erican-Japanese
ml~tions during the period of 1940-1941.

HUll, Cordell,

M!moirs, 2 vols., (New York,MacMillan,1948)
A capItal source of information on the de.
cisions taken by the United states during
the Second World War.

Ickes ,Harold L.,

The.Secret Diarl ot Harold L. Ickes, 3 vols,
TRew York, Simon and sehuster,1954) We use
especially the third volume: The Lowerias
Clou4s, 1939-1941

Welles, Sumner,

The Time for Decision,
Brothers, 1944).

c.
Armstrong,H~ilton

(New York,Harper

and

Books.

Fish, Chronology of Failure, The Last
Days 'If the.French RepublIc, (New York,
MaeMI lan, i941
--

Beard, Charles A., President ~oosevelt_!nd EP~oominf of
the War 1941, (Rew Haven, Yale Un versity Press, 1948)~
Bisson, T. H.,

Japan in_China, (New York, MacMi1lan,l938)
A good account of the Japanese aims in
China.

Canada, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, Indochina,
A Geo6£8£hical A22reciation, (Ottawa,Foreign
Geography InformatIon Serres,mimeo.,1953)
Very valuable stUdy or Indochina in the geographical point or view.
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Fall, Bernard B., Th! Vtet:.M~nh Resil.!!,.Q2vernment a~d A2mini,tra~!n1n
the_Demoerat~e_gepub11e
of
V1et-nam, [New York, Inst1tute ,of PacIfic
RelatIons, 1954
Feis, Herbert

The Road to pearl,~rbPr,
The Comins of the
War between th~ Un~ed states. and,2aiin
(,"ew
b
:ersey, PrInceton UnIversIty Press, 95).
This is a major and indispensable souree for
an understanding of the orisis whioh led to
Pearl Harbor Attack. Many studies are undertaken since 1950, but the work of Feis always
$and. as an insuperable authority.

Hammer, Ellen J. !he Straggle.tor IndoQhina, (California,stanford University ~ress, 1954). This is an
impartial study on Indoohina and espeoially
on Viet-name
Hat, Donn V.

Southes$t Asia !nd the Un~ed state!, A Back~round Pa2er, TNew York, Institute of PacIfIc
elatIons, ~954.) There is a good general
view ot the Indochinese situatiQn from 1945.

Institute of Pacific Relations,.New Z!!.!!nd Papers, (New York
Institute of PacIrIc Relatlons,1954). We
use the paper e~titled: "Colonialism in
Southeast Asia".
, A Brier Political and Economic
--------~h-a·n-~dl':'b-o-o'":"!f-o..,."tr-l:East!!rn
and Southern ASIa, (NewYork Ihstitute of Pacific Relations, 1954

Jones, F. C.,

Japan's_N2W.Order.in Eas~ Asia, Its Ri!!~
Its raIl, 1.937 - 1945, (New York, Oxford
unlveri:fty Press. 195.). A very dependable
study on dapan's expansion.

Kaw~i, Tatsuo,

The Goal
l!!1?!!ne-!!,
Exll~tt!!2.a (Tokyo, The
KOkuseIdores$,
1938

0i

Langer, William L. Ow; Vichy Gatnble,,(New lork, Alrred A.Knotf,
19471. A documented stUdy on the FrenchAme~iean relations du~ihg World War II.
Langer, William L., and Gleason,S.Everett, The Challense to
Isolation 19 7-1 40, (New York,Harper and
Brothers, 1952.
n s is a thorough and ob~ctive stUdy on the American foreign poliey
Qur,lng the critical y~ars before World War II.
The first Indochinese crisis is touched otf
here with a competent hand.
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, The Undeclared
----------------·--~W~a-r-;---i=~9~4~0~-~1~9~4~I-,~(·N~~ew--=York,Harper
and-~rothers,
1953}. This book, complete in itself. follows
the precedent.
Together. they stand as an
achievement of historical research and of
readable narration.
Marohal,Leon,

~tehl, ~o Years of Deceptiog,(New York.Macll~n, 1943. Well documented, but too
severe to the French Government a t Vichy.

MacNair, Harley F., and Leach, DOAald F., Modern Far Eastern
International Relations, New York,MacMilIin
1950} •
Quigley, Harold S. Far Eastern War, 1937-1941, (Boston,World
Peace Foundation, 1942). It has many documents regarding Indochina in Appendix.
E.,Roosevelt a~d HO£kins, 2 vols.(New York,
Bantam ~ook, 1950).

Sherwood,Robert
Werner, Levi,

American-Australian Relations; (Minneapolis,
University of Minnesota PreiS, (1946)
D. Periodicals.

~

.New Inlirnat!.onal Yearb2.2!£,vols., 1939,1940,1941; (New
~ork, Funk and Wagna11s, 1940, 1941,1942)
See "French Indochina".

~

New York Times, trom June· to December 1940. In the issu.e
of August 2, 1945, p.7, there i$ a tu11 text
of the statement of General Georges Catroux,
tormer Governor General of Indochina, on the
events of Indochina in 1940.

The New Leader,
Newsweek, XVI

January 27, 1955. We use the article of Joseph
Buttinger, "Are we SaVing South Viet-nam".
(October 7, 1940) p. 25

San Francisco Chronicle 1940
§!g Francisco

Examine~ 1940

San Francisoo News 1940
~

Magazine,July-December

1940
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II. French Sources
A. Documents
Bornet, Luoien,

Dien-bien-Ehu, (Paris,Documents du Monde,1954)
This fs a collection of documents conoerning
the battle of Dien-bien-phu, in which the
Vietnamese won over the French. Cited im
the Introduction.

Garoon, Maurioe

Le Proc~s ig Warechal,Petai~,Com~te Rendu
Stenogra2hiqu!~
(Paris,Albin Michel,1945)
Concerning Indoohin~ are the depositions:
of Charles-Roux, 249-276
of General Maurice Martin, 758-765;
of General Georges Oatroux,8G7-869

Sabattier, General G., &! De s~in ~ !t ±I!£ochine,~g,yen!t! !1
Documents,-r94l-1951 TParis,Plon,1952) .
Giiieral-Sabattier visited Indochina after
World War I; he cane back to Indochina in
World War II.
B. Memoirs

Charles-Roux, Francois, 2i(~ Mois T~!Bigues !ux !fta~
~~~alares
arIs,Plon 1949f. !he author was
ecretary General in the Foreign Office of
111eFrench Government at Vichy 4uring the
period of which he gives the account.
Decoux, Jean, A

La Barre ~ ~t Indochine, Histoire ~ !2B
Gouvernement General, 1940-1946, {Paris,
Plon, I9iiT7 Thrs-document, of a decisive
importanoe, is not only a historian work,
but contains at the same time many attractive portraits.
The 8utbDr tried especially
to show how, of all the western powers,
France was the only one which could hold
its colonies In Southeast Asia until 1945.

Gard,Maurice Martin~u,
&! Carte Im2eriale, Histoire !! !!
France Outre-Mer, 1940-1945, (Paris Editions
,
Andre Bonne, i'9i9) The author.who was the
Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in
Indochina in 1940, gives here a masterly
account of the aotivities or Georges CatroQx
and Jean Decoux at that time.
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Mordal, Jacques,

Marine Indochina, {Paris, Amiot and Dumont,
I953Y:
book is not only a history ot
the French Navy in Indochina, but also an
account ot the main events ot the Indochinese
history.

Mus, Paul,

Viet-nam 80cio108ie d.tune Guerre, {Paris,Editions dU Seull, 1952T.~he
author lived
in Indochina trom 1927 to 1947. He gives a
sound analysis ot the reality concerning the
movement of resistanoe of 1ietnam against
the French.

Sainteny, Jean

!!!!toire dtune,Fai:x:Manguee, Indochine,lit5
1941, (Farls,AmIot and Dumont,1949). The
author gives a proud account of what General Leclere and himselt had done to reoccupy North Viet-nam in 1945-1947. He
criticized sharply the Americans.

~rs

o.

Books.

Bourgeois, Jacques,Saison Sans. La. ~ance,Des Ja~onaiS au
'VIet-minh,§!i!ien r!, (Firii, 1on,I94§').
~author
wrItes on the events ot 1945
but gives a good survey on tae period
1940-1945
Chassin,Genera1

Chesneau:J:,Jean

L.M., Avi~tion Indo!bine,

(Paris,Amiot
~t Dumont, 1954}.~good
history ot
the French Air Foree in Indochina from
1940 to 1954.

Oontribution a ltHi@tgire de 1a Nation
Vletnamienne,-(Parls,EdrElonsSocialii,
1~~5). This is the most impartial History
of Viet-nam written by the Frenoh.

J2b.r-

Despuech, Jaoques, ~ '!'raticde Eiastr~$, Avec D02W11entf!
tooopies. TParis.De~
Rlves,I953}. In th s
vork, the autho.r reveals the s ea~dal ot the
protiteers of the Indoohinese situation
durin~ the Japanese oeoupation and the
Vietnatnese war.
Deveze, Michel,

La France d' Outre-Mer, De ~, Em-Eire Colonial,s It-Unron-rrinCa~-l938-rq{7;-n>irIs7 Haehette,1945f Verypartial stUdy
an the French colonies.
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Devillers,

Philippe, Histoire du Viet-nam de 1940 a 1952
(Paris; EdItIons dU Seurl, 1952Y. The-author
was the attache ot the press ot General Leclerc. With the Viet-Dam, Speiolosie d'une
Guerra ot Paul Mus, thls"book contrIbutid-greatiy to reveal to the French people the
real situation in Indochina during the 1940's

Geudel, Andre

L' Indoehin~ Francaise en !!£! au JeE1n,
TParls, S~sse, 1947)~ ThIs book-rs va uable
inquiry into the problems ot the FrancoJapanese relations during the second World
War. It is.very into~ative on the year 1940.

La Civilisation Annamite, (Hanoi,Collection
Huyen, Nguyen-van
de la DIrectIon de l' Instruction PUb11que de
l' Indochina, 1944.) Written by a Vietnamese
this book 1s not original, but it is a conscientious work on the Vietnamese oivilisation.
Khoi, La-thanb, Le Viet-nam, Histoire et Civilisation, (Par1s,
Ie~ !ditions de Mlnult7"""l955)•. Thls survey
or the History ot Viet-nam is regarded as
the most ~partial and the most complete ot
all the studies pUbli$bed on this subject.
Laurent, Art.hur La Banque ~ l'Indochine et le Piastre, Avec
lSocWB.!,nts?hO'toC0'2I'is,{pari9;x.es Deux RIves,
1954Y. 4fh1s book gIVes the inside unlawful
praotice ot the aank ot Indochina, which was
said to have bought the French authorities
so that they continued the tight in Indochina.
Marchand,General

Jean Le Dram~ IndOChinoi~, (Paris,Peyronnet
et cie;f95!T7 The author iecusses the Indochinese problems as presented in 1953.

Masson, Andre

Histoire ~ !'Indochine
(Paris,Presses Universitaires de-rrinoe,1950). A briet synthesis written b~ an expert on the matter.

Pouvourville,Albert de, LtAnn~ite,
(Paris,Albin.1932). A
work or propasanda, praising blindly the
colonial policy ot Franee.
.
D. Periodicals.
~s

Temps Mode~nes,XVIII, March 1947,special
!n~oohinese situation.

issue on the

Le Monde, September 8, 1949. In this issue, it was published
a letter ot General Catroux concerning the
eNente or June 1940
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III. Souroes in Vietnamese.
Anh, Dao-duy,

Y!!!:.!!!1! Y!B !!2! ~ onanEl, (Hanoi, Ben-phuong;
l~38

This is the best study of the Vietnamese
culture ever written up to that date. The
title means: !-flis~orz or the Vietnam!!e
Culture.
- ...
Khiem, Pham-duy,

Hanh-dong la-hoi oua Giao-hoiViet-nam.
(Hue, Anphong, 1950):-lTh!s Sooial Aotivities ot the_Catholic Church In VIet-nam,
Ii a lir1e1 study- whfC"h contai'iisa-goo
account on the beginning of the Catholio
Church in Viet-nam

a-

Kim, Tran-trong

Viet-nam SU-luoe, Histar~Gf Viet.nam,
(Hanoi, Tin-VIet, I9'40) fs is themost
popular history text book in·Viet-nam..
The author was Prem1e~ of Viet-nam during
the short period ot independence under
the Japanese, March-September 1945.

Thiep, Luong-due

Viet-nam Tien-hoa-su, (ganai, Lien-hiep,
1950). The Progress ot Viet-nam inquires
into the origin of the Vietnamese people,
their expansion and progress through the
centuries.

Tram, Hoang-thuc,

Lieh-!S Xa-hoi Viet-nam, (Hanoi, Tan-viet
1949). TirsHlstory
ot the Vietnamese
Society is well documented.

